Crises, to go forward. Once again, the facts bear out the rule: Europe needs crises to make progress. Europeans sometimes give the impression of vegetating in a kind of unawareness of what's going on in the world, and of needing a shake now and then to become aware of the need to unite. The draft Constitution remains blocked by differences of opinion without a common gauge of the importance of what's at stake, and legal and police co-operation is static before essentially bureaucratic obstacles, or ones based on national touchiness. After the tragic events of 11 March, everything seems to be moving again, even though nothing has been agreed. In truth, it's too high a cost: why must the blood of innocents and children be spilt to reawaken the spirit of Europe?
Today, even the language has regained a certain vigour, and politicians dare to speak of "challenges thrown down to European civilisation". It has been acknowledged that the Constitution and the fight against terrorism are closely linked. Europe needs the Constitution as drawn up by the Convention to boost public confidence, to give the Union the means to protect itself against those that threaten it, and to create the common area of freedom and security called for by the citizens. One day we will laugh about the inconsistency of arguments forwarded to block the Constitution, if this week's Summit confirms this will to further the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and if it also gives substance and impetus to the fight against terrorists (although it is to be regretted that circumstances have, for the second time, prevented the Spring Summit from concentrating on the objective it was created for and which remains essential, i.e. the implementation of the Lisbon strategy).
Beyond the Madrid attacks. Analysis of the Madrid attacks shows that the terrorists had in fact meant the effects to have been even more bloody and lethal: the bombs were supposed to go off after the train entered the station in question, which would have collapsed onto everyone. The goal was the equivalent of the New York attacks, but in Europe. These aren't the actions of a few warped young fanatics; they imply painstaking organisation, financial wherewithal, and accomplices on the ground. This wasn't just imported terrorism. The conclusions of one newspaper ("Le Figaro" of 15 March) affirms that (our translation): "Islamic extremists are at home in Europe. The youngest are born here (...), the latest recruits have the advantage of European nationality (...). The enjoy all the rights their place of residence gives them, notably that of moving freely from one country to another to raise funds and collect weapons, and to communicate". And one of the Ministers of the Interior who met last Friday in Brussels said: "terrorists find interlocutors and accomplices in the extremist fringes of the 17 million Muslim immigrants". We can see the atmosphere terrorists were able to create.
Confusion, reluctance and mistrust. This time, certainly, Europe is starting to react. The panoply of instruments that the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers discussed last Friday, and which the Foreign Ministers will discuss on Monday, is not inconsiderable. But I'm slightly mistrustful of calls to create new bodies, and even more so of the emphasis placed on extra financial resources. The priority is neither to swell existing bodies, nor to increase bureaucracy, but to know to what extent governments are disposed and determined to use European institutions to develop police and legal co-operation. Friday's Ministerial debates, the statements on the sidelines of the Council, and the basic documents of the Council Secretariat and the European Commission prove that obstacles to effective co-operation are largely political: they are called mistrust and confusion. Europol and Eurojust exist, and they are already costing quite a bit given the use that's made of them, little and poor as it is. The opinion of leaders of the European Parliament provides me with some comfort. Graham Watson observed that "in times of crisis, politicians like to respond by creating new jobs or bodies, but it would be more effective to use what we have". Enrique Baron criticised the reluctance of certain Member States to implement the European arrest warrant and the anti-money laundering measures (see our bulletin of 17 March, page 5).
I invite the reader to look at what our bulletin had to say last week, especially on the two pages devoted to the results of the JHA Council (pages 4 and 5 of the bulletin of 20 March), detailing the measures decided upon by the Ministers- they form a consistent package, with no need for new bodies or extravagant funding- and which also show reluctance, half-sentences, some of which hint, and some of which are explicit, and confidences on the sidelines, all expressing "strong reluctance on the part of most countries' secret services to leave the bilateral framework for the European one".
An eloquent anthology. It would be naïve and populist to get indignant or scandalised about this; it might be more helpful to look for reasons. At the basic level, unsurprisingly, is the fear that secret information confided to the Community machinery might not remain secret for long. Several Ministers talked of this fear, neither agreeing with it nor condemning it. But statements, most of them anonymous, garnered by journalists at the sidelines of the work in Brussels or the capitals, are more frank and explicit. An anthology? Here it is: "States refuse to confide confidential information, which affects their security, to a European factory which is open to all winds". "The exchange of information is highly random; overall, it remains very opaque, especially once you touch upon radical Islam". "London has a lot of information but Scotland Yard isn't very talkative, traditionally preferring exchanges with the CIA or the FBI". A British diplomat's answer: "The EU has no culture of confidentiality; there's no question of entrusting sensitive information to structures which are open to all". More explicitly: "experts on terrorism have nothing to say to each other which you haven't already read in the newspapers". The issue of the new Member States is sometimes raised: "with twenty-five, exchanges of information will not be that far removed from bar-room discussions". According to one newspaper, the countries of central and eastern Europe base themselves on NATO structures in these fields, with the result that all confidential European information will automatically go to NATO. Is this not normal, in the context of the Atlantic Alliance? Or is this something else to get mistrustful about?
A couple of sentences in the Council Secretariat document (which, it is important to note, was sent to the Member States confidentially a few days before the Madrid bombing, and the basic contents of which EUROPE pre-empted in its bulletin of 13 March, p.4) don't say anything very different, although with less brusque wording, when they talk of "the fear of sharing restricted and confidential information with too many others".
A long apprenticeship. Let's be right about it: mistrust and reluctance won't disappear overnight, or in the heat of the moment. It will take a long apprenticeship, it will require people to get used to working together, and for personal links to be established. Mistrust won't be changed into trust by creating new bodies for which Europe is not yet ready (like a kind of European CIA), or by inflating Europol and Eurojust by massive injections of cash; the result would be just to create an even heavier bureaucracy which wouldn't necessarily be any more efficient. First of all, we have to get what's already in place to work, and anticipate achievements which have already been forecast, and plug the gaps criticised in the aforementioned Council Secretariat report. There was something prophetic about this report, which referred explicitly to the gaps discussed by the JHA Council- the implementation of the European arrest warrant, external border control, future biometric visas- and it also stressed aspects which go beyond the JHA Council's scope, but which are still vital, such as the funding of terrorism plank (what Europe has done in the past, it appears, is largely ineffectual), or making sure that anti-terrorism clauses are being respected in agreements with third countries. These clauses exist, but what use are they if nobody checks they're being implemented? On this point, it is the Foreign Ministers who have to act, and the Finance Ministers, within the Ecofin Council, have to act on the financial elements, the importance of which is absolutely fundamental both to block terrorist plans in the EU, and to become aware of the countries and bodies which fund them (they are at least partly known, but there's a long way between knowing and acting).
The non-use of Eurojust's structures by governments is also symptomatic: a good half of Member States has apparently yet to transpose the necessary provisions into their national legislation. It is quite an eye-opener, reading the Council Secretariat's report, as summed up in our bulletin of 13 March.
On the right path. In conclusion, my impression is that the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers picked the right path, emphasising the functioning of what already exists and the anticipation of achievement already forecast, rather than creating new organisms or increasing bureaucracy. All the more so as the list of measures recommended touches upon essential aspects such as the European arrest warrant, measures to cut passport forgery, the effective creation of the European Border Agency, the collection of data gathered by telephone and Internet service providers, the register of people found guilty of terrorist acts. These measures are concrete, operational, and could save thousands of lives. It is to be hoped that the Foreign Affairs Council and, above all, the Summit will confirm and extend the conclusions of the JHA Council.
(F.R.)