A dangerous weapon. I know that I have used the argument of the vanguard, or "pioneer group" throughout the IGC, as a means of pressure for the Constitution's approval, to get the message across to the reluctant countries: if you don't want to move forward, the others will do it without you. But at the same time, I knew that this was a dangerous weapon. Positions or declarations on this, even at the highest levels, prove the existence of a certain level of confusion about the concept itself. Two interpretations exist, with radically different effects;
the first is based on the inclusion of reinforced co-operation (or, in the case of defence, of structured co-operation) in the Constitution itself. The initiatives would then take place within a Union framework. Creating them would be subject to Community procedures, and they would remain open to all Member States wishing to take part in them, subject to certain conditions;
the second option is to set this up on the sidelines of the European Union, under the premise of the Constitution's not being approved, or being hacked to pieces.
Everything, therefore, depends on the adoption of the Constitution, and on its contents. This is why, despite the failure of Black Saturday, 13 December, the Constitution must remain a priority objective, and its contents must remain as the Convention left them. The idea that there's no hurry, or that the EU can do without a Constitution because the Treaty of Nice is there, is dangerous and insidious, because they would lead to co-operation outside the Union. The EU would become nothing but a free-trade zone, a single market, with its uses, no doubt, but devoid of ambition or perspective. The Institutions would be diminished, the Commission, in particular, reduced to a caretaker role. Certain countries would welcome this, because they have never seen the Union as anything else; but those expecting substantial support for their economic development should be disenchanted, because financial solidarity on its own will not be able to survive the shipwreck of other solidarities and ambitions. In particular, foreign policy and defence Europe would not be able to develop within the Union, because reinforced co-operation in the field of security/defence is banned under the Treaty of Nice, and foreign policy cannot exist without defence.
The intergovernmental threat. In a few capital cities, they might be saying: it's no big deal, there's the single market for those with no other ambitions, and the Europe-power for those who want that. But make no mistake, anything built outside the Treaties and the European institutions will be intergovernmental! The Institutions which make up the EU- an independent Commission of Member States with the right of initiative, Parliament with legislative powers- would have no say in anything carried out on the sidelines. The handful of initiatives planned- a joint secretariat, collaboration with national parliaments- would change the intergovernmental nature of the undertaking not one iota. And I do not see how the rights and interests of small and medium-sized countries would be protected in these structures.
Disharmony to overcome. The confusion between the two categories of "reinforced co-operation" explains the disharmony in positions taken. Using terminology borrowed from football, the President of the European Council, Silvio Berlusconi, has opposed the idea of a first and a second division Europe. The President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, has replied that if we resign ourselves to moving forward at the pace of the slowest country, the whole of the Union will be relegated to the second division. The initial haziness distorted many of the later position-taking: most of the criticism of reinforced co-operation centred on the initiatives on the sidelines of the Union, whereas co-operation covered by the Constitution appear, logically, to be admissible. The differences would thus be greatly apparent.
Perplexity in London, clarification in Paris. There are two exceptions, however. Certain British political figures have apparently let it be known that they see the Constitution as neither urgent nor necessary (awaiting clarification), and Jacques Chirac has given the impression that he is raring to get started on the new forms of integration, without waiting for the Constitution to reach fruition. Having stated that "the Brussels summit rescued the prospects for an ambitious Constitution for the whole of Europe", and that "the spirit of the Convention lives", he added: "we want to achieve a Constitution for all Member States by the end of 2004 (...) Reinforced co-operation, which the Constitution should help to bring about, will allow some to act in the absence of a general agreement, without leading to a two-speed Europe. This is entirely in line with Europe's growth: affirming our unity in the respect of diversity".
This is a conclusion to which all could subscribe. But it presupposes that the Constitution exists.
F.R.)