The 1994 initiative of Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble, suggesting a Franco-German federation with possible Benelux participation, is generally considered to be the starting point for plans under discussion today (see this section yesterday and the day before). At the time, the French authorities did not react, and bilateral relations then went through something of a cooling-off period, before their gradual rebirth over the last few years, which (after some other brave attempts that didn't lead to much) led Commissioners Pascal Lamy and Günter Verheugen to jump-start the federal project personally, last January. The project has caused the most ripples in France. Concrete initiatives are mounting up, diplomatic ones (Franco-German common positions for the Convention), operational ones (Eurodistrict, Euroregions, school co-operation), and symbolic ones (Jacques Chirac in an EU Summit speaking on behalf of his own country and Germany). To reassure their EU partners, it was made clear that the objective was not a merger between the countries or an alternative to European construction, that there was no idea of a "board of directors" in the EU, and that it was open to all Member States.
Evolution in defence. How have the States reacted, that have been invited in from the sidelines? Most want to wait and see, which is justified given that nothing has been proposed formally as yet, but some are trying- and failing- to hide a certain mistrust. In the most spectacular field, defence, in which the "two speeds" is a given, this is being played out in the IGC, because the Constitution itself must provide for various degrees of participation. Compared to the situation described on this page on 13 November, a lot is being said about the Italian Presidency's intentions of doing away with the common defence clause ("closer co-operation") in its global compromise. With this sacrifice, the acquiescence of the United Kingdom will be pretty much assured; it remains to be seen how France and Germany will react. To sum it up: most Member States would get involved in a common basis (reinforcement of Petersberg missions, solidarity clause in case of terrorism or of disasters, natural or otherwise, Armament Agency), whereas involvement in "structured co-operation" is definite for the four countries of the "Defence" Summit, and it is under positive negotiation with the UK. Spain wants to be in on it, and Italy seems to be moving in the same direction, and a few positive signals are being sent from various others.
Belgium steps on it. Belgium, in the meantime, has taken a step forward towards a generalised "two-speed Europe", and what a step it was too. A member of the coalition government (the French-speaking socialist party) called upon the government to pronounce itself formally, at next week's parliamentary vote on enlargement, in favour of a structured vanguard should the IGC fail to produce a satisfactory Constitution (see yesterday's bulletin, page 5); Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and Foreign Minister Louis Michel declared that the government had no problem with that kind of commitment.
A Commissioner talks openly. When asked about the consequences of the IGC failing, Commissioner Günter Verheugen answered: "we will go towards a Europe of several speeds, with varying degrees of integration. At the centre, of course, there will be a Kern Europa, a hardcore, possibly made up of a Franco-German federation, which I have already proposed to Pascal Lamy, and which we are getting closer to in practice". At the same time, Mr Verheugen called for faith in the acceding countries. They "must first find their feet in the institutions. Experience has shown that involvement in the institutions encourages them to seek compromise and present their positions in a more conciliatory manner than some of them do at present. The old ones became integrated gradually; the French and the Germans have internalised the spirit of integration. You cannot expect the same behaviour of Poland and the other newcomers just yet". He added, however, that in Poland 'the new generation is well-formed and turned towards Europe".
What they won't accept. I could continue this game of quotations, but I think the main thing is quite clear already: some Member States will not accept that it is possible to enlarge without deepening. If the Constitution, as defined by the Convention, is not approved, they will turn towards the "two-speed Europe", which will then take on a more traumatic character than if we had followed the "differentiation" method put forward by Jacques Delors, involving an unambiguous definition, from the word go, of the objectives of this "Greater Europe". Any government which might try to reduce the substance of the Giscard d'Estaing draft should think about the notably institutional consequences of its attitude.
(F.R.)