Aspects that are still pending in the draft Constitutional treaty, on which this section has been looking at over recent weeks, do not mean that the list of points that the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) will have come to an end. Beyond institutional reform, some governments and especially the European Commission expect to raise other aspects and request amendments approved by the Convention. The Commission will outline its points in the recommendation it will be presenting in September. But President Romano Prodi has already expressed on a number of occasions, notably to the European Parliament, his points of satisfaction (which are many) and his disappointments (quite a few). To my knowledge, it was in the speech of 5 July at the University of Bologna, where he provided his most comprehensive explanations. Perhaps he considered that in front of a University audience he could be totally frank, without being limited by considerations of institutional cautiousness.
Different takes. I won't come back to his overall positive judgement but rather point out that in his opinion, the Convention, "allowed for a movement of reforms to be created, which we had never had in Europe before" and that this had finally enabled everyone to understand the limits to the intergovernmental method. But Romano Prodi did not appreciate the fact that on one occasion the Convention component representing the governments had tried to impose its views, anticipating in a certain way the IGC (where governments alone decide). In his opinion, "a kind of intergovernmental preference was juxtaposed at the Convention, which slowed it down and perhaps even prevented it from reaching a completely satisfying result". Readers of this section know that this is not what I felt at the moment of crisis, when a number of representatives from the governments tried to block institutional reform by affirming that in this aspect, the Convention should keep to the Treaty of Nice. I rather had the impression of a sharp and determined reaction from the other three components of the Convention, which overcame most of their divergences in order to obtain consensus on the draft propertied by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, which was revised and improved by the Presidium. The President of the Convention felt that this was a "spanner in the works" and he added, "the Convention has lost is autonomy in relation to the governments and has lost its power of imagination just when reform of the institutions is being discussed".
Romano Prodi's disappointments. Whatever they are, here is the list of aspect which the President of the Commission considered as disappointing and I mention them in detail as he will be taking part in the IGC.
1. Institutional Reform. "the solution for a permanent President, which is not subject to direct democratic control, national or European, could give rise to a new executive centre, aggravate existing fragmentation and create serious co-ordination problems with Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Commission President"; b) on the composition of the European Commission, Mr Prodi was reticent about the Commission in which half of all Member States would not be represented with voting rights and he thought it, "preferable to keep the principle of one Commissioner per country". Nevertheless, he did add, "naturally, this needs a more powerful and autonomous internal organisation" with "cores" and a certain number of "Commissioners groups" led by the Vice Presidents (see this section yesterday).
2. Maintaining the unanimity rule. Romano Prodi considers it unacceptable that the unanimity rule has been kept "in areas such as external policy (if another crisis like that of Iraq break out tomorrow, the Union would be once again divided), defence and taxation". On the question of taxation, the transition to majority voting is indispensable, as well as for "issues that have an impact on the efficient functioning of the single market and which create unfair competition".
3. Common policies: "We are proposing an update of the policies that weren't discussed by the Convention. It will be in fact difficult and dangerous to leave provisions drafted in 1957 in the Constitution and which have never been updated since, like, for example, those on agriculture or free movement for goods and services. We will therefore be adding our contribution".
4. Other Constitutional treaty revisions. "It is desirable that a simpler mechanism for amending certain parts of the Constitution is introduced". Mr Prodi then explained to the European Parliament that, except for fundamental modifications, such as accession of new Member States, it would be necessary to reach decisions by qualified majority voting because, "I cannot imagine how it will be possible to adapt the Constitution to the Union's new requirements, in the absence of a revision procedure based on the rule of majority. Nothing can be reformed unanimously".
5. The entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty. "It is absolutely vital that in the Constitution itself, provision is made for the mechanism to be used in case of non-ratification of the new Treaty by a State. What would we do if this happened? Would we once again have recourse to the solutions of the Treaty of Nice, perhaps the saddest moment in the Union's recent history?"
Romano Prodi also told the European Parliament that the Euro is still not being represented efficiently and coherently at international level, and confirmed that in September, the Commission will put all the points of the negotiating table, by giving its "opinion".
Each point made by the Commission President merits a brief comment.
The Commission, once again. In the area of the institutions, it seems to me hard to call the permanent Presidency of the European Council into question without re-opening discussions on reform as a whole. Wisdom suggests that efforts should be concentrated on the clear de-limitation of the new President's competencies, his role as chairman, the lack of any new administration at his disposal. These are the points that the Convention has already looked at and discussed in detail, and we must be careful to avoid re-treading the same path (which would lead either to the same results, or to complete disagreement). As for the European Commission, I mentioned that yesterday, so apologies to my patient readers. I believe that the draft retained by the Convention is not enough, and that further deliberation is vital. I even wonder whether this draft really has met with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's approval, as it seems to me far removed from the principles he announced. He stressed with some energy that the selection of Commissioners should not depend on their nationality; national borders must not be factors in their appointment, but the mechanism contained within the draft is firmly anchored in the principle of nationality, via the norm of "equal rotation" between Member States! In an interview, he said: "when six new Member States join us from former Yugoslavia, does that mean they have to have six Commissioners, like the founding countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux three)? Well, that is exactly what the existing draft prescribes!
Illusion-free foreign policy. Talking of the gulfs in moving across to majority voting, Mr Prodi mentioned foreign policy (CFSP) and defence policy (ESDP). For the latter, I find the Convention's result positive: it does not introduce a majority, which would prove illusory in the Union as a whole, but it provided the instruments which will allow such countries as want to, to make progress. This is wisdom itself, because the Europe of defence cannot be created by 25 players. For CFSP, I disagree with Mr Prodi and his advisers, who think that a common foreign policy can be born of majority-based mechanisms. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has had some wise words on this subject, and Jacques Delors warned against the misapprehension that common policy can be imposed by a majority. The only way is to get used to reasoning and working together, until majority rule is an option, and in the meantime, act together when there is agreement. This is a subject I intend to come back on. I do not believe that the IGC can change any part of the existing draft.
On taxation policy, on the other hand, Mr Prodi is quite right: majority is indispensable for certain aspects (which VGE has acknowledged). But it is virtually impossible for the United Kingdom to change its mind, even if the disagreement is largely down to misunderstandings (see this column dated 26 June).
Updating the Union's common policies is desirable as it can be done on a technical level, eliminating dead wood without claiming to be too innovative; the IGC could then act efficiently and practically without debate. If, on the other hand, one hopes to introduce highly-detailed innovations this way, the game would become risky, and endless discussions could be opened. The Constitution can open doors, but it cannot define the content of common policies.
Entry into force and revision. The introduction of a simplified procedure for future changes to the Constitutional Treaty without having to have each case ratified by the parliament of each Member State has been long discussed by Convention Members, and many amendments along these lines have been tabled and debated. But consensus seemed impossible, and unfortunately I do not think the IGC will reach one either. The Commission should perhaps propose one in its opinion, for the principle, but avoiding making a "casus belli" out of it.
Lastly, what can I say about the fundamental problem of the entry into force of the Constitution and the need to make sure that the chance of a single country voting "no" does not cancel out all the Convention's work, and the hopes that went with it? I believe I was on of the first to highlight how real this risk is, and that it must be avoided. But Valéry Giscard d'Estaing explained that this subject was not in the Convention's competency. It unquestionably must be discussed at a higher level, but as a post-script to the Constitution.
(F.R.)