It is not only a question of timetable. I fear that the Convention may not manage to get beyond the crucial moment it is going through unless the Convention Members also succeed in a perilous, albeit indispensable, task of putting minds at rest. This exercise consists in internalising the idea that the current and future Members States of the Union do not experience the same need or urgency to consolidate European integration. In other words, the degree of integration desired is not the same for all. You may say that this is nothing new. That's true. What is new is that it must be understood that the difference of ambition is not a dividing line on one side of which you have "good Europeans" and, on the other, "bad Europeans". There are quite simply different situations influenced by history, tradition, geographic location and the nature and mentality of the different populations. Ambitions and motivations are different, and each and everyone must seek to understand the reasons given by the others.

The case of Germany. Let us look at a few symptomatic examples. Since the end of the war, the leaders of Germany, after its return to democracy, have dreamt of a highly integrated continent so that the German citizens' vitality, capacity for work, spirit of discipline and other characteristics may be strongly and definitively integrated in a united Europe. On 23 May 1950, as he learnt of the "Schumann Declaration" on the creation of the first European Community and the first supranational Authority, Konrad Adenauer declared that, if he managed to achieve this plan, he would not have lived in vain. The same goal inspired successive Chancellors, from Willy Brandt to Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl. Germany no longer wished to have an army able to fight beyond national borders unless strictly within the framework of a European army. This "European" concept of the country went well beyond the military sphere, moreover. Helmut Schmidt, who explained why he wanted the DM to be taken up into a European currency (although public opinion, bankers and businessmen in Germany were all against the idea) wrote: "I do not want the German currency to overwhelm the others, at the risk of causing frustration and a coalition against Germany". Even today, the German authorities recommend strengthening the European institutions to the detriment of governmental powers.

Reasons put forward by France and Belgium. The reasons expressed by France are different but just as strong. This country has in its genes the ambition to play a role in world affairs, but its leaders (other than a small group of "sovereignists") are aware that this is no longer possible as "France" but only as "Europe". European Commissioners Pascal Lamy and Günter Verheugen launched an appeal in a joint article published in France and in Germany, for full French-German union, as a vanguard to a definitively integrated Europe.

And what can one say of Belgium? Last century, it was twice caught between France and Germany, invaded and overrun in wars that did not concern it. The only road to peace and security lies in an integrated Europe, with the guarantee of strong supranational institutions.

The British tradition. The situation of Great Britain is quite different. Threats to its freedom have always come from the Continent and twice during the last century it owed its salvation to the United States. It is hard to efface this from the memory of the people. But reason proves that the situation has changed and that it is precisely Europe's unity that represents a definitive guarantee. But some things continue to lie within a people's subconsciousness, putting a brake on the degree of acceptable integration. Several key British politicians have understood this evolution and are fighting for their country to become a part of all aspects of integration. Andrew Duff is not on his own. But the attitude adopted by the British press and the continued reticence on the part of the public force the government to hesitate and waiver. Sometimes, the speech by Winston Churchill on 19 September 1946 is quoted as proof of the resolve for European integration, but the close union that he recommended only concerned the countries of the Continent with his country being represented as a separate pole (to use a term now in fashion) with the Commonwealth. Also, in 1952, Anthony Eden reaffirmed how impossible it was for Great Britain to sign up to any suggestion of a continental federation. Part of the British press gives the impression, by its inflamed tone, of repeating the battle of end 1958, when the British government accused the "Six" of wanting to break Europe apart with their intention to create a common market.

The work of understanding must be mutual. One could go on citing examples and analyses for a long time, putting the different Convention countries on one side or the other. But this would be a pointless exercise, as we shall see what we all want. For now, it is important to understand the need to renounce mutual accusations and to simply note that the Member States of the Convention do not share the same ambitions and the same goals. What conclusions should be drawn from this objective statement of fact? It is my personal opinion that there is no doubt one should respect the rule, often stated but rarely followed, whereby no European country should be able to compel another to take part in an exercise that it does not wish to be part of, but neither has any country the right to prevent the others from carrying out such an undertaking. This is a rule that is not easily accepted by all, and there are those who uphold the opposite thesis, whereby those who wish to move forward without the agreement of the others are those who cause a divided Europe. Allow me to name two supporters of this position: Ralf Dahrendorf, who was European Commissioner of German nationality during the seventies, and Antonio Martino, currently Italian Defence Minister. But I believe that, although it is desirable for each of us to make an effort to understand the position taken by one's neighbour, this effort must be reciprocal. We must understand the British position, and be aware of the reasons that lie behind it and respect them. But the British, and those who share the same reticence, must for their part understand the reasons that make Germany, France, Belgium and other countries unable to agree that the enlarged Europe should become no more than a trade area without personality and without ambition.

A project with options - return to ineffective IGCs. It is true that ambiguity and things left unsaid have not at times prevented major progress in the building of Europe. The Union did not set itself a deadline for arrival. It navigated on sight, under the sign of pragmatism. The British, moreover, have made a valuable contribution to progress made. It is enough to recall the constructive and effective work achieved by Lord Cockfield in favour of the completion of the single market. I believe, however, that this time is past, and that nowadays the sentence by Seneca (introduced by Philippe de Schoutheete in the Community debate) is more valid than ever: "Ignoranti quem portum petat, nullus ventus suus est". This phrase may remind readers of something written a long time ago in this column as, almost two and a half years ago, I had provoked an academic (and friendly) competition to find the best translation. Without reopening the competition, I would like to cite the simplest and clearest translation (which, of course, has nothing of the elegance and conciseness of the original): "no wind is favourable to he who does not know which port he wants to be carried to". At the current stage of European construction, with the date for entry by ten new Member States now fixed, the port of destination can no longer remain lost in the mist. The port of destination is the European Constitution, a Constitution that has opposite ambitions to those still recently preached by the British Minister for European Affairs (see this column of 8 May). Limping, deficient, malicious compromises would leave a trail of dissatisfaction and bitterness behind them, a feeling of frustration among those (who would regret having given way on too much) and others (who would regret the incomplete path taken). I denounced the manoeuvre that is taking shape in this column on 17 May and also in that of yesterday. It consists in having the Convention present not a complete consensual text but an incomplete text with different options on fundamental aspects. It would be to avow failure of the Convention and a return to classical and ineffective Intergovernmental Conferences.

Accepting the principle of a two-part Europe. So what is the outcome of this? I can only see one - acceptance of the principle of a "Europe in two parts", not in the sense of a Union of first and second category, but in the sense of a base that is common to all, completed by additional construction intended for those who can and who want to take part, and of course open to all Member States. The accusations or insinuations that this formula smacks of discrimination would not be justified. It is exactly what exists today for single currency, which would not exist if we had waited for everyone to agree to join. We should take as a base the vision of Jacques Delors, who calls it "differentiation", whereby the single base represents what is essential with its three objectives guaranteeing: a) peace and security; b) economic cohesion and solidarity; and c) respect of national identities. The rest is not compulsory, and yet it is indispensable for some.

At this point I wish to cite Jean-Louis Bourlanges who said: "The first question is not that of Union enlargement but of Union narrowing: are we willing to pay the price of clarifying the European Constitutional Pact and accept the idea of internal division (in the Convention) between those who agree and the others? (…) The proposal which tends to allow the future Constitution to see the light of day even without unanimous ratification would have major consequences: the possibility for Europeans not to come into line with the most sceptical and the most cautious of their partners".

I could not have said it better. Let everyone decide for themselves, even if I consider that it would be possible (and preferable to division or to additional construction on the fringe of the Treaties) to agree on a Constitution valid for all, a Constitution which itself provides for "differentiation". (F.R.)