How many countries of the enlarged Union will take part in the "European Union of security and defence" proposed by the Four at the mini-summit of Brussels? It was with this question that I finished this section yesterday, proposing to return to the positions of Spain, Italy and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the exchange of views of the 25 at Kastellorizo appears to have brought wisdom and balance into the debate (see our bulletin yesterday p 6).
Spain's two conditions. The Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister (and Convention Member) Ana de Palacio clarified the position of her country in an official document (see our bulletin yesterday p 9). Spain supports all the suggestions of the Convention's "defence" group and most of the guidelines in the "declaration" of the Four: solidarity clause, extension of Petersburg missions, mutual defence clause, institutional strengthening (but she does not mention the operational measures decided on by the mini-summit). Ana de palacio, nevertheless, has formulated two demands: that the links between Europe/USA, as well as EU/NATO cooperation are strengthened and that the process is brought into the EU institutional framework as only a policy defined in this framework could be considered as "European". If she is successful on the two aspects, Spanish support for the projects in discussion would not be in doubt (but this does not exclude the possibility of reservations on certain proposals by the Four, notably those on strategic air transport, the European Head Quarters and the possible "European preference" in weapons matters).
The Italian mist. The case of Italy is more nebulous as there have not been any explicit lines taken by the government. The reason for this silence is said to be because of the Italian government not being obliged to reach any clear position at this time (not on defence or on other controversial cases) as it will have to play a mediating role at the Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) when it takes over the Presidency (and therefore the ICG). I don't think that this justification explains everything. In fact, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Franco Frattini, is still currently seeking a suitable orientation and will have to deal with the Minister of Defence, Antonio Martino, whose anti-European positions are well known (when he was Foreign Affairs Minister he opposed the Euro). And especially the attitude of Silvio Berlusconi, which is far from being transparent. Fortunately, there is a pro-European feeling diffused in the country and in a large part of the political class (with the President of the Republic heading this layer).
Overcoming bitterness. I have already had the chance to explain the positions of Central and Eastern Europe as much as possible. They need NATO for their security and for those for whom accession to NATO is not yet formalised, realise that this formalisation goes through the US Congress and it is not the moment to alienate its sympathy. Added to this demand is, in the majority of cases, a real link of recognition and admiration for the USA, which is totally normal. Former Polish Foreign Affairs Minister, Bronislav Geremek has recently written ("carte blanche" in the "Le Soir", Brussels 1 May): "let's say it clearly: a the current time, there is not other organisation outside NATO, no other supranational body which is capable of providing us with this rare commodity, this feeling of security". The commentaries that accompany this logical observation are less justified. After singing the praises of the USA, Mr Geremek adds, "We haven't forgotten Munich and we remember the often indifference of your countries to the world of the gulag and the destiny of the enslaved peoples. Under the Nazi occupation, as under Soviet domination, the words, order reigns in Warsaw, signed the tacit agreement of the West with the oppression of which we were the victims". Moreover, it is obvious that the European Community represents the overcoming of these sad memories: our countries have done it, the new Member States will also do it. And they will understand that European solidarity, with participation in the same institutions, involves global, economic and political solidarity.
Worries about the British attitude. What has happened does not exclude certain countries in Central and Eastern Europe from feeling, in the domain of defence, closer to the British positions than to that of the "Four". The attitude of the United Kingdom will, therefore, be largely determining. Tony Blair's theory, according to which the USA and Europe have to constitute a single pole in the world together in the future, raises a number of worries. It brings us to the eternal problem of knowing how London sees the Europe of the future. I will attempt to examine some recent development tomorrow.
(F.R.)