VGE is not naïve. Is the hope of seeing the Convention reach a consensus for a draft for institutional reform in the middle of disappearing?. I'm afraid this could be happening. I see Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's draft as "provocative proof". VGE is, however, not being naïve, he was aware that his draft document would stir up some lively opposition. The way in which he launched it (informing the press about it without even discussing it at the Presidium) already indicated the desire to provoke and assess reactions. The intensity of the reactions has already superseded expectations. The more moderate reaction of this section has been rather surprising (and sometimes disappointing, I know) coming from a consistent supporter of the "Community method" (I'm speaking about me), but my goal was to first of all understand the nature of the VGE's message.
I don't believe in the Machiavellian interpretations according to which VGE would have pushed his "intergovernmental" choices to the extreme in favour of the large countries, in order to give himself room for manoeuvre that would then allow him to drop the excessive provisions, while keeping to the essential part of his direction. I don't believe this because I continue to believe that his essential ambition is the success of the Convention and subsequently be seen in history as the man that gave Europe a Constitution. Neither has he ever hidden a certain disdain for the sensitivity, in his opinion, exaggerated in institutional matters. He considers (wrongly in my opinion) that the debate on this subject essentially represents a "row about power", with each participant concerned with defending his prerogatives or grabbing new ones and that the "European people" are barely interested in it. VGE thinks that the essential aspects of the Constitutions are elsewhere: improving and consolidating the economic acquis and the new aspects for supporting foreign and defence policy and the freedom, security and justice area.
"You don't agree amongst yourselves…" What was, then, the message that VGE wanted to send? We have to start from the lessons of the Athens Summit. He observed that the Heads of Government were demanding that the Heads of Government were demanding respect for the 20 June deadline for the conclusion of the Convention's work and that different positions on the institutional structure were very different. For example, the "President of Europe" is demanded by the large countries but rejected by the small countries, by the European Commission and a considerable part of the European Parliament. VGE is therefore proposing it were a few modifications that in spirit, should mitigate worries: a straightforward "Chairman", without executive powers nor administrative staff, accompanied by a Vice President for facilitating respect for geographical balance etc. The message was therefore in the following vein, "My dear Convention members, there is not agreement among you, I suggest a set of compromises for you. If you go in my direction, it will be possible to define a common project. If you all stick to your own positions with time running out, there will be no common consensus and we will be obliged to send Heads of government two options, with negotiations being transferred to the IGC". Only this kind of logic can explain the kind of unusual way of opening the debate. His presentation of the draft (already amended by the Presidium) to the Convention members during the plenary was, however, quite clear: "You don't agree among yourselves…, but, nonetheless, we need to build a common framework" (see our bulletin 25 April, p 4).
Unusually sharp level of opposition. The response to the message was negative. With just a few exceptions, with the reactions from the small countries and the supporters of the "Community method" being much harder than expected, with the European Commission press statement and that from Jean-Claude Juncker speaking for the small countries and the positions by several MEPs (an eloquent anthology of positions appears in our bulletins of 24 April pp 6-7 and 25 April pp 6-9). The tone was of an unusually acute level of opposition. The Commission has accused VGE of not having respected the results or the debates of the Convention and the Athens Summit. Jean-Claude Juncker considered that all the proposals by VGE were unacceptable (except for the setting up a European Minister for Foreign Affairs); Monica Frassoni thought that the proposals were a "slap in the face for democracy" and the list goes on. My conclusion, and I said it in the beginning, is that the fracture will be reduced with difficulty to several weeks and an institutional draft that gains consensus will not be produced by the Convention by 20 June. But I'm aware that this conclusion is not shared by all. There are some Convention Members who believe that there are still possible compromises that could obtain the essential consensus (which does not necessarily mean, as we know, unanimity).
Some errors of assessment. Before taking into account the opinion of the optimists and their reasons, I'll sum up my impressions on the attitude of VGE. I don't agree with those who see a Machiavellian trap set for his enemies to fall into but I do think he is mistaken in some assessments. For example, the formula for a permanent European council Vice President, represented in spirit, a concession to the small countries, guaranteeing them a role at the Head of the Summit. The same goes for the Summit Bureau: more functions meant, in his opinion, more opportunities for equilibrium. In reality, this heavy construction was unacceptable because it would have killed the Community method and taken away the weight of the European institutions in regard to the European Council. One only needs to look at the composition of this bureau to understand its effects. It would have brought the President and the Vice President of the Summit together, two Heads of government in rotation, the European Foreign Affairs Minister, the President of the Ecofin Council and that of the Justice and Home Affairs Council. A genuinely restricted and all-powerful EU government in whose regard the European Commission would not have much weight. This construction was demolished by the Presidium, there is no theoretical chance of a bureau bringing three Heads o government together.
Understanding the Commission. Why has VGE got himself lost in this way? I think that those who say that he has never completely understood the role and function played by the European Commission in the history of a united Europe are right. Always committed to the construction of a "European power" side by side with a "European area", he does not appear to see the possibility of a Head of government who, hoisted into the Community boat, would row in the opposite direction and defence of the Community method appears to him like a modern form of combat for power, with its pettiness, alliances and betrayals. But he has, nevertheless, accepted the arguments of the members of the Presidium and given up on the idea of a Summit Vice President and a seven member bureau. This was the same for other aspects of his institutional project. He is, therefore, open to certain arguments and is not closed to compromise.
The optimists' reasons. I thus arrive at the arguments of the Convention Members and other players active in Community life who believe that it is still possible for the Convention to define a single institutional project. The first argument is quite rightly the scale of the amendments introduced by the Presidium in the "Giscard project". Inigo Mendez de vigo, MEP and member of the Presidium, gave a broad account to the European Parliament institutional committee by listing the most significant changes (see our bulletin of 25 April p 7). It is all the reports on the work of this committee that should be read both for the quality of the contributions made by its Chairman, Giorgio Napolitano, and other MEPs because they pre-figured the debate that will be taking place in mid-May at the Convention (this report can only be found in our bulletin pp 7/8). The second MEP on the Presidium, Klaus Hänsch, did the same with regard to other aspects. The EP could reject the president of the Commission proposed by the summit (which will then be obliged to propose another candidate); the Commission will not be "accountable" for its action to the European Council but to the EP alone. The Convention Vice President, Giuliano Amato mentioned the getting rid of the indication according to which the European Council would be the "supreme body" in the Union; a limit to the competencies of the Summit President; indications on the Commission's powers. Opinions that go against those of the "Giscard project" - its perfectly possible to amend it.
The second argument is therefore the opportunity for the Convention to introduce other important modifications to the current project. Inigo Mendez de Vigo declared, "the text of the Presidium is radically different to that of the President, and the text the Convention will produce will again be something different". He has already announced two amendments that he will proposing himself: "team presidencies" for the Council and the possibility that the President of the European council is a "moral authority" (without the demand that were Head of a government from a Member State). Sixteen MEPs making up the EP delegation at the Convention are also going to prepare a "common position". If it succeeds, it will provide a signal as they represent all the different political tendencies of the Parliament. It was again Inigo Mendez de Vigo who took this initiative by announcing "we go on the attack". Good luck, as among the "sixteen" are also the supporters of the "President of the summit", as well as his adversaries and the Euro-sceptic Jens-Peter Bonde etc.
Two conditions that give hope. I remain sceptical, as the divergences are two deep-seated and have been expressed with too much vehemence to leave no traces behind. In any case, I believe that the possibility for Convention consensus on a single text necessitates two conditions: a) more flexibility regarding the deadline/guillotine of 20 June, which appears imposed by some of the Heads of government who did not want the Convention to tie their hands with a single text for consensus; b) a defrosting of the relationship between the large and small countries because when the quarrel degenerates into a question of prestige, there is no longer solution (just as Jacques Delors stressed, see our bulletin yesterday pp 3 and 4). In absence of these two conditions, the most wary governments will therefore have their hands freed and the sad scene of the most recent IGCs will be on offer again. (F.R.)