Imagination and precautions. To criticise Valéry Giscard d'Estaing for not having made everyone happy would not have much sense. If a sizeable number of countries are calling for a full time, long-term President of the European Council and an even larger number of countries are opposed to the idea, whatever the proposal, there will be those left dissatisfied. We can say the same thing about the composition of the European Commission and the list goes on. The only valid criteria for assessing the institutional reform draft submitted by the President of the Convention to the Presidium (summarised in the following pages) is to ask how far this idea for reform takes into account the different positions and defines, while executing certain unavoidable choices, the compromises likely to result in the necessary definitive consensus. From this point of view, my impression is that VGE has shown imagination and has taken the maximum of precautions for taking into account the positions that are at times contradictory.
A President who's not alone. Let's take the example of the President of the European Council. Such as had been described in the different positions supported by the United Kingdom, Spain and, under a somewhat different guise, by Spain and France, it was sharply rejected by most of the small countries and EU institutions (European Parliament, Commission), who criticise him of breaking the institutional balance that forms the basis of the Community method. VGE then added a large number of riders and corrections to the draft, which in his opinion, ought to be able to iron out any fears. The President of the Summit would have the functions of a "chairman" and above all, he would be accompanied by a Vice President (we understood straight away that if the President came from a big country, the Vice President would come from a small country or vice versa), he would have no administrative staff, he would have no decision-making power, he would chair the summits but wouldn't take part in the voting (in the sense that his positions would not contribute to obtaining consensus). And he would also not be alone, he would have a new body to back him up: the European Council Office. Someone is bound to ask, if so many precautions are necessary, then why not simply give up on the idea of a long term, full time President? We already know Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's response: in his opinion a certain continuity at the head of the Union is indispensable for ensuring effectiveness and Europe's profile. He's not alone in sharing this opinion; Jacques Chirac was clear that with 25 Member States, maintaining the six monthly roster would be really ridiculous and it would in that case be better to give up on the idea of a European Council.
Small countries' mistake. The aspect in VGE's draft that is likely to provoke the most virulent reactions and criticism is that on the composition of the Commission, with its thirteen members and twelve "advisors". But I think that the small countries are partly responsible in the choice made by VGE . By demanding a "Commissioner for every country" without any suggestion of how to keep balance in this monster of 25 Commissioners where the weight of the large countries would be negligible, would be both illogical and unreasonable. Either the Commissioners have no link with their countries of origin and their nationality would therefor have no importance and it would be necessary to respect a certain geographical equilibrium or the link exists. It would be absurd that Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Slovenia and Estonia (total population of less than five million) is identical to that of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. Even in the High Authority of Jean Monnet, France and Germany had two members each (and the other countries one). In today's Commission, the five countries mentioned are represented (a term that is not very precise but is clear) by ten Commissioners out of twenty. In he future Commission, their presence will be reduced by half, and the number of the small and medium countries will be doubled. The Constitution has to correct the stupidities of the Treaty of Nice and not set them in stone if we want the Commission to keep and strengthen its powers. Some attempts to reform the way the Commission works have been looked at (by Robert Toulemon and by Roberto Prodi, himself), but the small countries have not responded being primarily interested in their own representation. This has ended up with the Giscard draft, which will certainly not be retained as it is but is indicative of a certain trend.
VGE not giving up on his Congress. In VGE's draft proposal, it is still necessary to highlight the introduction of the "double majority" in the debates at the Council, which decides with majority qualified voting 'this is a revolution) and the precautions aim to get the idea of the European Congress accepted by all who oppose it. It won't be a new institution but an element in the "democratic life" of the Union and will be prepared on the basis of requests for possible amendments of the Constitutional Treaty. It won't have any real powers (appointment of the President of the European council) apart from when Member States decide.
The hunt is now on, the Commission has taken the first shot (see page 6). (F.R.)