Yesterday's readers of this column, who had the patience to go through my attempt at summarising the first real official debate on the fundamental choices for Europe, will wonder about the lessons to be drawn from it. The question is that of knowing whether an enlarged Europe aims to be a political and economic entity, with its cohesion, its common policies and its solidarity extended to foreign and defence policy, or whether it will be diluted into a free trade area, which is no doubt important but of quite a different kind compared to the project of the founding fathers. In my opinion, it is possible to deduce the following lessons tested by the discussion within the Convention on 20 December:
1. There will be no consensus on the ambitious formulae of foreign policy or common security and defence policy. Let's look at this in a lucid manner: the positions and the ambitions of the Member States differ very considerably, as their history, their traditions and their hopes to play a role in world affairs and even the aspirations of their populations are not identical. Seeking a compromise at any cost could only result in minimal solutions, insufficient for some and excessive for others.
2. Only the "differentiation" solution would make it possible to define agreements that safeguard the EU's institutional unity. This solution would imply a common base, not only for foreign policy but also for defence and, on this base, there would be structures in which the countries that so wish can participate if they fulfil the minimum essential requirements.
3. If the "differentiation" solution fails, EU dilution would become inevitable. The Chairman of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, has been aware of this from the outset. Back in November last he had stated: "If we fail, Europe will become no more than a free trade area. There are signs pointing to this, for example the rejection of the Stability Pact or refusal of Common Agricultural Policy. If, on the other hand, we succeed, then we shall have not only the greater market but also a number of political ambitions. There are essentially three such ambitions: develop a European foreign policy, set up a defence system and organise a common area of freedom and security". In the meantime, continuity of agricultural policy and safeguarding of the Stability Pact have been assured (thanks to the re-establishment of Franco-German harmony), but the other ambitions remain open.
4. In the event of failure, ambitious countries would carry out their projects outside the EU. The countries that nonetheless wish to move forward along the road to political and military integration will do so among themselves. However, while "differentiation" (see point 2) would fall within the EU framework, with participation of the European institutions and according to Community procedures (adjusted where necessary), a new structure outside the Union would be totally intergovernmental, dominated by the large countries, without any institutional balance being guaranteed by the "Community method". Such evolution would have repercussions on common economic policies, which could not continue as they are.
These four conclusions result from the analysis of the positions taken within the Convention, and continue to prefigure the final result as the number of Foreign Ministers within the ranks continues to grow, with the new Council President, George Papandreou, being the last to arrive.
Modest consensus on foreign policy. Concerning CFSP (common foreign and security policy), the situation is simple. There is quite a general consensus on the principles and objectives (see this column yesterday, in fine), but, if one looks at the operational measures, it appears from the Dehaene report that consensus is only to be found on two elements: a) regrouping into a single text all the provisions relating to "external action" by the Union (today dispersed in several treaties and answering to different criteria and procedures), bringing together economic competences (aid and support to third countries, trade policy) and political competences; and b) attributing to the EU the ability to conclude agreements with third countries on questions that come under its internal competences. The other majority guidelines are purely practical: setting in place a "common service" bringing together the Council and Commission officials and national diplomatic services; and creating an EU "diplomacy school". There is no consensus, on the other hand, on the other aspects, whether these concern the merging of the functions of the High Representative (Javier Solana) with those of the External Relations Commissioner (Chris Patten) to be attributed to one and the same person, or the functioning of CFSP (participation, autonomy, voting methods, etc.), with the Member States being divided into three groups with different ambitions (see yesterday's column).
Jean-Luc Dehaene last week explained (interview with "Le Monde") that it is agreed the Council should be left to take decisions on foreign policy action and strategy to prevent "two foreign policies having to compete with each other: one of which is intergovernmental and the other a Community method linked to socio-economic issues and justice/home affairs" (immigration, right to asylum, etc.), even if, in the beginning, the difference must be maintained between that which comes under the Community method and that which is intergovernmental.
Regarding the content of foreign policy, Mr Dehaene explained: "It is all a matter of political will, and this cannot be decreed by any Constitution …". Jacques Delors had told "Le Soir" on 29 December that it is absurd to imagine foreign policy can be born all in one go through improved instruments: "we have all seen, for example, that, with regards Iraq, three of the four large Union countries take different stances. Foreign policy must be tackled in terms of joint action for which there would have to be an agreement between a majority of the countries". At first, this policy will therefore be limited to certain objectives and certain situations, bearing in mind the historical, psychological and factual constraints proper to the different countries. Even the idea of single EU representation within the United Nations is not for now realistic: Europe would have a single but silent spokesperson within the UN Security Council, if there were no common positions to be expressed! And how would it use its right of veto? In the near future, four European countries will be members of the Security Council: France and the United Kingdom with right of veto, then Italy and Spain. The voice of Europe would not be strengthened but weakened by having a single representative who would not have any common positions to put forward.
All in all, what is really possible for CFSP at European level will largely depend on the guidelines that are adopted for the institutional chapter, that the Convention has not yet tackled and for which the Franco-German common position is expected in coming weeks. Solutions adopted regarding a "president of Europe" and regarding the transformation of High Representative for CFSP into a "European Foreign Minister" (whatever his/her future name may be) will be a determining factor for safeguarding the balance between the institutions and the "Community method", and therefore for the future prospects of European foreign policy.
Two-tier defence policy. As far as the field of security and defence is concerned, the rapporteur for the Convention (and European Commissioner), Michel Barnier, has clear ideas. He is also aware of the necessarily intergovernmental nature of ESDP at this stage, of the need not to cut it off from the EU by making it a totally separate structure, and of the different approaches of Member States. The road to be followed consists, he feels, in defining a part of the "common base" acceptable for all current and future Member States and, also, what would be reserved to the countries that wish to go further, therefore with application of "differentiation". According to the work of the group that he chairs:
a) The common base would, in addition to what already exists and which is far from being negligible, comprise modernisation and updating of the "Petersberg missions" and a "solidarity clause" towards the "new threats" (i.e. terrorism). This would already be considerable. The updated Petersberg missions would cover conflict prevention, programmes for weapons destruction and arms control, the formation of democratic armed forces in third countries, stabilisation operations at the end of conflicts and (a totally new element) support at the request of third country authorities in the war on terrorism. The anti-terrorism solidarity clause would apply to threats from non-state entities (in order to clearly mark that the EU is not a military alliance), but it would cover a very wide area: preventing the terrorist threat, protecting the civilian population and the democratic institutions; facing up to the implications of a terrorist attack. The EU would mobilise all the instruments available to it, that is, not only military means and structures created for the "Petersberg missions" but also the civil protection mechanisms and police and judicial cooperation.
b) The "voluntary" part would essentially comprise the "collective defence clause" and the creation, at an intergovernmental level, of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency. Participant countries could take on board the obligations of the WEU Treaty involving total political and military solidarity, and establish a harmonised policy for the production and procurement of weapons as well as the strengthening of the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and support to research (including regarding military space systems). Some Convention members see this achievement as "strengthened cooperation". Mr Barnier leans more towards a system of the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) kind, with accession criteria such as the proportion of the defence budget compared to the GDP and the state of preparedness of the forces, including deployment and interoperability capabilities.
There is no unanimity over this two-tier plan, but, according to Mr Barnier, it is the minimum for ESDP to be a success. In the event of failure, military cooperation would be achieved outside the EU, with all the repercussions that are inevitable on other aspects of tomorrow's EU. (F.R.)