The Commission's role is becoming much more recognised. I am going to conclude the "institutional marathon" with a few considerations on which this section has been focusing over the week. My analysis of recent developments might appear too optimistic to some Convention Members and observers. The Belgian Prime Minister has himself detected the "spectre of inter-governmentalism" in the work of the Convention (see our bulletin of 20 November p 7). I am not claiming that this spectre has disappeared but I believe that the signs of an about-turn are obvious. These especially concern the role of the European Commission whose change of tone and approach is not only visible, but also impressive. In the beginning, the desire to control the Commission's action and gnaw away at its powers appeared to by shared by many Heads of Government and by a number of representatives from national Parliaments at the Convention. This is not in fact the case. The clarifications of France's position going in the opposite direction has been spectacular. Chancellor Schröder consolidated the traditional direction of his country by appointing Joschka Fischer as his representative at the Convention. José Maria-Aznar has toned down his alignment with the British position, and keeping Ana de Palacio as his representative at the Convention is significant. Silvio Berlusconi has declared that he won't stand in the way of developments (he's going in the direction of the traditional Italian position). The risks have certainly not disappeared; the President of the Convention's position is not yet clear and there will be a need to stay alert. But if there are positive developments why not highlight them?
Two significant reservations. In my overall optimism, I had, nonetheless, indicated that there were some grey areas that haven't gone away in regard to the question of the "Single President", while progress has been made in the area (see yesterday's section). I would like to add some even more significant reservations. One involves the appointment of the President of the Commission by the European Parliament. First impressions may suggest further democratisation of the EU but in reality it's a dangerous idea: the President of the Commission would be too politically coloured, permanently subject to the pressures of the EP political groups, which would have chosen him and it would be difficult for him to deal with Heads of Governments from other tendencies. The politicians who support this reform are undoubtedly dreaming of a President of the Commission who shares their views but would they be prepared to accept a President of a different political hue over a five-year period? Or would they permanently be in opposition, making the legislative work of the EP more difficult?
I also think that the idea of the European Council being able to overrule the Commission, in the same way that the Parliament is able to do, is just as dangerous. The Commission would in this case be subject to a kind of permanent blackmail from Heads of government, with the temptation to relax some of its positions in order to remain viable.
As for Montesquieu. The support of the Belgian Prime Minister for a return to the "separation of powers", which Montesquieu had appropriated (see the speech already mention) appears at first glance to be in contradiction with Jacques Delors' slogan of calling for "Montesquieu to be forgotten". In reality, we are witnessing Guy Verhofstadt's feat of dialectical juggling. The affirmation by Delors signifies quite simply that in the EU, there is no need to make the Commission the only executive power (by transforming the Council, as is currently the case); the EU Executive must be made up by both the Commission and Council, as is the case today. The Belgian Prime Minister has said the same thing, while insisting on the clear separation of the two Council functions (the executive and the legislative), which everyone agrees to now. It is true that he erects a category situated between the two branches of executive power, with the Commission in pride of place ("guiding nerve centre") and the Council in second. This distinction appears to me to be both superfluous and dangerous, as the Commission's strength as an executive power results from the fact that this involves a mandate from the Council or an agreement with it. We often mention the example of trade policy as a sector where the EU negotiates on as equal partners with the USA and others, with Pascal Lamy as the mediator acknowledged by all. This is true but Pascal Lamy's strength derives precisely because of the Council's mandate; he has to define and seek approval for the Union's position each time he approaches third countries. The mechanism has served well; it's Mr Lamy who negotiates but on the big occasions the Council is present in the next room and it can request consultation at any moment, even during the night. In other fields, such as environmental negotiations, the Council negotiates, but with the Commission at its side. Conferring the Commission with unlimited power would be to give it a poisoned chalice because it's due to having the Member States behind it that enables it to speak in the name of Europe and not simply as the Commission. Executive power is shared, it should remain that way.