The enlarged Commission seems inevitable.. Within the Convention, the direction in favour of two priority institutional requirements - respect of the nature and competencies of the Commission, involvement of the heads of government - is making steady progress, but several essential aspects of these two principles remain to be defined (see this section of 20 November). It will not be possible to speak of a genuine institutional draft for the future EU until we have answered questions relating to the "President of the Union" and the composition and workings of the European Commission.
Regarding the Commission, one things seems certain: all Member states will be represented. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt had the political courage to firmly take a stance in favour of a limited Commission (see yesterday's bulletin, page 7); but it seems politically impossible to have this accepted by most Member states, current and future. In several candidate countries, the Union is identified with the Commission; its through her that their request pass, its with her that they discuss concrete problems. Politicians could not announce to the public the possibility that there could be a Commission without one of their nationals in it. And most current small EU countries are just as firm (the shrewdest do not say that a Commissioner of their nationality is indispensable, but that a Commission without a French or German Commissioner would not be serious).
…but we don't know how it could operate. There will therefor be as many Commissioners as Member states. But I still don't know the answer to the key-question that automatically stems from this choice: how will this enlarged Commission work? Today, the situation is clear: the Commission is a college that votes through a simple majority. The large countries have two Commissioners of their nationality (this disparity already existed at the time of Jean Monnet): their weight is reasonable without being overwhelming. Tomorrow, they would only have five or six votes out of 25, the day after tomorrow, six or seven out of 30 or more. Valery Giscard d'Estaing concluded that the Commission would no longer be able to vote, as any decision could be blocked by Commissioners only representing a minute part of the Union's population, or approved despite opposition by Commissioners representing three-quarters or more of the population. It's true that these are "school hypotheses", as a front of the small against a front of the large has never in fact been seen. But is that a guarantee for the future? We shall see on 5 December what the Commission itself will propose to the Convention. Romano Prodi mooted a certain number of ideas in June (in part inspired by the "Toulemon project" of which there is question below), based on an increase in the number of Vice-Presidents, each of them being responsible for a "block of competencies". The President and Vice-Presidents would meet at least once a week and act by procurement of the college, that would meet once or twice a month. Is this a good formula? I can't say. What seems certain to me, is that consolidation or even strengthening of the role of the Commission is only possible if at the same time the modalities are defined enabling it to work effectively. A college of 25 or 30 Commissioners with the current rules and voting method would have doubtful legitimacy and be inadequate to represent the Union's institutional heart.
A personal avowal over the presidency. The question of the Union President is just as thorny and controversial. Valery Giscard d'Estaing takes it for granted that the current system of half-yearly rotations of Council presidencies is absurd and must be dropped: Jacques Delors had already reached a similar conclusion before. But the formula of a Union President appointed for five years by the heads of government has led to mistrust among small countries, who see in this a step towards a "board of the large countries", and opposition by the Commission which sees the risk of direct competition. Personally, I saw at least one positive aspect to this initiative: recognition of the fact that Community responsibilities at a very high level constitute a "full time" job and cannot be accumulated with national responsibilities. I was wrong: on the contrary, it is the exclusively "European" nature of this Presidency that justifies and explains the Commission's reservations and those defending its role. The current President of the Summit, who accumulates his European roles and roles of Prime Minister or President in a Member State, can play a role of spokesperson for national stances and of promoter of compromises, thereby making a balance with the Commission that represents the general European interest. But a long-term and super partes president would double the role and task of the Commission President while at the same time being directly linked to the Summit.
In favour of a single president. Here lies the intuition of Robert Toulemon: the Union President must be unique. He wrote in his project (published in no.2280 of our EUROPE/Documents series, annexed to the bulleting of 8 June): "to have two rival presidents at the head of the Union, with an identical profile, would contribute neither to efficiency, nor visibility nor democracy". It would, however, be unrealistic to purely and simply transfer to the president of the Commission the powers and competencies being envisaged for the new "Union President" (as would, moreover, transforming the Commission into a single European Executive); that's why Mr. Toulemon envisaged a presidium which "would better correspond to European diversity than would a solitary president" and that would provide a balance between the large and less large countries, between North and South, between old ad new Member states, and whose composition "could reflect the diversity of the dominant political tendencies in Member states". This presidium would have to have the confidence of both the European Council and Parliament and reflect the outcome of the European elections. It would be at the head of the enlarged Commission (in which all Member states would be "represented", not only for the reasons mentioned above but also to "have some understanding of the very useful pedagogic role Commissioners play in their country of origin)". The efficiency of this too large a Commission would be assured by the rule whereby "no decision could be taken without agreement of the presidium" (whose members would be an integral part of the Commission). The chair of the Presidium, and the Commission, would thus represent the "face of Europe" that is now considered indispensable, at this all-powerful media time, and the members of the presidium would represent the Union in international bodies, according to their respective competencies. They could also chair, without voting right, the European Council and other Council formations. But the essential element of the reform of the Council would be the introduction of the double majority rule (of Members states and populations represented).
An idea that's gaining ground. The Toulemon document, "planned synthesis" between a federal Europe and a Europe of States, has many other aspects, and notably the rule by which the institutional treaty would take effect as soon as a majority of states, representing two-thirds of the Union's population, has ratified it (opening up to those absent associate status involving participation in the single market and possibly the euro) and the "negotiated exemption" formula for countries which, while remaining in the EU, do not wish to participate in certain policies. If today I have recalled the essential of its institutional aspect, it's because the central idea of the "single president" has been taken up within the Convention by the representative of the French National Assembly, Pierre Lequiller. It is, therefore, among the ideas to which the Convention will have to turn. The Belgian Prime Minister has, moreover, just espoused it, on the whole, and said in the aforementioned address that the Benelux was in the process of examining it.
The courage of Pierre Lequiller. Mr. Lequiller had courage in launching his project as it does not correspond to France's official stance, which is against a "long-term president" appointed by the Summit. His initiative proves that he has understood the need to exceed the dualism between Commission President and new Union president, recommended by certain capitals, and that he is aware of the irreplaceable role of the Commission. The proof that his project represents a balanced effort is provided by the fact that he is being criticised on both sides: defenders of the Commission's prerogatives accuse him of leaning too much towards the intergovernmental system, whereas those who would like to reduce the weight of the Commission accuse him of handing its President too much power. Thanks to its clearly pro-Community leaning, the Lequiller project is gathering growing support within the Convention.
I shall not conceal the few questions that the formula of a single president for the Council and Commission leave me grappling with. The missions are too different not to see some danger there. The Commission must dare present proposals that it considers in compliance with the European interest, even if these are strongly rejected by some head of government or another, and it has to defend them robustly and with determination before the Council. The Council president, on the other hand, has as task to seek compromises taking account of all national stances. In Council sessions, the two presidents may find themselves in opposite camps. The Commission has the ability to withdraw a proposal if it considers that the compromise towards which the Council is heading alters its nature. For its part, the Council can distance itself from a Commission proposal, if it is unanimous. Doesn't the unification of the two roles risk distorting the institutional dialectic? Of leading the Commission to seek compromise more than defend the European interest? And how would Parliament's right of censure work (which can overthrow the Commission, but not the Council, whose members depend on national parliaments)?
These are questions that the Convention will try to answer, in the context of this open building site that is the Union's new institutional structure. (F.R.)