Two unavoidable demands. The document that the European Commission is to submit to the Convention and present to the European Parliament on 5 December will be a significant step on the path towards a constitutional treaty. But I do not believe that that day we shall discover the Union's final architecture. I do not believe so because ongoing reflections give the impression of a building site full of ideas and projects that still need deepening and confounded before the settling can occur, just as it takes time for the alchemist's crucible to be cleared of unpurified substances. For me, the point of departure has to be the respect of two unavoidable demands, that I'd place at the same level.
a) safeguarding the competencies and nature of the Commission in letter and spirit. It has to retain its autonomy in relation to governments and its executive right of initiative, and remain responsible for the European interest, without which the Community method would be disfigured;
b) closely involve, at institutional level, the heads of government in the Union's governance, given their democratic legitimacy and their right to speak on behalf of people that chose them, without which the nature EU as union of States (and of people) would be compromised. I know full well that this second demand is not admitted by all, but believe that if the objective is a Europe-power covering all political and economic areas, the heads of government must be directly engaged. Otherwise, the EU, whatever its future name, would be confined to economic responsibilities and the remainder would be built up on the fringes (which would, notably lead to the marginalisation of small countries).
The indispensable nature of the Commission is increasingly compromised. A few months ago, the Commission was the "one most threatened" among EU institutions. Its autonomy annoys quite a few, as it alone can say "no" to the major powers and narrow national interests, on behalf of the European interest. The British press (the most read, being the most understandable everywhere) succeeded in giving it a despicable reputation of poor management of Europe, with a lazy or corrupt administration, whereas, despite its very real faults, this administration is better and more effective than many national administrations. Today, the Commission's position has been considerable redressed within the Convention, quite simply because the members of the Convention that do not belong to Community institutions (a great majority of them) now know better its nature and how it operates. I've already had occasion to write, but do not hesitate to repeat myself: with an intergovernmental method without Commission, the EU would not today have either a project for reforming the common agricultural policy, nor a project to rescue fishing, nor a Galileo project, nor a perspective for an "open sky" agreement with the United States - and I could continue the list -, simply because too many Member states were against, one or other of these initiatives, at the outset at the highest level. Sure, the plans will be reviewed and improved in debates within the European Parliament and Council, in accordance with the "Community method", but experience teaches us that the point of arrival will not be that far from the initial proposals. The awareness of the irreplaceable role of the Commission has progressed especially with the national parliamentarians members of the Convention, but also with governments, the most spectacular turnabout being that relating to the economic management of EMU. Last year, the idea of a warning or procedure against Germany or France for infringing the Stability and Growth Pact was considered as inadmissible: today, it is an admitted reality (and even invoked). The Convention will doubtless take account of this in the rest of its work on the EU's economic governance.
Too much uncertainty. If that is how things are going, why do I believe that the definition of the new institutional architecture is still far off? Because too many elements of the puzzle remain uncertain and controversial. To maintain and strengthen the role of the Commission is the right direction (even the representative of the British Government in the Convention has had to admit that), but its composition and operations remain totally open: the Commission itself hesitates, and what it will propose on 5 December will not be a miracle solution. Involvement of heads of government is generally admitted, but the formula that seems to prevail today (a long-term president of Europe to have emerged from the Summit) has dangers for the institutional balance. More thought is needed. I do not hesitate in recognising that I too have committed an error of judgement. I shall speak of that the day after tomorrow.
(F.R.)