Between two incompatible projects. What has led me to give both importance and time to the "constitutional schema for Europe" submitted by Robert Toulemon last week to the Circle Populaire Européen led by Fernand Herman? Two essential reasons: a) This represents, to my knowledge, the first complete attempt to go beyond the two "government of Europe" formulas which have been at the centre of the majority of discussions until now, which have been strictly incompatible, one to the detriment of Member States (the Commission would become the sole Executive), the other to the detriment of the Commission (replaced by an Intergovernmental Executive); b) Mr Toulemeon has used his imagination to come up with two innovative formulas, absolutely necessary at the moment the Convention on the Future of Europe is preparing the formula to submit to Government Chiefs.
Innovation and realism. This does not mean that I support the Toulemon solution 100% (for what that's worth); there is still something that perplexes me about it, which I'll return to. I believe that it does, however, deserve the attention of the reader. Robert Toulemon is far from being rigidly dogmatic; he's looking for realistic solutions, whilst taking account of the different projects already on the table (He mentions a number of them). There is something almost visionary in his approach (what he calls innovative solutions) and a pragmatic side. For example, he does not believe in a swift passage to the Community Method in foreign and defence policy, suggesting a transition period during which the right of initiative would be shared between the Commission (or the body replacing it) and Member States. He does not conjure up a too detailed definition of Union objectives, given that this would encounter too many obstacles (neither are national Constitutions afforded too much detail either), nor a strict separation of the respective competencies of the Union and Member States. On this subject he provides a few specific observations: a clear separation would stop student and teacher exchange programmes financed by the Community (we are aware of their success and importance) given that education and culture would fall into totally national competencies and it would be difficult to fight against international crime because in the past we were unaware of the possibilities that exist in this domain today. He outlines a schema of shared tasks. The crucial point is the recognition of a Union competence in foreign and defence policy, to be exercised over a "fairly long" transition period, according to specific procedures strictly associating countries and a new future European Executive.
Governing the Union. The new Executive is the central aspect of the Toulemon project: what will govern the Union and how? The Council of Europe must remain but in order to set out the general guidelines and not interfere in daily government business. It would firstly have the job of approving legislation and together with the Parliament, a Union action programme. An important point: the issue of the Presidency of the Council of Europe would be regulated radically by placing it within the remit of the President of the Union, Head of the new Executive. This would constitute the essential innovation of the project. Robert Toulemeon does not believe in solutions that have previously been put forward and he doesn't see any other way than the creation of a real Presidency of the Union, close but distinctive from national governments, accompanied by a certain number of Union Ministers. The Presidency would be collegial, in other words, a Praesidium, with Union Ministers replacing the European Commission and constituting the Executive power. The Praesidium would consist of a Union President, nominated for five years, whose mandate would be renewable, four Vice Presidents, all nominated by the Council of Europe immediately after the European elections (in a way that would include the election result). Nominations would be decided by consensus or by majority voting made up of both the people and States and would be approved by the European Parliament by simple majority. No condition of nationality is envisaged except that Members of the Praesidium would be made up of different Member States. It would fall to the European Council and the Parliament to respect certain checks and balances (political guidelines, small and large countries, the North and South of the Union etc.), which would be impossible in the case of a single President with no electoral college. Each Vice President would be responsible for four main sectors of EU activity: external affairs trade issues), defence (including arms policy), justice and internal security, economic and financial affairs. The Vice Presidents could be increased to five by separating economic from monetary affairs and management of the single market from social affairs.
An authority for individual competition decisions. The Praesidium will then appoint the Ministers of the Union, with the number corresponding to Ministerial departments judged to be necessary, not based on nationality. We would then be able to have an Executive consisting of around fifteen members (possibly with Ministers without portfolio), if all current and future Member States insist on being represented in the Executive, which would have the right of initiative but which would be shared with Parliament. This "politicised" Executive would be responsible for individual competition decisions: competition policy guidelines would be defined by the political institutions according to normal procedures, but decisions on concrete agreements or abuse of dominating positions would be dealt with by an expert and independent institution.
Presidents of the Councils. The President of the Union will preside over the European Council and ensure, together with the competent Vice President, the external representation of the EU. Council sessions will also be chaired by a new Executive formula: the President or a Vice President will chair a new General Affairs Council (consisting of national Ministers responsible for European Affairs advising their Prime Ministers), and a Vice President or Minister for Europe responsible for the other Councils. In some fields, foreign policy and defence policy, the Executive would not be able to take a decision or the initiative without prior approval of the competent Council. In other domains the Executive would be bound to submit its other projects to the Councils made up of national Ministers, before decision-making. This would be the same for monetary and fiscal issues, cohesion policy and the distribution of Structural Fund loans. But at the end of a transition period (that remains to be decided) the Executive would be responsible for its prerogatives in all Union areas.
Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of States. Legislative functions would be exercised by two Chambers, one from citizens (heir to the European Parliament), the other from the States (which would take up the legislative powers currently exercised by the Council). The Chamber of Citizens would be elected for five years by proportional and harmonised representation (one MEP per million inhabitants, with a minimum of one MEP per country). This would give an enlarged Europe a Parliament of around four hundred members. The Chamber of States would be composed of national delegations, with each having a voice but Member States would themselves decide on its composition: thus, a delegation would consist of national MPs, another of representatives from authorities enjoying legislative powers. This Chamber would reach decisions by double majority voting: that of the States themselves and those represented. To adopt a law, a simple majority in the Chamber of Citizens and double majority in the Chamber of States, would be needed.
Several formulas are outlined on control methods on the Executive by the two Chambers. Mr Toulemon does not say whether he is in favour of one or another. They include censure, the possibility of dissolving the Chamber of Citizens, arbitration procedure (by the Council of Europe) in the case of persistent divergences between the Parliament and Executive.
Second fundamental innovation. As opposed to others who preceded Mr Toulemon in elaborating drafts for institutional reform, he has not forgotten the issue mentioned many times in this section: how to ensure that a project that is approved by the Convention and the IGC is not rejected by a "no" vote of a single national Parliament and which effectively means years of work have all been in vain, as well as that of all the other Parliaments? Robert Toulemon's answer is simple and logical: the new Constitution would enter into force as soon as the majority of Member States representing two thirds of the Union population have ratified it. States that do not not ratify the project (or which have rejected it during the IGC) will be able to withdraw from the Union, whilst still participating in the Common Market or single currency.
In conclusion, Robert Toulemon stresses that his formulas are a response to the worries sometimes expressed in a different way to the variety of projects put forward. Particularly, the demand of a majority of States that any decision by the European Council or the second Chamber provides small countries with the guarantee that their positions will be taken into considerations (given that the large countries will never constitute a majority). In parallel, the demand of the majority of citizens guarantees the large countries against the risk of being placed in a minority by a coalition of small countries. His project proposes some important points for reflection for all those who are concerned by the institutional architecture of the future EU. (FR)