Brussels, 23/08/2001 (Agence Europe) - After fifty years of "nuclear peace", the nuclear landscape presents original characteristics that allow one to claim that "the end of the cold war did indeed mark the end of a nuclear era, but not the end of the nuclear era", says Burkard Schmitt, responsible for research at the WEU Institute, and Camille Grand, associate researcher at the Institute francais des relations internationales (IFRI) in Paris, in the conclusions of this work to which numerous experts contributed.
"The return of the nuclear issue has been a bad surprise" for many Europeans, note the two authors, remarking that "the wake-up is all the more disagreeable in that the characteristics of the new nuclear landscape (…) may modify in depth, and quickly, the international system along lines almost directly opposed to the European approach". According to them, whereas negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have been in deadlock for years in Geneva and that "progress in multilateral or American-Russian disarmament is very unlikely, it is up to Europeans to provide their contribution to defining an agenda to get out of the current deadlock", and to "engage in the military nuclear debate" so as to have "their "restrictive approach to the role of atomic weapons prevail".
"What could be the bases for a European method taking account of both the new strategic challenges and strategic cultures of the different States of the Union?," the authors wonder, for whom this model should be based on: (1) a demanding and ambitious approach to non-proliferation, which, in particular, means: - developing systems of inspections and sanctions, implementing the principle of irreversibility; - placing the respect of standards in matters of proliferation "at the heart of policies vis-à-vis third countries"; - further engage diplomatically in the fight against proliferation, notably be associating export control policies with trade sanctions towards "recalcitrant" countries; (2) a strict and demanding concept of deterrence, resting on principles such as: - low arsenals and "pursuing reductions as far as possible"; - acceptance of binding international treaties and standards; - a strict concept, ensuring the "character of the last recourse to nuclear weapons"; (3) a cautious and demanding debate on missile defence, in a framework by which if the Americans want the Europeans to accept their project, they themselves must agree to certain conditions "in compliance with the European approach", like: - ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and pursuit of the START process with Russia (instead of moving to unilateral, non-negotiated reductions); - a "limited" system of missile defence, that does not contain "destabilising aspects, such as space interceptors" (if the system really is designed to tackle "rogue States", it will, by definition, also have to be limited in its capabilities"); - emphasise that possible transatlantic cooperation in this field cannot occur to the detriment of other more urgent projects to achieve the European Headline Goal (rapid reaction force the EU wants to have); - more intense intelligence data exchanges with the Europeans.
(NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A NEW GREAT DEBATE. Under the direction of Burkard Schmitt. Cahiers de Chaillot No.48, July 2001. Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union. 43. Avenue du President Wilson, 75775 Paris cedex 16. Tel.: 53 67 22 00. Fax: 47 20 81 78. E-mail: ies.ueo@iss-weu.com. Web site: http://www.weu.int/institute .)