Importance of a good dictionary. I expected it, and I certainly was not the only one, the new contribution by Jacques Delors to the debate over the future of Europe, at a time where the stances merge and certain ideas have made a breakthrough, while others tread water and others still are challenged. Through his understanding of the dossiers, through his imagination and his ability to summarise, the former President of the Commission always brings clarity, without ever forgetting the general direction, even when he then develops the details. Once more this is the case, during his hearing on 19 June before the delegation for the European Union of the French Parliament's first chamber (National assembly), hearing that Alain Barrau, President of this delegation, wanted to be open to the press and public.
First remark from the former Commission President: the uncertainties over the future of the institutions must not translate into a wave of pessimism over the European building process. It turns, Europe, he exclaimed when recalling the introduction of the single currency within a few months, the creation of a European rapid reaction force (which will allow the EU to intervene to prevent conflicts, re-establish peace or accompany a humanitarian effort) and the general strengthening of food safety in Europe. Second aspect, he clarifies a few concepts (as "a good dictionary is often necessary to understand the terms of the debate"), namely:
- The "community method" is based on an institutional triangle that does not correspond in any way to the principal of the separation of powers defined by Montesquieu, as it includes a two fold legislative power (Council and European Parliament) and a European judicial power (the Court of Justice). Each time that the Community method has worked well, Europe moves forward, in the opposite case it does not move;
- The definition "federation of nation-States" allows to conciliate the two fold need to "preserve the nations and apply the Community method to the decision-making system";
- Subsidiarity (in democracy, the problems must be treated closest to the citizens) and a notion that is simple to use, but very difficult to translate into a legal context;
- Differentiation, meaning that all the countries of the Union do not walk to the same beat, has always been at the heart of the European history, allowing some Member States to "take their time";
- The European Constitution. Jacques Delors does not reject it if it constitutes a political gamble aimed at regenerating the acceptability of policy in Europe, while it would seem to him difficult to accept if it goes hand in hand with the creation of a European constitutional court, which could move the lines sharing out the European and national competences. Thus he could support the constitutional approach if it is a way to democratise the institutional architecture of the Union.
The flute players. He then posed two fundamental questions: what could we do with 30 or even 35? And how? On the first point, he has been, once more, clear and explicit. The enlarged Europe should give itself three fundamental objectives: a) to create an area of peace; b) to establish a framework for sustainable development; c) maintain the European model in a world threatened by standardisation. He also added: if these three aims are achieved in an enlarged Union, the Europeans will have maintained a good balance between market and regulation. Though to say that the Union of 30 States could do more, would be to lie to oneself as it is already hard enough to achieve the three objectives mentioned above. He also defined the flute players as those who imagine that a Europe with 30 could have a common foreign policy, a common law, security for persons ensured according to the same criteria. He also added: it is necessary to avoid that the policy, be that of the Atlantic Alliance, and the European Union, the economy, as stated an American figure.
The conclusion that Jacques Delors draws from his analysis is no surprise: it is necessary to form a "pioneer group", a "centre of gravity" or a "vanguard", call it what you will. And he adds: if we take care to say what that this group will be open to all the States that want and can join, there is no reason that the candidate countries see a danger of being cut-off from the Europe, divided in two. Furthermore, he does not see the formation of a vanguard as a sudden and traumatic operation: it will first require "testing" the enhanced cooperation (according to the rules of functioning eased by the Treaty of Nice): we will then see if these enhanced cooperation converge towards the formation of a vanguard. Though it is futile to continue to oppose enhanced cooperation and the vanguard; this debate serves no purpose; we must first find the countries with an appetite -- and the courage - to join the enhanced cooperation.
Prepare the decisions differently. The second question, "how to do it?", involves the institutional problematic. Jacques Delors does not favour any revolution in the powers of the institutions, but he considers it necessary to renovate the "Community method", which already does not function with fifteen. The balance between the three institutions - Commission, Council and Parliament - must be safeguarded, but the method for preparing decisions must be revised. Within the Council, the "around the table" system (each delegation expresses its position on each point of discussion) must be abandoned, otherwise the session will become so long in an enlarged Europe that the Ministers would leave the room to go speak before the media. The "General Affairs" Council should gather twice per month. The European Council must "return to its origins: the Heads of State and Government must stop taking countless decision of which many remain to be implemented". Otherwise, in the face of too numerous texts, the Heads will provide themselves with "Sherpas" to prepare the meetings (thus outside the Community procedure) and the European Council "through rounds of back and forth will become a sort of new G7". He also cites that need to decide on the issue of knowing who represents the Union on the foreign scene, without entering into the details of the different options (Mr CFSP or a Commission Vice-President for Foreign Policy, the Commission or the President of the Eurogroup for the Euro).
His conclusion was a call for debate: if we want to engage ourselves down this path, the risk is that of a loss of course for the European building process, or even a dilution. It is better to have a true debate, with the risk of provoking a crisis, rather that remaining in the present situation.
Two ideas that have progressed. It is only as an answer to questions that Jacques Delors specified certain institutional aspects of his vision. He confirmed the thesis favourable towards the creation of a General Affairs Council formed of Ministers for European Affairs, who would gather every fifteen days to select the projects to be examined and define the precise agenda of the Council works, with priorities. He reaffirmed that for the time being the only way to enhance the democratic meaning of the vote for the European Parliament's election consists of "personalising" it by inciting the political groups to select their candidate for the Commission Presidency. These are two ideas that he had launched a while back, through his association "Notre Europe", and which have progressed.
I would like to underline the flexibility shown by Jacques Delores. His principals are clear, but without any dogma in the application. He is convinces of the need for a vanguard, but he admits the possibility of first "testing" the enhanced cooperation. He has concerns (explained and justified in a previous event) with regards a European constitution, but he is prepared to support a constitutional move, with certain conditions and if the objectives are clear.
Unnecessary battle. His clarification over the concepts is also fundamental, as we are sometimes witnessing semantic battles sometimes, in vain. One of these futile battles concerns the notion on "Federation of nation-States", to which we have everything to reproach, the terms are contradictory, legally it means nothing, it wants to combine incompatible concepts, and so forth. The answer is simple: it is not a legal notion, it is a political message. And this message means that Europe must have federal elements, they are already under our noses, even if sometimes we do not want to recognise it, and they must develop. Though at the same time the united Europe must not become a super-State not a single nation, as the nation-States that form it represent the soul and substance, the culture, the memory of the peoples'. Let us not wrap a simple political message with legal subtleties and displaced ironies.
The second concept, often misunderstood, is that of the Community method. We sometime present it as antinomical of the intergovernmental cooperation, or we abusively simplify it by asserting that the intergovernmental method, are the unanimity decision, and the Community method, majority decisions. This is entirely false. The Community method means that the decisions are taken on a proposal from the Commission (which has the exclusive right to initiative), after discussion within the Parliament and other bodies, by the Council (formed of governments), in codecision with the Parliament in a growing number of cases. Thus the government are there, and well and truly there, at the decisive moment; but the procedures are radically different from those of classic intergovernmental cooperation. The aspect of the majority vote is important, but it does not determine the Community method on its own. (F.R.)