One questionable aspect of the Schroeder document. We were expecting it, the response to the questionable aspect of Chancellor Schroeder's scheme of things, and it is normal that it should come from the country most attentive to these issues, France (see yesterday's bulletin, p.4). At a time when, from all sides, came enthusiastic reactions to the Chancellor's document, in this section I had already expressed my perplexity, incredulity even, vis-a-vis the envisaged transformation of the Council into a "Chamber of States", involving the transfer of all executive powers to the European Commission. Hubert Vedrine denounced this break of the European institutional balance that would result from this, and placed emphasis on the democratic legitimacy of governments (which is obvious). The European inspiration of the Schroeder document remains, and that is what is essential: now, the reaction of the French Foreign Minister will encourage the Germans to think more deeply about the balance of powers. Vedrine himself stressed that, on most aspects of the Schroeder document, there was no difference between France and Germany.
Transparent and legitimate institutions to manage the vacuum? Michel Barnier, European Commissioner for institutional reform, tactfully pointed out a contradiction in the ongoing debate on Europe's future, which is: the demand for democratic legitimacy and the transparency of EU institutions sometimes goes together with the tendency to "reduce the scale of the European plan" (see the Figaro of 9 May). In other words, the institutions would become more legitimate and transparent, but what to do? If regional policy and agricultural policy are "handed back" to Member States, if the control of State aid and certain elements of competition g down the same road, if foreign policy, security, defence, police and justice are forever destined to remain intergovernmental, there would not be much left for reformed European institutions to manage. That is why, Barnier observed, the debate on the future of Europe has foremost to concentrate on "what to do together"; we do not need the same institutions nor the same degree of democratic legitimacy to manage the common external tariff as we do to manage a foreign and defence policy.
Discourse on method (with many apologies to Descartes). Wolfgang Schauble warned of the danger that the a different interpretation of terms causes serious misunderstandings in the debate on the future of Europe, as "differences lie more often over terminology than over the substance itself". It is in that spirit that I would like to clarify two concepts that I often use in this section: "Community method" and "intergovernmental method".
I've pointedly noticed that the "Community method" is at times understood to be a system by which the role of governments is played down, that sidelines them, reducing their weight in the Union's decision-making. At the same time, criticism of the "intergovernmental method" is attributed to the fact that it gives too much room to governments, and thus States. This false interpretation annoys me, even though it is sometimes made in good faith, sometimes with malice.
- the "Community method" in no way means an institutional system in which the role of States, governments and national parliaments would be of little significance. This section has often stated the preponderant role of the European Council (thus, Heads of Government) and backed the need to improve the way the Council works, s well as strengthening its presence in Brussels. The Community method is both a procedure and a mentality; it means that plans come from the Commission, guarantor of the common European interests, and pass through Parliament, possibly with a conciliation procedure. But, in the end, it is the Council which decides (at times through a majority, at times with co-decision with the EP). The same procedure has to go for preparing the Summits. It's not me who proposes that the Council should become a second Chamber of Parliament or who "forgets" the Summit in the new institutional structure;
- the "Intergovernmental method" means that governments would negotiate between themselves, according to the mechanisms of classical diplomacy, without an independent institution being responsible for the common interest and with the right of initiative, without debate nor parliamentary vote. This method has always existed and has only ever led to systems of alliances that offer no guarantee that they will last, that crumple under a change in majority and have never prevented wars, conflicts, or other disasters.
The difference between the two methods is radical, but it does not lie there where the false prophets say it is. The role of States remains decisive, half a century of European history shows us so. (F.R.)