Wonderful tussles expected. Why are the results of the Nice Summit concerning the European Commission insignificant and especially dangerous? Because they do not resolve the true problems. The decision in Nice includes some positive elements: nominating of President and Commissioners by qualified majority (with this rule, the "post-Delores" Commission would have been Presided by Mr Dehaene, as the United Kingdom would not have been able to use its veto) and a three fold increase in the powers of the President (nominate the Vice-Presidents, modify the portfolios of the Commissioners and the resignation of a Commissioners). Though the measures that will enter into force as of 1 January 2005 resolve nothing. They foresee one Commissioner for each Member State up to 27; then, a number of Commissioner below the number of States, by indicating some general principals, but by postponing the core to a future decision by the Council, to be taken by unanimity (which announces some wonderful tussles).
In substance: one Commissioner per country for several years, then we will see. We do not know at what time, within how many years, the EU will exceed the selected number of 27 countries (all the candidates that are already negotiating are covered by this figure); thus we will have to count on a rather long period with a maxi-Commission. Though this should not scare off other measures. There exist valid reasons to feel that it is impossible to take away its Commissioner from any Member State, present or future. And these reasons are not based on an incorrect interpretation of the Commission's' nature, as no government has claimed that one Commissioner of its nationality is necessary to defend the interests of its country; no, the motives are more subtle. Let us quote that of Mrs Ferrero-Wladner, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs: "What matters for us, is to have complete information on the ideas of the Commission, on its action and its plans. What is important, is that there is somebody within it that understands the situation, the problems and sensitivities at home. This is all the more important with regards to public opinion when the Commission takes unpopular decisions, which sometimes happens." For the candidate countries, it is even clearer. For them, the Commission represents the true government of Europe, it is with the Commission that they are negotiating accession, it is the Commission which tells the truth (or nearly) on the timetable (while the Heads of Government juggle with the demagogic or fantasist dates), it is the Commissioner who indicate in detail the efforts that each country must make to push forwards its candidacy. It is unthinkable, for any candidate country, not to have (at least from the start) a Commissioner of its nationality.
Opportunity dreamed of for some Heads of Government. Though the maxi-Commission is not necessarily unmanageable, it is a question of organisation, clarity or balance. Though it is precisely the balance which is the problem. In the Commission with 27 members, deliberating by a simple majority, the weight of the large countries will be negligible: 6 Commissioner, including Poland. Looking at it from farther away, the countries from the former Yugoslavia could have more Commissioners than the founding countries of the Community. Which is strange, it is that the small countries have never asked the large to renounces their second Commissioner; in extremis, it would have been preferable to maintain the present situation. 32 Commission instead of 27, that would not change a great deal, but the balance would be better protected (the double Commissioner for the large countries already existed in the High Authority of the ECSC half a century ago).
The true question is to know if some of the Heads of Government do not feel that such an unbalanced Commission (with 6 votes for 7 large cumulated countries) represents the dreamed of opportunity to lower its powers, to consider it as a Areopagus of the wise, which would have much to discuss, but nothing to decide. How to protect under these conditions the balance of the institutional triangle, necessary to escape the trap of the intergovernmental method? We do not have any ready made solutions, but one certainty: it requires imagination, a lot of imagination, and political courage, to define the true solutions, because the danger is great. We will try to prove this tomorrow.
(F.R.)