You didn't have to be called Nostradamus to understand. Given the developments in the preparatory work on EU institutional reform, prediction had become easy: the Nice Summit could only lead to a rather mediocre reform, but sufficient to continue, rekindle even, accession negotiations and to enable the European Union to function correctly. We had no need of Nostradamus to write in this section, at a time when the Summit was beginning its work and as the hysteria of apocalyptic forecasts was in full swing, that the "political and psychological atmosphere prohibits major results in Nice, but Europe will not be paralysed and enlargement will not be blocked" (see this section in EUROPE of 8 December, pp.3/4). The successful dramatisation had its use, alerting the media and, through them, public opinion, but it was obviously absurd to announce that in Nice Europe had to choose between paralysis and re-launch. Nobody wants paralysis; nor is it yet time for a re-launch.
The truth is that once more European construction has progressed (enhanced cooperation, thus vanguard, has really become possible, and decisions in several fields will become easier) and that re-unification between Western, Central and Eastern Europe is today closer. Furthermore, the debates in Nice provided some precious lessons: for example:
- Understandable susceptibilities. President Chirac explained the laborious path of negotiations by the fact that they touched upon the "most delicate issues, those that hurt": weight of the different countries, national dignity, etc.. It's curious that certain commentators should have wanted to wax ironic on national susceptibilities on this, and present them as petty-mindedness, when issues were raised one or another of the Fifteen, yet justified when they were the work of candidate countries. It's normal that Poland should be proud of its past, its civilisation and its traditions; why should Portugal and France be ashamed of a similar reflex? There was not too much petty-mindedness in negotiations in Nice, but understandable susceptibilities, accompanied by gestures of generosity (on the part, for example, of Germany and Belgium).
- The "red lines" and Realpolitik. Two days before the Summit, the appeal by Javier Solana for Realpolitik was obviously aimed at some aspects of the "move to the majority rule", for which it would have been an illusion to expect those Member States directly concerned to ease their stances. France had to safeguard cultural exception. Regarding France's stance, Luxembourg's Prime Minister declared: "should this cause sniggers in certain European circles, it's that they have understood nothing about France". For its part, Germany could not give way on immigration and asylum for a very simple reason: in the current situation, with no common rules at borders, most illegal immigrants head for Germany, whatever the country of entry; nor are there any standards on distributing the cost of illegal immigration. We shall be able to vote through a majority once there is a European policy on these matters. As for the United Kingdom, Tony Blair set out clearly the "red lines" that could not be crossed; under the pressure of an excited press, a distrustful public and a raging opposition; Realpolitik simply meant that in London there was no margin for manoeuvre. Spain regarded as essential retaining its right of veto over the resources of the Community Structural Funds, fearing that the Union's enlargement should lead to a reduced flow of funding to Spanish regions. It secured retention of this right of veto for the next period of financing; but we believe it an illusion to imagine that the EU is moving towards new "Delors packages"; the general climate and new obligations lead us to expect less generosity, and the rule of unanimity could take the from of bargaining in which each Member State (current and future) will want to secure something in exchange for a concession. This bodes ill for an effective and balanced cohesion policy.
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It's true that, in all the aforementioned areas, the change in the voting method involves no transfer of State sovereignty to Brussels (the goals are not ideological but pragmatic, said Romano Prodi: it is a question of being able to take decisions and not of handing new powers to the Union), and never has it been a question of removing the control of fiscal policies from governments or national parliaments; but, in certain cases, the truth is, at least momentarily, impotent before professional agitators. Javier Solana demolished the European Commission's formula of a simple double majority (States and population) for Council decisions with the following calculation: in a Europe of 27 countries, 16 countries having a population corresponding to 12% of the EU's population would have a minority block. One may wonder why, in which strange situation, all small countries should have to get together to vote against the large. But Solana's argument won the day. The compromises finally agreed to are monstrously complex and almost incomprehensible for trade policy, promising in the long-term for immigration and asylum policy, of concern for cohesion policy, pure blockage for the field of taxation and for certain social aspects. We must make do, and look ahead.
- a political group in difficulty?. The British Conservatives have strongly criticised the outcome of Nice as further step towards abandoning autonomy and sovereignty for the United Kingdom: the German Christian-Democrats for the timidity of progress towards European integration.. The misfortune is that they both belong to the same political group in the European Parliament, the EPP, and that the attitudes described seem further dictated by domestic reasons (attack the majority in place in the respective countries) than by European ones. How will they vote in Strasbourg? Openly recognising the opposite reasons for their reservations, or adding together the criticisms with less logic but greater political impact? The EPP Group is the largest, but one may doubt that it is the most cohesive or coherent.
- the hero of the day. This is how Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen described his Belgian colleague, Mr. Verhofstadt, who, in the last convoluted hours of negotiations, dared to agree to his country having,, within the Council, one vote less than the Netherlands. There was obviously something absurd in this uncoupling, as a similar uncoupling had been rejected in a case where the difference in the population is of 20 million people, and not just a few million as between Belgium and the Netherlands. But what counts, is the Belgian Prime Minister's explanation: what's important, he said, is that the Benelux as a whole has as much weight as any of the large countries. Here is a criterion of geographic re-grouping that could become precious when it becomes essential to seek new imaginative formulae for the composition of the European Commission. Which means that, in our opinion, what happened in Nice over this aspect is neither sufficient nor really satisfactory. The Commission's real problem does not so much lie in the number of Commissioners, it lies elsewhere. And it deserves an ad hoc comment.
It needs to be emphasised now already that the principle of appointing the president of the Commission through a majority represents a very significant innovation. One Head of State immediately pointed out that the majority procedure could have prevented the United Kingdom from opposing the appointment of Jean-Luc Dehaene, following Jacques Delors departure, and Europe's history would have been partially altered. At first sight, the gradual return to Brussels of all Summits is a more banal initiative; we have had excellent and productive summits in many cities. Most likely, this initiative responds to the fears of new Member States wanting to displace Summits to areas that are doubtless full of charm and historic memories, but not very compatible with the increasingly weighty commitments of Heads of Government.
- Proof that Europe is moving forward. Despite the efforts of Chirac and Prodi, the results of the Nice Summit compared to the institutional reform have not reverberated much. And yet, their significance must not be underestimated, as they focus on subjects that have long been of concern to economic circles (statute of the European limited company) or citizens and public opinion in general (the distinctive nature of sport, maritime safety), and even the new European policies that could gradually alter the EU's very face (defence, area of freedom, security and justice). These issues prove that, despite the faults and shortcomings of the Treaty of Nice, Europe is moving forward.
Ferdinando Riccardi
