Brussels, 02/11/2000 (Agence Europe) - Speaking at the "Chatham Lecture" at Trinity College, Oxford, the European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten turned to the place of his country, the United Kingdom, in European construction, raising the problem of sovereignty and noting among many Europeans, not only British, a feeling of alienation in relation to the project, which led him to make suggestions as to how to ensure greater "democratic legitimacy" for the EU. He said in particular:
- de jure sovereignty is not de facto sovereignty: "sovereignty" in the sense of unfettered freedom of action, is a nonsense. A man, naked, hungry and alone in the middle of the Sahara desert is free in the sense that no-one can tell him what to do. He is sovereign, then. But he is also doomed. (…) My own conviction, as I shall argue, is that in our national debate we have focussed too much on sovereignty. The more important concept is that of democracy. Constitutional authority, or de jure sovereignty, may very well be divided between several institutions both within the country and outside it, if the authority thus divided can maximise the common good. So the proper question is not whether participation in the EU is a reasonable abdication of sovereignty, as some opponents have sought to prove in the courts. It is how the emerging polity can best represent, and be felt to represent, the will of the people (…) By seeking to preserve our de jure sovereignty, did we maximise our de facto sovereignty - our influence over our destiny? It is now generally accepted that we did not. By staying out, we allowed the Community to take shape without us, according to principles that were alien to us."
- The risks of remaining "outside the euro. For years, the British debate has been about the pros and cons of a single currency 9…) But the debate should always have been about whether Britain was better off inside or outside a project which was going ahead anyway (…)Already the advent of the euro is having s profound influence on decision-making (…) Gordon Brown does not always bother to attend the traditional meetings of the 15 Finance Ministers, the EcoFin Council. That is perhaps understandable insofar as the most enticing smells are starting to emerge from the Eurogroup kitchen - with some of the EcoFin menu pre-cooked there. (…) Britain is a member of the Group of 7 (…) But what of the G7 were to begin to give way to G3, bringing together all those with responsibility for the management of the dollar, the euro and the yen? Would we be invited to dine at the high table if we were outside the euro zone?
- Paths and means of bringing the populations closer to the Community institutions and activities. At present, people feel sullen and alienated from the EU - not just in Britain (…) If national parliaments assumed a more prominent role in the European process they would impart greater legitimacy to the supranational effort (…) The European Parliament fulfils an important role, and very demanding one. It is not a job which could be done by national part-timers. Some might suggest having a proportion of delegates from national parliaments, but this would only be a partial solution (…) There is still a gulf to be bridged. What other things might be considered? One possibility under discussion would be to create a second chamber of the European Parliament which could help to apply the principle of subsidiarity (…) Members could be drawn from national parliaments - perhaps also with some regional and other representatives (…) they would not be paid for their additional work, which could be seen as an extension of their national duties. They would not scrutinise all legislation, but look only at proposals that were opposed on subsidiarity grounds by a given number of Member States. Another idea is that elections to the European Parliament should take place the same day as national general elections. Members would then change on a rolling basis as national elections occurred, rather than all in one fell swoop every five years. (…) National parliaments could engage more wholeheartedly in the European enterprise. Westminster, in particular, could do much more. Why not make MEPs ex officio members of the national upper House so that they can help bind together the national and European policy debates? (…) In general, there has to be a greater sense that Europe is us, not some foreign conspiracy. Westminster, in short, should begin to take responsibility for European outcomes.
If the EU as a whole is suffering from a lack of connection between its institutions and its electorates, this problem is especially acute in the field of external relations. (…) The tender plant that is the so-called Cfsp is a rootless one. The former EU and UN ambassador Sir David Hannay suggested recently the constitution of a Foreign Relations Committee of the Union drawing its members both from the EP and from national parliaments.
I like the idea that we should try to define more clearly, in a political document, where the boundaries lie between national and Community prerogatives. I will not call it a Constitution, for fear of exciting the wrath of those who would see that as positive proof of the emergence of a superstate (…) So perhaps it would be better to refer to a statement of principles or charter of competencies, as Tony Blair has (…) If we had such a document, it has been argued that we might accompany it by a change in the Treaty itself confirming that the EU is now a mature institution which has achieved the broad balance it seeks between national and European powers. (…) The founding Treaty calls for an "ever closer union between the peoples of Europe". The suggestion is that we should balance that ambition with wording to make clear that this does not mean "ever dwindling nations". This might for example take the form of an explicit assurance in the Treaty that the destiny of the European Union is to work in harmony with its Member States, not to subsume them.
