An unaccommodating analysis. When Pierre de Boissieu speaks of the EU Council, he needs to be listening to with care, for at least three reasons. The first: he is its Deputy Secretary General, he thus knows what he is speaking about "from the inside". Second reason: in previous years, as France's Permanent Representative, he took an active part in all the work of the Council. Third reason: his frankness is almost legendary, MEPs who heard him last month speak for almost two hours (see the report on this unusual hearing in our bulletin of 6 April, pp.12/13) were flabbergasted.
Mr. de Boissieu is doubtless right when he states that "the problem of the Council resides less in Brussels than in the fifteen capitals". The main accusation leveled by most observers against the Council is that it does not ensure consistency in European action: each Council "formation" acts for itself, and what one decides is at times in contradiction with what another decides. The "General Affairs" Council, whose task it is to coordinate the different work and decisions, has not done so for years. Why? Because it is increasingly taken up by its responsibilities of "external relations", as well, and especially, because it is obviously impossible for Member States to have a coherent attitude within the different Council formations if this coherence is not first assured at national level. According to Mr. de Boissieu, the coordinaion process has weakened in all capitals and has even practically disappeared in three or four; the outcome is that ministers arriving in Brussels often speak personally, instead of speaking on behalf of their government as a whole, which diminishes their authority and renders any dialogue more difficult (as most European issues concern several ministers). In addition, the different Councils "do not speak among themselves".
The "General Affairs" Council also has other shortcomings. For now Cfsp (common foreign and security policy) consists in declarations more than decisions, and often foreign ministers come to Brussels not to decide something but to "say" something and repeat it to the press. And here Mr. de Boissieu had one of those formulas for which only he holds the secret: the Council session then becomes "the preparatory forum to a press conference". Other shortcoming: the Council has no "obligation to come up with a result" (if a decision is not taken, it is simply put off to the following month).
Inadequate or illusory therapy. As one sees, the analysis is unaccommodating. Remains to be seen if the remedies are adequate. Mr. Boissieu considers that the European Council (Summit) should provide the General Affairs Council with a remit to recover its original coordinating role, as it would be "very dangerous" for that role to be assumed by the heads of government themselves, who must not "overexpose themselves" but reserve their role for "weighty solutions". A "filter" must therefore be maintained between the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the European Council. In addition, the successive presidencies should further turn to the Council Secretariat - which, for its part, does not change every six months - to ensure continuity and avoid any break between one presidency and the next. Adaptations to the very functioning of the Secretariat are underway and, for the most part, will be achieved by the end of the year (except for the problem of languages).
This therapy to cure the ills of the Council is based on remedies for which it first needs proving that they are possible. A "remit" from the heads of government is not enough for the General Affairs Council to recover the fullness of its coordinating role! With the gradual introduction of the Esdp (defence), foreign ministers will be increasingly involved in their role of heads of diplomacy with responsibility for external relations. Whatever, they will not be able to implement coordination in the economic and monetary field. The final phase of EMU, with the single currency, has multiplied Europe's tasks and responsibilities in this field, and these responsibilities are obviously those of economy and finance ministers. Mr. de Boissieu knows full well that the Permanent Representatives are not even informed of what the relevant bodies are preparing for the sessions of the EcoFin Council or (why not call a spade a spade?) the Euro Council. And even were the ambassadors "informed", that would not change anything much: an essential chapter of Community activity anyway escapes the grasp of foreign ministers. We know Jacques Delors answer: split the General Affairs Council in two: the formation composed of foreign affairs ministers would be responsible for everything pertaining to external relations. The other would be composed of deputy-prime ministers with "real authority" and should guarantee coherency in all European activities.
The Heads of Government are there, and there they will remain. The second unrealistic aspect of the "Boissieu recipe" concerns the return of the European Council into the empyrean, detached from the contingencies of Union management. Unrealistic, because the Heads of Government will no longer shirk the more direct responsibilities they have assigned themselves. The movement has been slow and gradual, and fundamentally justified because of their democratic legitimacy and undeniable representative nature. The vital decisions for a country are taken increasingly at European level. How can one imagine that the Heads of Government (or of State as is the case of Jacques Chirac, elected by universal suffrage) would agree to return to a more effaced role, less directly involved in decision-making and in the preparation of decisions? They will agree even less as the powers of the Union are being extended to the defence field. And in the economic and monetary field already cited, only the Summit is authorised to impose the guidelines of the Ecofin Council and perhaps gradually play the role of economic and social government of the Union, as a counterweight to the "monetary government": the European Central Bank.
Formidable institutional problems. Of course, the self-promotion of the European Council raises formidable institutional issues, because it is not easy to include it in the mechanisms of the Treaty and it could, possibly, determine the definitive slide of the "Community method" to intergovernmental cooperation. Such a direction does not frighten some capitals, which, on the contrary, would rather place it among the positive elements of the current EU evolution. But it can still be countered, on condition not to reckon on the Heads of Government going back on things, which would be illusory and not even desirable as their involvement is becoming increasingly necessary if one wants fundamental decisions to be taken in common, in the Community framework rather than in bilateral meetings. How can the institutional balance, the role of the European Parliament and the autonomy of the Commission be safeguarded under such conditions? How can one ensure that preparation of the essentially intergovernmental summits and the deliberations of the European Council without participation of Parliament respect the "Community method"?
The road is narrow. It above all implies political determination by a sufficient number of Member States in order to prevent institutional slide towards procedures not included in the Treaty. Secondly, it implies that the Commission should have the ability to keep the "intellectual control" of the European Council sessions: ideas must come from the Commission, with frameworks for initiatives, monitoring of respect of Community guidelines and the appropriate documentation. In the second phase of preparation of the Lisbon Summit this role was maintained. The European Parliament, for its part, must ensure its prerogatives are fully respected. Whatever the guidelines defined by a Summit are, the Parliament must be there at the time they are implemented, with its budgetary authority and its decision-making authority. This is where the democratisation of Europe comes into play, far more than in the attempts to whittle down the Commission's prerogatives or to engage in procedural battles with it.
As for the Council, the institution the most directly concerned by the growing interference of the Summit in Community affairs, the debate opened before the European Parliament by its deputy secretary general must be continued. The debate within the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on reforms should be accompanied by reflection on all the problems evoked yesterday and today under this heading. And with even greater attention as, as there is no intervention, the failings and the shortcomings of the Council would worsen with the future EU enlargement, to the point of transforming it into a sort of powerless and ineffective assembly.
Ferdinando Riccardi