Public opinion is lost. Let's be sincere: the decision to convene a special summit this month in Lisbon was first greeted with a certain scepticism, even a few ironic smiles. It gave the impression of having been invented not in response to a need but as a sort of gift to the Presidency, to enable Antonio Guterres to have "his" extra European Council, with which his name would be associated. But the facts are that the truth is very different: the European Council on 23/24 March, according to several qualified observers, is being seen as a turning point in the economic history of Europe.
First, it became obvious that the Portuguese Prime Minister was not looking for a superficial success but had a precise idea of the objectives to be attained. Second, several Heads of Government intervened personally to specify, clarify and -why not admit it?- orientate the summit. Third, a number of Social Affairs and Employment Ministers endeavoured to make their voices heard to keep the employment/social policy element from becoming secondary. And fourth, the European Commission tried to give a coherent nature to the numerous contributions in a single document that has the ambition of representing the basis for the conclusions to be reached by the summit. Further, the body representing European employers, Unice, has tried to underline the importance business attaches to this event, from which it is expecting precise and, as far as possible, binding guidelines for the European economy. A parallel contribution is expected from the European Trade Union Confederation.
But not all is positive in the multiform and scattered evolution of the preparations. Before talking about content, we would like to devote a few paragraphs to this preparation, which is also fundamental. The way the national contributions have piled up gives an impression of institutional confusion and, above all, has inevitably disconcerted not only the public opinion but also Community circles themselves. The public opinion has so far understood none of the summit's stakes and objectives. From this point of view, everything needs to be done in the coming weeks if anything decided in Lisbon is to get across to the public and if the media are to be convinced not to focus their attention on the other subjects to be added to the agenda (defence and security, Chechnya, etc.).
Beware of institutional drift. Concerning the Community institutions, the Presidency's preliminary documen(See EUROPE Documents Nos 2171/72.) proves that Mr Guterres first conducted impressive preparatory work and had clear ideas on the direction he intended to give the summit; the number of objectives was still excessive, however, and no timetable (which will later become a fundamental element) was included. For its part, the European Commission distributed its communication on "The Information Society for All"(See EUROPE Documents Nos 2173/74) which -presented on a preliminary basis at the Helsinki Summit- went by almost unnoticed because that day all attention was logically focused on the decision to open accession negotiations with six new countries and to grant Turkey official candidate status. Then, preparation slipped from the European institutions into the hands of governments (individual, or in groups of two, three or even four), whose contributions were sometimes significant but gave rise to no debate within a Community framework. The General Affairs Council was totally absent, and yet it acts surprised if it is accused of not playing the role it should to ensure the coherence of Community work! The Economy/Finance Council will state its view on 13 March; it is doubtful whether its intervention will have any influence whatsoever. The Social Affairs Council acted in fragmented fashion: never at a sitting, but in meetings between groups of ministers. There are so many national documents that anyone who does not have the vocation and qualities of an archivist has lost count. The Belgian Government has even signed two different documents.
The European Parliament has debated subjects that will be discussed in Lisbon, almost without realising it and resulting in a left/right split that does not correspond to Member States' current political situation. The case of Parliament is so particular that we have devoted an "Asterisk" to it below. And the European Commission? Its overall document of 28 February is valid from several points of view, as we will see below. But we still have the impression that the Commission has not really directed preparation of the summit and that certain Heads of Government, from José Maria Aznar to Tony Blair, influenced it much more. So did the EU's institutional system really play its role? Superficial observers might take the view that the main thing is not the way a result is achieved, but the result itself. That is true, but we should beware of the drift towards intergovernmentalism, which would undermine the Union from within. Institutional balance requires the General Affairs Council and Parliament to play their roles more clearly and the European Commission to exercise a certain "intellectual control" over the European Council. We shall not speak of "political control", because the Heads of Government will not give up the role they have gradually taken on and to which they have a right, in the final analysis, given their indisputable democratic legitimacy. But without the Commission's intellectual control, how can summit debates be kept from scattering in every direction, or in fact being steered by two or three Heads of Government who have a clearer idea of the desired direction?
Victory of the "third way". There is no need to have read all the preparatory documents (who could possibly do so?) to have a clear enough idea of the orientation of the Lisbon Summit. On the contrary, the excessive number of declarations, communications and positions has made it harder to follow the main idea, which is quite simple: it goes very much in the direction of what last year was called the "third way", i.e. -in vastly summarised form- half-way between radical liberalism on the one hand, with the market as the supreme criterion for defining what is good for the economy, and on the other, rigid protection of the acquis of the European social model and maintenance of public monopolies for essential services. This "third way" was tempered and corrected during preparation of the summit by commitments relating to the increase in employment, social cohesion and fighting exclusion.
Mr Guterres' original document already contained the essential guidelines, including those of a social nature, but was not operational enough; it was more of a manifesto in favour of the "new economy" than a programme. Emphasis was placed on the Europe of knowledge, explained in parallel in the Commission document on "An Information Society for All", with details on its social, economic, fiscal and budgetary objectives.
Mr Aznar and Mr Blair leaped into the opening thus created, to reorientate it in the direction of reforms, and several Labour Ministers did the same, insisting on the aspects of employment, social cohesion and the fight against exclusion. The most explicit and most operational document was by the Spanish Prime Minister (See EUROPE of 24 February, page 13), which contained a three-phase plan matched with a timetable. The first phase makes provision, before the end of the year, for: the abolition of all barriers to electronic commerce, approval of a European Charter for SMEs, strengthening of the Broad Guidelines for Economic Policies and added flexibility in the labour market. But the decisive rendez-vous would be in 2004, with full liberalisation of the electricity, oil, gas, telecommunications and air transport markets, the reduction of state aid (with target figures) and a fully integrated capital market. The third phase would last until 2010, the objectives being even more ambitious, with renewal of the European social model leading the way. The phased approach, which led to the single market and Economic and Monetary Union, would thus be used again for economic and social reform, the timetable becoming binding thanks to its formal approval by the Heads of State and Government.
A demanding and ambitious timeframe. Everything that came afterwards (or in paralllel) was meant to strengthen aspects that did not seem sufficiently highlighted in the Aznar plan, especially in matters of employment, while admitting the necessity of a more flexible labour market, with a greater choice of employment arrangements and with social security systems that are more of a springboard for employment than a safety net. The percentage of 3% annual growth a year, already indicated as indispensable to jump-start employment in the Guterres document, is taken up in the joint memorandum by employment officials for France, Italy and Belgium (See EUROPE of 22 February, page 9). We would be interested in learning the Ecofin Council's opinion on this subject. The European Commission intervened energetically in this context by adopting (along with a communication on "The Information Society for All" and a recapitulative document) no fewer than four papers by Mrs Diamantapoulou: on employment in the fields of information technology and internet, employment in general and social inclusion, including for those without regular work.
The Commission's document of 28 February has the ambition of representing the recapitulation of these scattered contributions, cleaning them up as much as possible by deleting the statements of principle and excess verbiage they sometimes include. Emphasis is placed on specific measures (lower telecommunications costs, for example) and the timeframe takes on a previously unsuspected scope: agreement on electronic commerce in 2000; in 2001, telecommunications package, connection of all schools in the Union to internet and European patent; new rules for public procurement in 2002; full implementation of the venture capital plan in 2003; in 2004, full liberalisation of all energy markets, creation of a single European air space, and development of rail freight corridors; in 2005, completion of the financial services action plan. Deadlines are also set for certain social objectives, in particular higher employment, which has a significance far beyond its economic and social importance and deserves an "Asterisk" of its own (which we promise to write soon). A more detailed analysis, comprising other, more qualified interventions, is needed, but at first sight, the Commission's document could indeed represent a balanced synthesis of liberal reforms and protection of the European social model with indispensable adjustments. How far can this document steer debate in Lisbon? Will the Presidency of the summit invite Romano Prodi to open the debate and explain its stakes to members of the European Council who may not yet have taken measure of its importance?
In any case, the Heads of Government will have the last word and they do not give the impression that they intend to leave much room to either the General Affais Council (which would meet the day before the summit) or the other Councils. Several have tried to take a prominent position, with José Maria Aznar and Tony Blair being the most active. What is awing is the total silence of Chancellor Schröder and President Chirac. How distant seem the days when the Franco-German relationship represented the driving force of Europe!
Ferdinando Riccardi