L’Ukraine, la République et les oligarques
Sébastien Gobert has lived since 2011 in Ukraine, where he has served as correspondent for Libération, RFI, Mediapart and Le monde diplomatique, amongst others, before joining the NGO Team4UA. In this book, he takes us on a deep dive into the Ukrainian oligarchical system and its many different facets. It falls between the two stools of a saga with all its excesses and the unpicking of the dysfunctional rule of law and mechanisms of corruption, against a backdrop of a mobilising civil society and future prospects that are still far from setlled.
“Since 1991, Belarus has (…) had just two heads of state and Russia two and a half – as Dmitry Medvedev’s term in office (2008-2012) was effectively just a preliminary for Vladimir Putin’s time in power. Over the same period, six presidents, 16 prime ministers and 21 governments have handed over power to each other peacefully in Ukraine, with the exception of 2014, all despite three financial crises back in 1998, 2008 and 2014), two revolutions (2004 and 2014), one war (since 2014) and one pandemic (2020-21)”, the author points out, adding that “what some people denigrate as proof of chronic instability the Ukrainians hail as a symptom of their allergy to authoritarianism” (our translation throughout). Furthermore, “the country’s oligarchs, typically independent and influential players, have brought all their influence to bear on this process. With their economic and political crossings of swords and, in many cases, highly ill-advisable actions, they have helped to prevent the consolidation of a vertical power structure, which would threaten their interests and influence”.
Although, following revolution or electoral upset, windows of opportunity for structural reform have remained open for an average of just two years in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Guatemala, South Africa, Malaysia and Sudan, “Ukraine has on the other hand managed to solidify a consensus around the need for root-and-branch change, which took on a most original expression in the election of the Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2019”, Gobert argues. He goes on to explain that “since 2014, the country has been on track to achieving a sustainable transition, very much like South Korea in 1987, Taiwan in 1988 or the post-Pinochet’s Chile. These countries, however, have not (yet) come under fire from an imperialistic and vengeful neighbour. Unquestionably, the Ukrainians are first and foremost to blame for their own corruption; but this has undeniably been encouraged by the Kremlin, its armed forces, its hydrocarbons and its undercover agents. This context of war makes the progress made since Maidan Square all the more remarkable”.
Whilst the “biases and conflicts of interest of the principal media outlets are obvious”, something that is peculiar to Ukraine, particularly with regard to the Russian situation, is the multiplicity of these. “Their fierce rivalry and considerable resources engender (…) a culture of debate and investigation that will characterise the Ukrainian public space. The multiplicity of opinions prevents the emergence of a single official discourse”, the author stresses.
In 2014, during the Orange Revolution, it was civil society that mobilised, foreign players going no further than to accompany the movement, with “declarations, mediation efforts and ad hoc donations”. “Similarly, the Russian oligarch in exile, Boris Berezovsky, would admit that he had transferred 50 million dollars to the ‘Orange’ businessman David Jvania. Conspiracy theories and Russian propaganda would present this commitment as evidence that the Revolution had been ‘fabricated’ by the West. Not only has this kind of interference never been proved, but this kind of geopolitical pseudo-analysis detracts from the local origins and very Ukrainian staging of the protests”, Gobert writes.
Since the inception of the “Oligarch Republic” under the Presidency of Leonid Kuchma, “the Russians have obviously remained present on the Ukrainian market, be it in Donbass, the ports of Odessa, in the energy circuits or through industrial cooperation projects”, “these connections by no means presuppose that the oligarchs have any appetite for greater integration within the Eurasian Economic Union”. With as many different opinions as there are individuals, the stances taken by the billionaires and multi-millionaires of Ukraine tend to support the status quo in the country, to avoid the constraints and competition of the Western and Russian models. “Yet it is in Ukraine that this status quo is being called into question” by the “construction of a vertical power structure benefiting Viktor Yanukovych’s closest circle”, the author explains. He goes on to point out that it is estimated that Yanukovych’s ‘Family’ disappeared between 12 and 40 billion dollars between 2010 and 2014. And while the President and his ‘Family’ were fleeing, on 21 February 2014, the foreign affairs ministers of France, Laurent Fabius, and Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, were still trying to push through a political compromise that would have left Yanukovych in position. “In Kyiv, they were the only ones who did not realise that History had already been written”, Gobert observes.
Since 2014, “neither the Kremlin nor the great magnates have been able to contain Ukrainian society’s appetite for change”, the author goes on to explain. “Unlike in 2005, civil society did not ‘go back home’ by hoping for change from the bottom up. The organisations that have come into being in recent years have generated myriad ideas, projects and recommendations. They intend to accompany the reformers in their duties and, if necessary, bring pressure to bear on them. The government, the second actor born of the post-Maidan elections, shaken by war and financial precariousness, is eager to go to work on the transformation of the State. Finally, Ukraine’s Western partners are investing as never before. Brussels feels a particular responsibility for a Ukraine that has defended the blue flag with yellow stars on barricades running with blood. The European Union has focused its efforts on the rule of law and adapting the Ukrainian economy ahead of its integration into the single market. It is setting in place binding conditionality: reforms in exchange for financial support. Washington is becoming aware of the risk posed by Russian imperialism to Europe’s fragile balancing act”, the author argues, clarifying that “Ukraine went through more transformations between 2014 and 2015 than in 25 years of independence”.
When he became the surprise winner of the 2019 elections, “Volodymyr Zelenskyy channelled his voters’ various expectations into a message of overall change”. Despite having an absolute majority at the Verkhovna Rada, 254 seats, the first phase of his term in office was shaped by his inexperience and “after a year and a half in the job, the head of state seemed to have been overtaken by intrigues inherent to the Oligarch Republic”, Gobert writes, adding that “his majority in Parliament became reduced having lost several members of Parliament. Governmental instability continues to be the rule rather than the exception, with sudden – and often unjustified – dismissals of ministers and agency heads. Although Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s integrity is not directly in question, the behaviour of his closest circles and MPs is not always beyond reproach. Political activity seems sluggish, paralysed by the underhandedness of rival groups over which the head of state does not seem able to exercise authority or arbitrage”.
The widespread invasion of 24 February 2022 would change matters. “In the space of a few days, Russia came to occupy some 25% of the country’s territory, bringing about the exile of more than 10 million people to other regions of the country and of more than seven million others abroad. The cost in terms of human lives and resources rapidly reached levels unprecedented in Europe since the Second World War. Against this dramatic backdrop, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stood as an invincible geopolitical player (…). Through his charisma, bold communication and undeniable bravery, he became the face of a nation in resistance. This aura overlaid the extended powers conferred upon him by martial law to coordinate the war effort and make some changes to the equilibria of the Oligarchic Republic. Bankova [the name of the street on which the presidential residence is located and, by extension, used to denote the presidency: Ed], the RNBO [National Defence and Security Council], SBU [security services] and the various military administrations took on an unprecedented ascendancy, overshadowing the existing imbalances between the presidency, the government, the parliament and the regional baronies”, the author writes, also stressing the renewed fight against corruption. Indeed, in March 2023, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption removed Ukraine from the blacklist of countries making no effort to tackle this plague.
Furthermore, the opening of European Union accession negotiations has helped to drive reform. “In 2022, 53.6% of national exports went to the European Union, compared to 39.1% in 2021. A number of Ukrainian businesses have scaled up their activities to the single market, if nothing else then for logistical reasons. The idea of Europe is already a reality for Ukraine, irrespective of the pace of the progress made in the technical negotiation process”, Gobert observes. He goes on to note that “of the seven prior conditions laid down by Brussels, four of them have already been met and confirmed. A transparent procedure for the selection of the judges of the Constitutional Court has been adopted in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission. The process of verifying the integrity of the candidates to the High Council of Justice is complete. Similarly, a High Commission for the selection of judges has been set up. An anti-money laundering law has been passed, in accordance with the standards of the Financial Action Task Force [FATF]. A strategic plan to reform the security and police bodies has also been approved by Volodymyr Zelenskyy (…). Finally, the legislation regulating the media has been brought into line with a Community directive concerning audiovisual matters. Changes to the legal framework on the protection of national minorities, a point of contention of particular sensitivity with Hungary, is still pending. The fight against corruption is a sixth – critical – criterion to be complied with (…). The seventh condition is connected to it: the ‘de-oligarchisation’ of the economy. Although the last two points refer to battles that are somewhat conceptual and long-term, the Ukrainian government is determined to provide tangible evidence of its actions. The staffing levels of the NABU [national anti-corruption bureau] have increased by 30%. A restructuring of the Anti-Monopoly Committee is underway. Laws on transparency of the funding of political parties and lobbying are designed to show Kyiv’s determination to change the rules of the game, or even bring down the Oligarch Republic altogether”.
Although it is clear that the “excess of the Kremlin’s imperialist adventure would lead to a paradigm change and the military defeat of Ukrainian sovereignty, and therefore of the Oligarch Republic”, the author discusses several scenarios on the options available to Ukraine. First of these is the status quo, which would see the “perpetuation of a rapacious oligarchy entangled with the institutions of State and judiciary”, complicating the war efforts in the longer term and the efforts of civil society to bring the country to the door of the European Union. A second scenario involves the current oligarchs being replaced by a new generation, with more or less marginal developments, but allowing the Oligarch Republic to survive, which would slow the Europeanisation of the country. The third hypothesis looks at a slide into authoritarianism, generating a “reinforced vertical power structure that would have more resources to get results in the fight against corruption, ‘de-oligarchisation’ and keep up the appearances of political plurality”. Lastly, a “Rockefeller moment” would see a “voluntary withdrawal of the Ukrainian oligarchs, in favour of a de-monopolisation of the economy and respect of the rule of law, in exchange for the State’s respect of their fortunes, freedoms and lives”. A combination of two or more of these scenarios is also possible, the author explains.
“Europe is going to come here and bring order”. This popular refrain arguably reflects a hope, but most of all the deep distrust of Ukrainian citizens towards their leaders. Yet although the European Union made a huge contribution to domesticating the post-Communist oligarchy of the Baltic states and Poland in the 1990s, it “is not certain that Brussels is as strong today as it was back then”. Gobert concludes by listing the weaknesses and risks affecting Europe: “the penetration of the economies and real estate markets by funds of dubious origin, from post-soviet oligarchs or others, questioning the capacity of the Western authorities for resistance and self-defence. Many of the legal systems seem barely able to sanction criminals who, having been recognised as such, are enjoying a golden asylum in the West. From a political point of view, the time for which Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has held onto power in Hungary and, up until December 2023, the PiS party of Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland, seems to legitimise their repeated assaults on the rule of law, even though these run counter to the Community acquis of which the Commission is supposed to be the guarantor. Recent electoral developments in Italy, Slovakia and the Netherlands send out mixed signals over the West’s determination to respect a common pillar of values and standards. The renewal of the European Parliament in June 2024 [reflected a strengthening] of the populist and Eurosceptic groups. United Kingdom is still dealing with the consequences of Brexit. In the United States, more than one person is concerned by the prospect of a return of Donald Trump to the White House. Similarly, there is Marine Le Pen’s growing confidence in France, upstream of the 2027 elections”. (Olivier Jehin)
Sébastien Gobert. L’Ukraine, la République et les oligarques (available in French only). Tallandier. ISBN: 979-1-0210-6054-8. 349 pages. €21,50