Souveraineté et solidarité, un défi européen
37 contributions from 37 different authors make up this work, which was coordinated by historian Nathalie de Kaniv and the former director of OCCAR, Patrick Bellouard. This diversity allows the work to meet its objective of unpicking notions of sovereignty and solidarity, within the framework of a global reflection on the future of Europe, commissioned by the association EuroDéfense-France.
Is the concept of European sovereignty a legitimate one? This question begins the exploration. The philosopher Martine Méheut answers it, by pointing out first of all that “sovereignty is (…) absolute or it is not sovereignty” (our translation throughout). In a French reading of the word dating back to the 16th century, “it implies the centralism of a solitary, overarching and indivisible power”. She argues that “Europe will never be a nation-state implying the concentration of sovereign power, a relationship of command and obedience, the recognition of individual but not collective rights and, in particular, uniformity without recognition of diversity”. “But nor will it ever be a political organisation according to the model of a centralised federal state”, she adds, going on to stress that “even so, if we can agree to move away from the mystification of national solidarity, we need to make room for a European decision-making model which requires not just solidarity, but which shares to protect common goods at the expense, if necessary, of the exclusive defence of national interests. Today, we must acknowledge that the State no longer holds supreme power and that it is therefore no longer the veritable decision-maker which vouchsafes sovereign power”. She concludes by saying that “we have long been aware that self-sufficiency was an empty term in the context of globalisation. We must now accept that we need to break up the autonomy-sovereignty coupling and move over to autonomy-ordered harmonisation. To do this, the principle of subsidiarity takes on its true meaning within the issue of a global approach and convergent actions, as solidarity between States can go as far as to share out the burden and redistribute the benefits. The challenge at stake of truly political Europe requires this”.
Having begun his contribution with a “history of sovereignty in Europe” that is admittedly painted with broad brush strokes, certainly making for a more interesting read, former regional Prefect Cyrille Schott goes on to offer up the following observation: “the perpetuity of the European Union, the affirmation of a higher justice and a body of law applicable to the member states and all European citizens, the work of central government bodies, a monetary monopoly in the Eurozone, these elements are reminiscent of those used by kingdoms in the late Middle Ages to forge their internal sovereignty against feudal principalities”. And yet the European Union is not an empire and has no vocation to become one: “if a State wishes to leave it, it has the freedom to do so, as testified by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. The perpetuity of the Union is based on the continuing assent of the people”. The states, meanwhile, retain their exclusive prerogatives in the fields of police, security and defence. “Thanks to their advances in the economy, science, weaponry and the organisation of State, the Europeans, albeit disunited, were able to conquer empires in the 20th century. Those days are gone. These days, the new empires of the State continents (the author refers here to China, Russia and the United States) threaten the sovereignty of the Europeans if they remain in isolation”, Schott argues, adding that “compared to the mediaeval age, when the matter of sovereignty first took its place in history, the level where the decision is made has changed dimension, as has the power of the actors in attendance. Then, the stage was limited to Europe, where kingdoms of limited extent wanted to have sovereignty from the Pope, a spiritual authority lacking the temporal sword of government, for all its conviction, and from an emperor weakened by his rivalry with the former and the discords within the empire. Today, the scene has shifted and has become global; as for the actors from whom Europe must meet the challenge of sovereignty, these are States of continental dimensions and with planetary power. International sovereignty will never be available for the taking, any more than it ever has been. It is something that is built between one entity and another wishing to impose its own sovereignty, in its position as an adversary, rival or protector. This construction of sovereignty in Europe stands no chance of success unless it takes place in the unity of European nations”.
“In the current security context, in which the European states, which are broadly exposed to the same security threats, cannot claim to be able to defend themselves individually and in which the American guarantee of security is no longer as certain as it once was, the reinforcement of their solidarity is becoming indispensable”, stresses General Jean-Paul Perruche, former head of the EU military staff. He goes on to point out that “in the power balance imposed by the State-continents (China, India, the United States, Russia), strategic autonomy cannot be achieved at national level. It is therefore at European level that the operational system sufficient to meet all security challenges must be conceived. The traditional model of coalitions of circumstance does not seem either sufficient nor appropriate for the requirements of responsiveness and unity of action. To be effective, this system of European collective defence must be more integrated, which raises the central problem of the exercise of authority and accountability, therefore sovereignty”. “A union of States can only produce power if all forces are pulling in the same direction. In defence, therefore, there must be common objectives, a single command structure, a common language and similar or interoperable capabilities”, Perruche, explains, adding that the “current intergovernmental system of cooperation based on the NATO model is inadequate. Unlike NATO, in which one country (the United States) can stand guarantor for the military credibility of all jointly decided engagements, the EU must find the way to constitute a credible multinational system with guaranteed unity of action and power. It must therefore be integrated”. “The level of ambition of this system must first be aligned to the objectives pursued in terms of foreign and defence policy. What must therefore be done before all else is to take stock of all requirements of European defence, distinguishing between those common to all States, those that are shared by groups of States and those that are specific to each State, so as to balance the adapted system: centralised European command, framework-nation in coalition or national engagement with European support”, he continues. He considers that the “completion of a proper white book on security and defence, the final stage of the Strategic Compass, setting out the priority threats the EU and its member states, is absolutely vital”.
Bertrand de Cordoue, former director (research and technology) at the European Defence Agency, makes the case for “not denuding the concept of European sovereignty that France has been working hard for several years to promote to its partners, whilst far too obviously putting it in to bat for its national industrial interests, of all its sense”. “Exporting French equipment to European countries is a good thing, particularly if this choice is made at the expense of an American offer, but claiming that this is progress for Defence Europe could lead to immediate and entirely understandable misgivings as to what the French intentions are really about”, the author quite rightly points out. It is also this kind of attitude that led the other Europeans to reject the concept of “European preference” so energetically championed by the French.
“When will Paris finally understand the political meaning of the words ‘perception’ and ‘the other’ before publicly proclaiming its ideas?”, asks Joachim Bitterlich, former diplomatic adviser to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in a contribution that highlights all the diplomatic clumsiness and misunderstandings that are hampering progress towards European sovereignty and solidarity. “The fact is that Paris and Berlin are not on the same wavelength on a number of subjects, but have not been able to engage in dialogue to iron out their differences over the last 20 years, hence a high risk of incorrect perceptions on either side. I sometimes get the impression that the Germans and the French could do with a mutual friend to act as arbitrator to guide them down the right path”, writes Bitterlich, who nonetheless acknowledges that on certain subjects, defence in particular, “France today finds itself having to deal with a Germany that is effectively divided”. How can this deadlock be broken? “To begin with, we must answer a fundamental question that is of critical importance to my fellow Germans: what does France want? ‘A strong France in a strong Europe’ is a slogan that we often hear. Does this mean Europe as a tool of French policy, is it being used to cast French interests further into the world or is France prepared to stand, if necessary, behind European interests, albeit still to be defined? In my view, France should be Europe’s pilot in security and defence matters without this looking too visible to the Europeans. It is France that should develop the future European consensus – and, in particular, to accept Germany as a partner at the same level, on an equal footing”, says the former ambassador, who considers that Europe’s priority dossiers include digital sovereignty, the protection of sensitive industries, reciprocal trade measures with third countries, economic coordination, finance and debt as well as a reform of European external policy. “On its own, France cannot bear the burden, but it is its responsibility to put together the engine and, to an extent, to take an educational role to convince the Germans who still have misgivings. To reverse the trend of recent decades, the French must embody this expected change of course, firstly with Berlin, then with Poland, within the Weimar Triangle and, finally, with the involvement of other partners. A new impetus will require both Paris and Berlin to take a broader view and try to understand each other to arrive at a pioneering approach”, argues Bitterlich, who recommends the creation of a committee of the wise, consisting of former foreign ministers under the chairmanship of Javier Solana, to “shake up the European leaders” on matters of vital interest to the Europeans and the creation of a similar group on defence “in parallel with the drafting of the European white book”.
The former executive director of the European Defence Agency , Claude-France Arnould, would like to see a return, in most respects, to the situation she experienced when she headed up the CMPD (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate within the secretariat general of the Council) by stripping back the European External Action Services. In line with her highly inter-governmentalist vision, she daringly argues that “EU policies on matters of defence, space and internal security, more than ever need the involvement of the President of the European Council, to ensure consistency of action on the part of the EU in these legislative areas and to escape the pointless conflict between inter-governmental and Community approach”. This involvement, which the author forbears to describe in detail, would also weaken the European Commission and, on the same account, the already limited controls of the European Parliament. (Olivier Jehin)
Nathalie de Kaniv and Patrick Bellouard (edited by). Souveraineté et solidarité, un défi européen (available in French only). Les Éditions du Cerf. ISBN: 978-2-2041-4835-1. 344 pages. €24,00
Diplomacy and Artificial Intelligence
Foreign affairs ministers are already using artificial intelligence for administrative purposes, to analyse the median social networks (Australia, United Kingdom) and to monitor disinformation campaigns (Denmark, Germany, US, France, Sweden, Czech Republic), bots and trolls (France, NATO), but this study, published by SWP, sets out to determine the extent to which it can be valuably used in the analysis of data in the context of preparing and conducting negotiations. It is based on two case studies: bilateral negotiations in the years 1930 and 1931 for a German-Austrian customs union; contemporary negotiations in the framework of the UN concerning a resolution on cyber-crime. Although Volker Stanzel and Daniel Voelsen make clear that there are a number of weaknesses in the current state of development of artificial intelligence (cognitive bias, difficulty in taking account of informal processes, evaluation of the degree of relevance of the information collected), they nonetheless reach the conclusion that “artificial intelligence has the potential to become an important, possibly indispensable tool for the preparation and conduct of diplomatic negotiations”. “In the future, those who best succeed in embracing the possibilities of machine learning will have an advantage in negotiations”, they argue, while warning against delegating any decisions of a political nature (objectives of the negotiations, the acceptable price of an agreement, risks run) to a robot. They also highlight the importance of establishing an ethical framework and ensuring the security of the artificial intelligence systems developed. (OJ)
Volker Stanzel and Daniel Voelsen. Diplomacy and Artificial Intelligence – Reflections on Practical Assistance for Diplomatic Negociations. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). 20 January 2022. ISSN: 2747-5123. The study can be downloaded free of charge, in English or German, from the website of the Institute: http://www.swp-berlin.org