Researcher at the Bruegel think tank and the Peterson Institute, Nicolas Véron, says he believes that the EU/UK trade agreement, in its structure and content, is in line with the mandate of the European Union. He praised the unwavering unity of the EU27 that weighed in the negotiations (interview by Mathieu Bion).
Agence Europe - How is the trade agreement with the UK better than a failure?
Nicolas Véron - There is clearly more visibility, because a lack of agreement would have had more chaotic consequences, which in turn would have stimulated a new form of negotiation in one way or another.
Given the City’s share of the UK economy, why is it that there are very few financial services elements in the bilateral agreement?
Since the start of negotiations in 2017, the UK government has made the somewhat surprising choice not to prioritise financial services in its negotiating priorities. And in recent months, the British position has not been any different from previous stages.
Why is that? The answer is mostly political: the defence of financial companies has very little resonance in the Conservative electorate.
What elements of the agreement are easier to sell to the Conservative electorate?
The main symbolic point, I think, is the mechanism put in place for the control of British undertakings which does not give a formal role to the Court of Justice of the EU.
The reality is that, when comparing the UK and EU negotiating mandates, the final agreement is more like the European mandate, both in structure and content, than the UK mandate. From the outset, a fundamental feature of the Brexit negotiations has been the sequencing between, firstly, the withdrawal agreement at the end of 2019 and, secondly, a trade agreement at the end of 2020, a sequencing that was initially not agreed at all on the British side.
How has the unwavering unity of the EU27 contributed to this?
The European approach was determined by technical and substantive considerations, not so much by short-term considerations, because this Brexit negotiation did not resonate very much with public opinion.
Furthermore, the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, and his team have succeeded in ensuring that the delegation of negotiations to the European Commission creates a dynamic of trust and works in the common interest.
On the contrary, in the UK, each micro-stage of trading has been in the political spotlight, generated headlines and, therefore, led to much more political and short-term steering.
Presented as a necessary emergency, does the provisional application of the agreement lead to a loss of credibility for the European Parliament?
What will help in this debate is the contrast with the British Parliament, which has only had a few hours to look at and endorse the agreement, whereas the European Parliament has a deliberation time that allows for a more credible scrutiny.
It is hard to imagine it rejecting the agreement or asking for changes...
I don’t think that Parliament is questioning the overall balance of the agreement. Now, will the agreement that will be ratified in the end be completely identical to the one that was negotiated? That remains to be seen.
Would a European Recovery Plan have been possible with the UK?
I think the answer is no. It is unlikely that a Next Generation EU Recovery Plan, including countries outside the euro area, would have been adopted in this form if the UK had still been a Member State.
Next Generation EU is an important step towards a budget union. This has always been something that has been a red line for the British.