Brussels, 20/10/2015 (Agence Europe) - In general terms, the European Commission manages fisheries agreements between the EU and third countries in Africa or the Indian Ocean well but “there are still several areas for improvement, as regards the negotiation process and the implementation of the protocols”, states the Court of Auditors of the EU in a report adopted on Tuesday 20 October.
The Court's conclusion was that “the management of the implementation of the access conditions was not sufficiently robust”.
The audit identified differences between the catch data provided by member states, the Commission and the ex post evaluations. These differences reveal shortcomings in catch data management and give rise to financial risk, since payments under fishing partnership agreements (FPAs) are based on catch data.
The Court audited fisheries agreements for which a financial contribution is made from the EU budget. It examined four of the twelve agreements in force at the time of the audit: Mauritania (a multi-species agreement in the Atlantic Ocean), Madagascar, Mozambique and the Seychelles (tuna agreements in the Indian Ocean). These four FPAs represented 77 % of FPA payments in 2013.
The auditors' report says that negotiating agreements and associated protocols is long and complex but “the Commission handled these difficulties well and, with few exceptions, managed to avoid interrupting the EU fleet's fishing activities”. Nevertheless, the audit identified a number of weaknesses in the way the Commission handled the negotiation process.
For continuity of the European fleet's activities, the Commission can make use of the possibility offered by Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008 to allow vessels to apply through the Commission to the third country concerned for fishing authorisations while awaiting the signature of a renewed protocol. This regulatory possibility is, however, not consistent with another regulatory requirement, namely 'the exclusivity clause' and its application led to misunderstandings between a partner country (Mauritania) and the Commission.
The Commission's strategy of enlarging the network of FPAs is relevant to the needs and priorities of the EU fleet. However, there is still room to improve the complementarity and consistency among the FPAs negotiated within the same region, so as to maximise the potential of FPAs to improve fisheries governance at regional level.
One of the main objectives of the FPAs is to only fish surplus stocks. However, this has proved very difficult to implement in practice “due to a lack of reliable information on fish stocks and on the fishing effort of domestic fishing fleets, or of other foreign fleets which have also been granted access by the partner countries”, the report states.
The actual unit cost paid for a tonne of fish was frequently higher than the unit price negotiated. For example, the real cost per tonne of tuna caught in Mozambique in 2013 was about six times higher than the prices negotiated.
While the negotiations considered catches reported from previous protocols, the reference tonnage agreed in the most recent protocols often remained higher, leading to their regular underutilisation. However, the EU financial contribution was paid in full regardless of the fishing opportunities used. The underuse of the protocols and resulting high costs could be partly attributable to the technical conditions negotiated with the partner countries to comply with their national legislation or to ensure the sustainability of fishing activities.
The usefulness of independent ex post evaluations as an aid to decision-making in the negotiation process is hindered by incomplete information being provided on the utilisation rates of the protocols, their lack of comparability and the absence of a critical analysis of the effectiveness of FPAs. (Original version in French by Lionel Changeur)