Three tendencies. We have to face reality: politically, the EU is not currently a compact system pursuing uniform objectives. There are at least three fundamental tendencies:
- the “classic members”, who support and apply the treaties in force;
- the “federalists”, who favour the birth of a European Federation;
- the “conditional members”, who reiterate the absolute priority of national interests.
You could argue that these three tendencies have always existed. This is true. But the compromise system and majority law used to work as they should, whereas today, certain governments are calling for a sort of right of veto, even in cases where it does not exist. In fact, opinions differ on the very significance of European integration. In a number of member states, the Community institutions are portrayed in a very negative light, described as bureaucratic and ineffectual. Belonging to the EU does not always mean the willingness to take part in an increasingly close-knit unity of the people which make it up. In certain countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, the greatest demand expressed by a significant part of the population is to bring back national identity, so often compromised by the ill effects of the war and the post-war period. The split of the former Czechoslovakia into two states, some Polish attitudes (such as support for Ukraine's accession) and recent developments in Hungary are indicative of this reality.
A symptomatic case. Currently, the case of Hungary is raising the greatest number of concerns and reactions; the attitude of governmental policy and its compatibility with the principles of the EU have been called into question. But the European Commission cannot sanction general orientations (unless it does so by the arduous route of Article 7); it has opened infringement proceedings against specific aspects, such as attacks on the autonomy of the national central bank. But most of those who voted Viktor Orban into power are unaware of the very existence of the autonomy rules governing their central bank; their election choice was determined by reasons of an entirely different kind, to do with the economic situation and also linked, more or less consciously, to history and the way their country was carved up nearly a century ago (in 1920!) by the Treaty of Trianon. The millions of Hungarians who found themselves citizens of Romania or other neighbouring countries would again have the right to take part in the elections of their country of origin. I believe that developments related to national identity, history and the freedom of expression (to say nothing of economic difficulties and the issue of the Roma, of course) are of greater interest to the population than how the EU works. I should add that in his many recent stances, the prime minister did not refer to the historical subjects I have mentioned here; these are my own personal comments.
Real priority objectives. The case of Hungary is spectacular, but not unique; some aspects of the situation of the Czech Republic are similar. The European dream of political unity does not necessarily represent the fundamental motivation for joining the EU, either for certain member states, or for the accession candidates. In fact, there are often three priority objectives: the financial support of the EU; active presence in the Community institutions; belonging to the “Schengen zone”.
There is nothing shameful about these ambitions: each government takes the aspirations and interests of its country's population into account. But the above-mentioned priority objectives will not always be available to applicants; the initial negotiations on the financial perspectives indicate that the states which are net contributors will want to tighten belts. It is unthinkable that a small group of countries (almost all of which have national budgetary problems) will agree to fund all the others generously (including the accession candidates). Calculations indicate that pretty soon, even Spain will be in the group of net contributors. Initial exchanges of views under the Danish Presidency have already shown how tough the exercise will be and that the net beneficiaries of the budget shouldn't expect miracles.
So, I return neatly to the three categories of member states I indicated at the beginning of this piece. The countries of the eurozone are necessarily in favour of radical integration, covering national budgetary policy, with automatic sanctions. The Federalists feel that a development of this kind should naturally lead to a federal Europe. The proponents of national autonomy will never accept either of these alternatives.
This column will take stock of the current state of play of the three hypotheses. (FR/transl.fl)