Overall project is unrealistic. Misgivings about Turkish accession (see this column yesterday) do not in any way mean that the EU is rejecting this great country. The choice is not about accession or nothing at all. Turkey and the EU have very close relations based on the customs union, a unique relationship consisting of superlatively close trading ties. There are geographical, institutional, political and economic reasons why accession is inappropriate. Turkey remains, however, the third country with the closest ties to the EU, whilst at the same time maintaining its autonomy and freedom of action, particularly in the area of foreign policy. These ties can, of course, be further strengthened.
Similar considerations apply to the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) of which Turkey is, rather unenthusiastically, a part. From the very beginning, this column has argued that the way in which the UfM was set up means that it is a theoretical conjecture, despite the guile and impressive feats of flexibility to adapt both geographical considerations and semantics. Its failure to make any overall impact is obvious. The UfM has not even managed to organise a summit at a level of heads of state and government because the countries on the southern side of the Mediterranean are divided by different conflicts, closed borders and different goals. The failure of the overall project, however, does not mean that other forms of cooperation are impossible; on the contrary, the EU is continuing to develop its bilateral relations with several southern non-EU Mediterranean countries. Amongst the latter, there have been a number of small cooperation groups set up around different specific projects. It is the overall project that has failed but the links between the EU and one or other of the non-EU Mediterranean countries are getting stronger and modalities in this connection are becoming more differentiated.
Different aims. The reason for this situation is simple: Mediterranean countries do not share the same objectives with regard to their relations with the EU and their goals and ambitions are not the same. The global objective of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone cannot be attained because some of the borders between non-EU southern Mediterranean countries are closed; some countries reject the free trade zone objective itself (Algeria); others already have close ties (Turkey), whilst still others are aiming to join the EU (Balkans). Each country effectively negotiates a specific bilateral agreement with the EU that corresponds to its own situation and objectives.
The negative effects of the situation are obvious. The UfM cannot even manage to organise a summit; conflicts between certain southern Mediterranean countries are becoming more intense; joint Parliamentary debates almost never get beyond declarations of principle and rhetoric, and are sometimes quite unpleasant. The only thing that is expanding is the bureaucracy. In these conditions, the positive results obtained in bilateral EU relations with individual southern Mediterranean countries (significant in certain cases) are overshadowed or presented and interpreted without any real reference to the UfM. In this acronym the term Union is totally unrealistic. Non-EU southern Mediterranean countries that have developed very strong relations with the EU, such as Morocco, have no intention of waiting for the others. They are all pursuing their own individual negotiations on different objectives. None of them claim that their own specificities now no longer apply or renounce possible conflicts with their neighbour. For example, Algeria is slowing down the border dismantling process and is stepping up its energy links elsewhere.
EU uncertainties and shortcomings. We should not, however, believe that the situation is completely clear within the EU. The institutional aspect is controversial: is the UfM a Community project or is it intergovernmental? What remit does the Commission have and how can it take action? The European Parliament has succumbed to rhetoric: in-principle support and enthusiasm for the UfM but criticism and opposition when it involves the application mechanisms. José Bové sharply opposed the agricultural dimension of the EU-Morocco agreement. In his opinion, this delivers the final blow to Spanish, French, Italian and Greek farmers, and would also destroy family-based farming in Morocco. He thinks that the EP will never approve it. To my knowledge, neither Mr Bové nor any other MEP formulated any objections when the euro-Mediterranean free-trade project was first launched …
The 2030 horizon? Despite all this, cooperation between the two sides of the Mediterranean is indispensable if real and very serious problems, which could become quite disastrous, are to be avoided - the deterioration of the Mediterranean Sea, fisheries control and water shortages in the Arab zone. Genuine projects in these areas would be more useful than Parliamentary sessions based on rhetoric and demands. One study (EUROPE 10280) indicates that it will not be until 2030 that mutual distrust and misgivings can be overcome and that it is necessary to go beyond the current stage characterised by “the lack of common vision, political will and trust”. Food for thought. (F.R./transl.fl)