Inefficiency. Euro-Mediterranean co-operation is both necessary and possible but the current instrument is ineffective. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is based on rhetoric and is producing many failures. It is not contributing to any practical development in relations between the EU and neighbouring third countries. Its instruments include four negative aspects: a waste of financial resources; demagogic use of the institutional structure, which is aggravating and highlighting differences; the impossibility of programmed political meetings being held (beginning with the summit); and the failure of a number of ministerial meetings that have, nonetheless, been programmed. This has produced a paradox: the UfM has sharpened conflict and differences by highlighting them. Implementation of the management bodies is the only area in which any progress has been made. The few positive Euro-Mediterranean accomplishments there have been, despite the overall structure of the UfM, have been achieved between a small number of countries in the framework of bilateral agreements between the EU and individual Mediterranean third countries - agreements that have worked and in several cases, are making progress.
Seven blockage points. Our publication regularly reports on what is happening, such as the developments presented as success stories by those promoting the UfM (creation of Inframed) or the difficulties and obstacles. The overall picture we get can be condensed into seven points: 1) the summit is now planned for November but we do not know which heads of state or prime ministers will be able to participate and whether the date will be confirmed; 2) the meetings that have been announced between ministers responsible for energy and their counterparts in agriculture have been cancelled, and very few countries have expressed any interest in participating in them; 3) the ministerial meetings on tourism and water related problems went ahead (with minimum level of participation) but produced nothing; 4) the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean strategy for the water sector failed, despite this being an essential domain (an area in which it is difficult to exert any control); 5) other ministerial meetings have been programmed (environment, higher education, work and employment) but there are doubts about these going ahead; 6) no Arab country has put itself forward for taking over from Egypt at the co-presidency of the UfM, ( the Egyptian mandate expires next month and Morocco and Tunisia have not agreed to take it over); 7) on the European side, the co-presidency is still being carried out by France without any formal appointment, in liaison with the rotating presidency of the Council. There is a trend in Paris which considers the situation as permanent and Community institutions have concerns about this.
Fault lines and uncertainties. In addition to these seven points, other fault lines and uncertainties persist. Funding is a grey area, as is the way in which the secretariat general functions, despite the efforts made by Spain and the European Commission. We can understand any hesitation there might be with regard to the uncertainty involving operational projects: one possibility would be to create a link between subsequent funding of the secretariat and launching projects. Community support to different Mediterranean third countries on a bilateral basis continues and considerable amounts of money are involved but this is taking place on the margins of the UfM. The situation is the same for the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), a specialist area of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which provides a serious guarantee for projects given the go-ahead. The EIB is particularly active in the Mediterranean energy sector (EUROPE 10135) but neither the Arab Gas Pipe Line nor the Desertec project is within the remit of the UfM.
An artificial construction. At an international political level, the UfM lacks depth. The Balkan countries are part of it because they neighbour the Adriatic Sea but this is an artificial construction and another example of overriding rhetoric. The people of Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina are totally unaware that they are part of the UfM. Their concerns involve the EU and are completely different. The southern Mediterranean rim does not have its eyes on the Balkans but, rather, on other Arab countries, particularly those in the Gulf. Libya has rejected the UfM because it considers that it is incompatible with African Unity and several countries from Black Africa agree. The business world has also expressed its disappointment with the UfM, “which continues to concentrate more on its own implementation, its structures and competencies, than on the results …The UfM is not acting in a way that is beneficial to the euro-Mediterranean zone”.
The UfM is an artificial construction between countries that have different objectives and no intention at all of becoming a comprehensive unit. It is a triumph of rhetoric over reality and is not going down the right track.
(F.R./transl.fl)