Brussels, 07/04/2010 (Agence Europe) - In a working document published at the end of last month, the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) examines the reasons for the EU's failure to reform its trade defence systems (anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures and means used to combat unfair competition from outside the EU), reforms undertaken in 2007 by former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson who, under pressure from a large section of EU industry and the “producer” (as opposed to “free trade”) member states had to throw in the towel in January 2008 due to inability to reach agreement (see EUROPE 9579-9580). In the document Professor Dirk De Bièvre and postgraduate researcher Jappe Eckhardt examine the work of lobby groups and the economics and politics of the anti-dumping policy. They conclude that the high level of political mobilisation by producer lobby groups compared with the weaker mobilisation of importers and retailers was the main cause of the failure.
The authors argue that several factors had encouraged the hefty lobbying against the EU's current anti-dumping policy, like consolidation amongst importers and retailers that made it easier for them to club together, and the division among producers between associations representing companies manufacturing solely in the EU and associations representing companies that have relocated some or all of their plants to outside the EU. These factors combined as an incentive to examine the anti-dumping rules. Moreover, the geographical concentration of manufacturers in particular industries in the single market led to a gradual decline in active political support for anti-dumping measures in votes on the EU Council of Ministers. Finally, the fear of reprisals against EU anti-dumping measures is seen by the authors as watering down producers' desire to make use of the anti-dumping policy.
During Peter Mandelson's reform drive, heavy industry manufacturers and their trade associations successfully defended business as usual in the anti-dumping rules, forming a solid coalition with a joined-up strategy. The author says that lobbying could well explain the fact that after two years of negotiations without any outcome no changes were made, but it is also interesting to speculate about the public nature of a policy that, due to the organisational power of lobbying, clearly favours certain specific groups of people. They argue that as long as the test of public interest in the anti-dumping policy remains limited to the interests of a concentrated group of producers and those in their pay, then economic sectors largely composed of small businesses facing problems of significant lobbying, importers, retailers and consumers will pay the price for the current anti-dumping policy.
The authors conclude that it is highly unlikely that the EU will make any reforms in the short-term in its anti-dumping rules. It is also highly unlikely that Council Presidency and Commission moves to boost transparency in trade defence instruments by means of clearer guidelines and providing information ahead of the levying of provisional anti-dumping duty will be supported by stakeholders and the member states. Industry's demand for anti-dumping measures is positively correlated with the economic cycle and the current downturn, suggest the authors, does not favour reform. The arrival of a new trade commissioner, Karel De Gucht, may lead to a more pragmatic approach, encouraging consensus over the need for greater clarity and predictability in the procedures used by the EU for its anti-dumping policy.
The working document can be found at: http: //http://www.ecipe.org/the-political-economy-of-eu-anti-dumping-reform/PDF . (E.H./transl.fl)