Is it reasonable to try to draw a few conclusions, having devoted five commentaries to the effects of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty? One can always try, without claiming to be exhaustive or having a unanimous consensus behind one, and bearing in mind the fact that certain explanations may appear repetitive, in view of what I've already written in this column.
1. Effects already visible. The political actors and commentators who have lamented a lack of instant results have very often misled the general public. They claim to be making a judgement on the institutional changes made by the EU before these have been fully applied, before the institutions have the opportunity fully to carry out their new powers, before certain instruments are in place. The reform provides the institutions with additional opportunities to act; they have very quickly started to do so, as evinced by the activity of the new-style European Council, which immediately became operational, and the behaviour of the Parliament, which is fully exercising its new powers in a number of areas; I need refer only to its rejection of the Swift agreement with the United States, a number of decisions in the agricultural domain and use of the budgetary instrument in foreign policy issues. Admittedly, problems and differences of opinion subsist, but as a whole, good use has been made of the new facilities. Some of the results of this are already visible and others will be soon.
2. Artificial disappointments. The disappointments decried by certain sections of the media, which will logically have an impact on public opinion, concerned, amongst others, the following: a) the results of the world Climate summit of Copenhagen and the modest role played by Europe in its end phase; b) the attitude of negligence of the American authorities towards the EU and the lack of consideration shown by other international bodies; c) Europe's lack of visibility at the time of the Haitian disaster. The first "disappointment" makes no sense as regards the Lisbon Treaty, because it was not in force at the time; it's a bit much to claim legal effects for a treaty before it even exists. I shall deal with the second "disappointment” in Point 4 below. The third has been the subject of fairly lively discussions, but I do not believe that Baroness Ashton was wrong in this case to concede priority to doctors and emergency services at the scene of the disaster.
In actual fact, none of these real or argued disappointments involves the Lisbon Treaty in any way.
3. Herman Van Rompuy is making his face known. When he was appointed to the Presidency of the new-style European Council, the warmest description of him was Mister Nobody. This was not inaccurate: who, outside Belgium, had heard of him? To the best of my knowledge, only Jacques Delors immediately spoke of it as a happy choice, because he had clear ideas on the role of permanent president: not the ambition and temptation to get across his own personal opinions, but a calm and talented negotiator, capable of facilitating the emergence of European positions and getting these across. Mr Van Rompuy's assertion that his own personal opinions were of no importance and that he would therefore not be expressing them was in fact highly astute, because it lends much a priori weight to anything he subsequently goes on to declare: this represents the opinion of Europe at the highest level, as everybody is aware in advance.
And so, Mr Van Rompuy's name is starting to be known. Many references, some of them ironic, have been made to the famous quotation by Henry Kissinger (what's the telephone number for Europe?), pointing out that Europe now has three telephone numbers: President of the summit, President of the Commission, High Representative. Is that too complex for the Americans? It is simplistic reasoning. In reality, the situation has moved on a great deal. Until recently, in EU-United States meetings at the highest level, the American president had a different European counterpart in front of him each time; only the president of the Commission was relatively permanent. It has happened before that the staff of the US president has asked the name of the latest point of contact; a few weeks earlier, it was someone else. Now it is the same person every time.
Mr Van Rompuy is not known on the other side of the Atlantic? They will get to know him.
4. There is no European foreign affairs minister. How many times has this section stressed that Catherine Ashton is not the European minister for foreign affairs? She does not decide and define the positions of the EU; her job is to facilitate the long and gradual work of allowing a common position to emerge, as Herman Van Rompuy has explained as categorically as possible (this section 2 days ago was entirely given over to this: EUROPE 10090).
Baroness Ashton's role is so new and the combination of her three jobs is so complex that a certain amount of confusion subsists. One person who, at one and the same time, is the president of the "External Relations" Council, vice-president of the Commission and the head of this completely new instrument which will become the common European diplomatic service is unheard of in half a century of European integration. A number of the problems are purely formal in nature: at the plenary sessions of the European Parliament, is Catherine Ashton's place alongside Mr Barroso, as the vice-president of the Commission, or among the seats reserved for the Council, as president of one of its configurations? Or should she have an ad hoc seat as head of the diplomatic service? More knowledgeable people than I have indicated a solution.
But the fundamental points are those with a bearing on the susceptibility of the governments and their desire to have their say in certain important choices. With the Lisbon Treaty, the delegations of the Commission to third countries have become "EU delegations"; it is now the responsibility of Baroness Ashton as the high representative to appoint the heads of these delegations. Does she decide on her own? Or should she consult the Commission and the Council? This is not a secondary issue, as it is of great importance to the member states, as we saw with the appointment of the head of the delegation to Washington.
Equally lively discussions have formed the backdrop to Baroness Ashton's movements and whether or not she attends a given meeting. I refer not to her delayed presence in Haiti, on which I will say only that the German foreign minister, having stated that the most urgent course of action was to ensure that the rescue services were properly coordinated, added: "Europe has been a the continent of love thy neighbour. The aim was not to parade up and down in front of the cameras, but to act".
The rows started up again over other visits. I need hardly remind you of the scathing criticisms made of Catherine Ashton by the defence ministers for failing to attend their meeting in Palma, Majorca, where, amongst other things, they discussed- for the first time- the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) in common security and defence issues, as provided for by the Lisbon Treaty (EUROPE 10086). On that day, in fact, she was in Kiev for the inauguration of the Ukrainian prime minister, who was in Brussels two days later, a trip which was given priority over a visit to Moscow. After that, questions were raised as to why she was in Cordoba this Sunday for the informal meeting of the foreign ministers, rather than in Granada for the EU-Morocco summit. The answer was simple: because it is impossible to be in two places at the same time, even if the distance in this case was just 200 km; if she had made the opposite choice, she would have come in for just as much flak. The fact is that there are so many events taking place that it is impossible for one person to cover them all. She has already asked the foreign minister of the country holding the rotating Presidency (currently Mr Moratinos) to stand in for her on a number of occasions; this could be a solution for other instances.
Catherine Ashton's reticence has sometimes been put down to her lack of experience or a certain naivety. In fact, her role is entirely to be invented and it is not her fault if, from time to time, she seems torn between her various jobs, or if she is criticised by some for being subject to the influence of the Commission and by others for being subject to the influence of her country of origin. The member states, the Council and the Commission itself do nothing to make the job easier for her, with their concerns and jealousy in the division of roles within the European diplomatic service. Someone spoke of a fierce race for nominations, others have wondered how long Baroness Ashton will last. I feel that it would be more to the point to help her than to pile on the criticisms.
The real importance of the Lisbon Treaty lies in the common policies it can reinforce or create
Once Europe has got used to the new institutions and decision-making procedures, it will understand that the importance of the new treaty lies not in the institutional reform in itself, but in the opportunities that it opens up to reinforce common policies and to create new ones. From the time of his appointment, Herman Van Rompuy has urged people not to home in on the institutional aspects; the reforms are done and dusted and they are there for the long haul. A number of aspects will not enter into force until 2014, particularly as regards majority voting within the Council. We must not allow ourselves to be obsessed by the functions. The main thing is that new possibilities for action have now been opened up. I would like to remind you of three of them: a) any member states which so choose can get together within a common defence clause and launch structured actions for defence matters, going beyond the solidarity clause in the event of aggression; b) the Eurogroup takes on an institutional existence to coordinate the economic policies of the countries which belong to it (the effects of this are already more than visible); c) the common energy policy becomes an objective of the Union. Many other examples exist, particularly regarding the powers of the Parliament (trade policy, agricultural policy).
Enormous opportunities are opening up, if we just want to seize them.
(F.R./transl.fl)