To mark the State of the Union Forum on Tuesday 12 January, organised by nine think-tanks (Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bruegel, CEPS, Egmont, EPC, Friends of Europe, IFRI, Madariaga and SWP) in cooperation with Agence Europe, this issue of European Library focusses on the think-tanks' most recent relevant publications on the four topics covered by the State of the Union Forum, namely the climate, the Stockholm Programme, the economic crisis and the EU's role in the world.
*** HANS MARTENS & FABIAN ZULEEG: Where next for the Lisbon Agenda? European Policy Centre (Residence Palace, 155 Rue de la Loi, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium); Tel: ++32 (0)2 231 03 40 Fax: ++32 (0)2 231 07 04 ; Internet: http://www.epc.eu ; Policy Brief, June 2009.
The Lisbon Agenda, Europe's policy framework for structural reform launched in 2000, famously aimed to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” by 2010. In light of the imminence of this date and the discussions on what form the successor for the Lisbon Agenda should take, this paper reviews its performance and makes policy recommendations about the way forward.
The authors acknowledge that many of the original goals of the Lisbon Agenda will not be reached, driven by shortcomings in its implementation mechanisms. But, in light of the challenges Europe faces, including the economic crisis, the impact of an ageing population, difficulties related to migration and social inclusion, the need to deal with climate change, a rapidly changing knowledge economy with new emerging competitors and increasing global demand for resources and structural reform is even more important to sustain the well-being and prosperity of Europeans.
But to achieve this, the authors argue that Europe needs a more radical departure from the current strategy than what is currently on the table. This must include a strong focus on areas which have received little attention in the past, including public services, climate change and public finances, and more action at European level, including using the creation of a Single Market for knowledge. Implementation mechanisms need to be reformed to ensure that high level goals are translated into real progress.
The authors emphasise that there currently seems to be a lack of political will to tackle these more fundamental questions. They conclude by emphasising that leadership and a sense of ownership of the next structural reform agenda is vital: EU leaders must be convinced of the need to act and committed to promoting these policies at home. They must focus on how to create future growth and jobs within the next EU framework, agree a common approach and be frank with citizens about the long-term need to create sustainable jobs and growth instead of resorting to short-term populist rhetoric.”
*** PIERRE DEFRAIGNE: La fausse piste de la stratégie de Lisbonne, Madariaga Paper, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 2009 (Madariaga - College of Europe Foundation, 14 Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée, B-1040 Brussels. Tel: (32-2)2096210, Fax: (32-2)2096211, Mail: info@madariaga.org, Internet: http://www.madariaga.org ).
The aim of this paper is to explore the weaknesses of the Lisbon Strategy by inserting it within a long-term historical framework. Pierre Defraigne underlines the nature of the European integration project as basically built up on a supply side approach aimed from the start at increasing productivity through the benefit of innovation, competition, and a large open internal market. As such, the first steps have been the single market, carefully balanced by the equalizing institutions of the structural policy, and the single currency, largely inspired by the monetarist assumptions concerning the monetary origin of inflation. The third step has been the Lisbon Strategy, which according to the author resulted in complete failure due to several weaknesses: notably, improvisation; the neo-liberal underlying assumption deeply rooted in the Anglo-Saxon model and applied in countries whose economy is structurally different; the fact that a strategy set up for 15 states has then been applied to 27, aggravating income inequalities stemming from tax competition and weakening of labour market institutions. The author concludes by stressing that the failure of the Lisbon Strategy finally affords the opportunity to think in critical terms about the inconsistencies of the distribution of competences between the EU and the member states, and imposes a duty to think about competitiveness in a different way.
*** ELIZABETH COLLETT: Beyond Stockholm: overcoming the inconsistencies of immigration policy. European Policy Centre (Résidence Palace, 155 rue de la Loi, B - 1040 Bruxelles, Belgique. Tél. (32-2/2310340 - internet: http: //http://www.epc.eu ). EPC Working Paper N. 32. December 2009.
With the adoption of the Stockholm Programme for Justice and Home Affairs, the question of where next for immigration and asylum policy remains unsolved. This EPC Working Paper argues that policy-makers must focus on a few thorny issues such as completing border control projects and reconciling them with an equitable European asylum policy, and tackling undocumented migration by developing national regularisation criteria. At present the Directorate-General for Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS) is responsible for immigration policy, but this paper suggests 'outsourcing' it to more appropriate DGs, like Employment and Social Affairs, External Relations or Trade.
*** BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (eds). Migration, Public Opinion and Policitcs. Internet: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de . 2009. 392p. 35 euros. ISBN 978-3-86793-040-6
Public perceptions and media coverage of immigrants and immigration policy are powerful forces in shaping the immigration debate. Understanding public opinion on immigration, how this impacts the political debate and how it affects reform prospects is critical in designing a strategy to advance thoughtful, rational and effective immigration and integration policy. This volume explores a critical policy issue that has often been underestimated in the migration policy debate: the media and public opinion. This volume contains expert analysis of how our publics perceive immigration and immigrants from their effects on the job market, to their impact on culture and society, to their prospects for integration. It assesses the forces that are shaping how our publics perceive immigration and immigrants. The authors also highlight patterns and trends in how political leaders speak about immigration. The book focuses in particular on three case studies: the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. This book is the third major product of the Transatlantic Council on Migration. It is a result of the deliberations and thinking of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, which brings together leading political figures, policymakers and innovative thinkers-pollsters, political consultants, journalists, community organizers and politicians-from the USA and Europe.
*** SUSANNE DROGE: Climate Tariffs and the Credibility of the EU Climate and Energy Package: International Climate Policy and Carbon Leakage. Collection “SWP Comments”, n° 2008/C 26. Novembre 2008, 8 pp.
The French president Nicolas Sarkozy has repeatedly advocated strengthening the European climate and energy package by imposing tariffs on imports from world regions without an ambitious climate policy. Yet for a number of reasons, it remains ambiguous how trade-related policy instruments could contribute to the EU's climate strategy. Moreover, the EU faces the challenge of carbon leakage - the migration of emissions from the territory of the EU into non-EU regions through relocation of production and investment.
This issue could come to the fore as the EU price on carbon emissions will increase following the current revision of the EU emissions trading scheme for the period after 2012. If the EU's climate policy should become a credible contribution to global carbon emissions reductions, the key issue is to deliver reductions within the EU territory. In order to reduce the relocation effects, carbon cost adjustments at the EU borders could in fact be applied to a small number of leakage-prone industries. At present, however, all attempts to bring this forward at the international level are being perceived by emerging economies as a threat. This in turn places at risk both the international negotiations on the future UN climate regime and the Doha Round negotiations on world trade.
*** GRAHAM AVERY: Europe's Foreign Service: from design to delivery. European Policy Centre (Résidence Palace, 155 rue de la Loi, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 (0) 2 231 0340 Fax: +32 (0) 2 231 0704 http: //http://www.epc.eu ) « EPC Policy Brief », November 2009.
For Catherine Ashton in her task as EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the Commission, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is a priority. This Policy Brief by Graham Avery discusses the aims, structure and 'mission statement' of the new service.
He argues that - to make EU foreign policy more coherent - the design of the new service needs to put the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty effectively into practice: to avoid duplication with other parts of the Brussels system; and to ensure that outside Europe the new Union Delegations speak effectively for the EU.
It is not a question of giving priority to the 'first pillar' or the 'second pillar' of EU foreign policy, but of ensuring that they co-exist in a satisfactory way in the new structure. so that the Lisbon Treaty's 'double-hatting' brings added value.
If the EEAS can succeed in bringing together personnel from the European institutions and national diplomacy, it will develop a professional culture in which the terms 'national' and 'European' no longer imply antonymy but synergy.
*** THOMAS RENARD: A BRIC in the world: Emerging powers, Europe, and the coming order. Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations (69 Rue de Namur, 1000 Brussels. Tel: (32) 2.223.41.14 - Fax: (32) 2.223.41.16 - E-mail: t.renard@egmontinstitute.be - Internet: http://www.egmontinstitute.be ). Egmont Papers. No. 31. 2009, 42 p. ISBN 978-90-382-1505-1.
The American unipolar moment has ended. Yet, it seems too early nonetheless to evoke true multipolarity. This paper offers a snapshot of the emerging world order in which only few countries will emerge as central hubs of the system in the 21st century creating a sort of asymmetrical multipolarity with a distinction between dominant or central powers, major powers, regional powers and local powers.
Based on the analysis of several indicators, the author refines the “BRIC dream” into a more realistic BR-I-C scenario in which China appears to be the real story and the only emerging power that can challenge the US in the coming years. India will follow the path of China but its emergence will be slower and in all less impressive. Brazil and Russia are probably the least emergent among the emerging powers, but this is not to say that they are not emerging.
What place will be left for the EU in this coming multipolar order? According to most indicators, Europe has the appearance of a global power but it still fails to transform its potential into reality. To become a true global power or even a great power, i.e. a major pole in the coming order, the EU will need a more coherent approach and a more integrated strategy. There is a strong case for the EU to act together in foreign policy: Divided we fail, united we prevail.
The EU will also need to develop its relations with the emerging poles of the coming order through the use of strategic partnerships. A truly strategic use of the strategic partnerships, i.e. in function of EU foreign policy, must start from a thorough assessment of EU interests in the various regions of the globe and a clearer definition of its objectives towards them.
Finally, the paper concludes that for the EU to remain relevant in the 21st century, it will need to promote effective multilateralism at the global and EU levels, to seal real strategic partnerships, and to develop its leadership capacity in order a) to influence the global agenda, and b) to take the lead in issues of particular importance to the EU. Leadership and effective multilateralism are complementary and mutually reinforcing. They are Europe's best option to enter multipolarity as a global power. The EU will not rule the 21st century, but it can still become a major pole, and it must certainly avoid to be ruled out.
*** SVEN BISCOP (ed.): The value of power, the power of values: A call for an EU grand strategy. Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations (69 Rue de Namur, 1000 Brussels. Tel: (32) 2.223.41.14 - Fax: (32) 2.223.41.16 - E-mail: s.biscop@egmontinstitute.be - Internet: http://www.egmontinstitute.be ). Egmont Papers. No. 33. 2009, 41 p. ISBN 978-90-382-1514-3.
In its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the EU has a grand strategy, embracing all foreign policy instruments and resources, but a partial one. The ESS tells us how to do things - in a preventive, holistic and multilateral way - but it is much vaguer on what to do: what are the foreign policy priorities of the EU?
In this paper, a group of international academics and practitioners argue that a true strategic review of the ESS must take place in order to answer the most fundamental questions about the purpose of the EU foreign policy, eventually resulting in the writing of a grand strategy. The authors identify five priority areas which require the definition of concrete objectives, in order to direct policies and actions:
Neigbourhood: What is the desired end-state of the Neighbourhood Policy? Can only democracy safeguard our interests, or will democratization create such upheaval that our interests would be damaged? Only when our interests and red lines are clear can a true strategic partnership with Russia be pursued.
Enlargement: A successful instrument so far, further enlargement is determining for relations with Russia and for the geopolitical position of the EU - and cannot proceed therefore without strategic debate.
Regional objectives: A reluctance to discuss interests and join up the different European presences, from aid and trade to diplomacy, has undermined policies towards Central Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Other regions too, such as Asia, Latin America and the Arctic need a thorough assessment of EU interests to determine whether or not our presence should be stepped up.
Global and institutional objectives: The EU must sharpen its view about the multilateral architecture, reconciling reform with increased effectiveness of EU representation. That should inform a really strategic use of its strategic partnerships with the BRICs.
Crisis management: A White Paper should define Europe's ambition as a security actor.
*** MURIEL ASSEBURG, RONJA KEMPIN (eds.): The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations. SWP Research Paper 2009/RP 14, December 2009, 107 pages
Since the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) emerged into the light of day in June 1999, the EU's capabilities in this field have grown considerably. Twenty-three ESDP missions and operations deployed to places from the Balkans to Africa, the Middle East and even Asia testify to the member states' efforts to join together to engage in crisis management and to tackle challenges to European security. At first glance these engagements would appear to show that the EU has achieved the goals set by the December 2003 European Security Strategy. But a closer examination shows that in fact the EU still has a long way to go before becoming an effective and credible actor in international crisis management.
This study systematically takes stock of the strengths and weaknesses of the policy instrument of ESDP missions and operations, assessing their relevance and effectiveness as an instrument of European crisis management and the contribution they make to honing the EU's capacity to act on security and defence matters. Twelve ESDP missions and operations form the empirical basis of this study. The case studies concentrate on three decisive aspects of ESDP deployments:
How did the decision on a deployment originate and what does its mandate look like?
How has the mandate been implemented?
How effective was the mission or operation for short- and long-term crisis management?
As it turns out, to date, no strategic planning of deployments takes place. Also, individual missions and operations have attained very different degrees of success, both in terms of mandate implementation and with respect to their contribution to stabilisation in the area of operations. Moreover, no particular type of mission can be identified where the EU is especially successful.
*** ANTONIO MISSIROLI, JANIS EMMANOUILIDIS: Implementing Lisbon: the EU Presidency's other (rotating) half. European Policy Centre (Résidence Palace, 155 rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: +32 (0)2 231 03 40 - fax: +32 (0)2 231 07 04 - Email: info@epc.eu - Internet: http://www.epc.eu ). “Policy Brief”. December, 2009.
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty - in force since 1 December 2009 - poses a series of challenges to previous institutional arrangements, including the six-monthly rotating EU Presidency. Antonio Missiroli and Janis Emmanouilidis highlight in this Policy Brief the present need to (re)define the specific function of the rotating Presidency both in the European Council and vis-à-vis its President, as well as in the foreign policy arena. Given that Member States can be reasonably expected to continue their search for influence in EU affairs while (co)leading the Council, the authors indicate various ways by which the rotating Presidency could ensure its involvement in the new architecture without undermining the novel bodies and figures created by Lisbon.
Internally, they suggest that the Head of State or Government of the rotating Presidency could chair alongside Van Rompuy the General Affairs Council immediately preceding an EU Summit and then brief the media about it. Moreover, the rotating Presidency could also report on the preparatory work of the different Council formations under its supervision and organise “thematic” meetings to discuss strategic issues of domestic and European-wide concern. Equally important, the rotating Presidency could become the main interlocutor with the European Parliament on the Council's activities and present its programme to the EP at the beginning of each semester.
Externally, they propose that the rotating Presidency could consult the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) on the agenda for the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC); join Van Rompuy, Barroso, and Ashton in hosting summits with third countries and regional organizations; and arrange informal FAC sessions on topics it deems particularly important. Furthermore, the holder of the rotating Presidency could de facto also act as a deputy of Ashton, whenever the predictably busy schedule of the HR/VP would impede her participation in an official meeting.
Missiroli and Emmanouilidis come to the conclusion that the new Lisbon leadership structure looks like a "quad", with the rotating Presidency squaring the Brussels circle. However, it will - according to the authors - take some time to determine who holds the reins, drives the cart and sets the direction.