Brussels, 03/11/2009 (Agence Europe) - On Wednesday 4 November, General Henri Bentégeat will chair the EU military committee for the last time. Before handing over to his successor, Swedish General Hakan Erik Gunnar Syren, he agreed to answer our questions on the progress made by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) over the last three years. The full version of this interview will be published in our specialist publication “Europe Diplomacy and Defence” (Thursday 5 November issue).
EUROPE: How do you assess what the ESDP has achieved over the last three years?
Henri Bentégeat: (…) First of all, I want to point out that any assessment has necessarily to be collective. I don't put either the successes or the failures of the ESDP over these last three years just down to me. (...) I think it is fair to say that, from a purely military point of view, there has been progress, but on a limited scale. (…) From the point of view of member states keeping to our European security and defence policy …, there has been some quite significant progress. However, the area in which there has been great progress, to the extent that it has changed - at any rate, for me there has been a change - what we are doing, is civil-military integration. By that I mean that, when I took up my post, the European security and defence policy was highly fragmented. Relations, for example, between the Council Secretariat General and the Commission, or even through people responsible for civil operations, were virtually nil. (…) Considerable progress has been made in this area, providing the base for European defence in the future, and what we call here the civil-military area. In NATO, this is often referred to as the “comprehensive approach”. (…) This, of course, explains the success of the Atalanta operation, which is not really a military success, but which is a huge success for civil-military integration.
EUROPE: Precisely, in this operation, the civil dimension is not always obvious.
H.B.: It is huge. (…) If you go to the operation headquarters in Northwood, you will be amazed, just as I was, because I have never seen the likes anywhere. In the operations centre, at the very heart of the headquarters, there are almost as many civilians as military personnel. When I went there - it was about three, four months ago - I asked, who are all these civilians? I was told: representatives of the International Maritime Organisation, of ship owners, etc. And what are they doing? They are permanently involved in planning, they are permanently involved in updating the information and Atalanta advice to ship owners website. So first of all, civil military integration is clearly seen in the headquarters. The second indication is, and I've seen it for myself, the way in which the planning of this operation is done. For the first time, the initial document (…) which is called the CMC (Crisis Management Concept) is entirely designed, drafted and approved between the Council secretariat general, including military personnel, and the Commission. The second thing that has been made possible through this civil-military integration has been the establishment of a legal framework for the operation. This is unique: no other operation anywhere has the same legal framework. This legal framework comprises agreements with all the neighbouring states of the region so that pirate boats can be pursued in territorial waters, agreements that allow cooperation with their coastguards, agreements that allow the pirates to be tried in Kenya and possibly late in the Seychelles and Tanzania. It is also the establishment of joint rules of engagement for our vessels, also something unique, since they have to take account of the extreme complexity of national naval laws. To this must be added financial support and tremendous development aid advice from the Commission to ensure that the legal framework works with all the states of the region. You know, if the Commission, with its financial and advisory capacities, wasn't able to support these states in the legal and other areas, the whole thing wouldn't last long.
EUROPE: The political committee noted an opinion from the military committee and approved a recommendation on battle groups. Is this minor progress in the approval of limited flexibility not just purely cosmetic?
H.B.: I don't think so. When I arrived, my impression was that this issue was mired down. General Leakey, Director of the Military Staff, and I - because we shared the same personal and operation experience - were obsessed with giving credibility, substance to these battle groups. For us, it was absolutely imperative that it should not just be on paper. If we needed really to commit them, then let's make sure that it is successful (…) and not find out that, in fact, it was not just a lot of hot air! For two and a half years, we worked on that alone, that is, how to train, how to certify these battle groups. On top of that was the joint, air and naval dimension. I really believe that, through the preparation guide, the standards we set for training, preparation and certification, we have managed to give the battle groups some substance, some reality. I don't put his down to Leakey or to me or to both of us. There was the full support of the heads of military staff encouraging us.
However, they have yet to be deployed. The problem posed by the Swedes, is whether we can continue to prepare these battle groups, which costs a fortune, and put them on alert, which is also very expensive, if we never use them. We have to increase the likelihood of their being used. That is what held us up for three years. It wasn't possible to discuss it. Everyone was telling us: the concept mustn't be tampered with. (…) The big difference is that that it was clear to me at the last defence ministers meeting in Gothenburg that, for the first time, ministers told us: the concept mustn't be changed, but you have to bring in a bit of flexibility. That means that there had been a slight change in states of mind. For military staff, it means that, if our ministers are more flexible, we have to be ready to intervene, even in a situation that lies slightly outside the concept framework. This means then, that our demands in terms of the preparation of our battle groups will grow.
EUROPE: Some people use greater flexibility in the use of battle groups to argue once again for a permanent headquarters. Do you foresee any progress in this area in the relatively near future?
H.B.: (…) I don't believe that there is a single honest soldier who would disagree that it would be far more preferable to have a permanent headquarters than one which increases at the last moment. However, the creation of a permanent military HQ for the EU poses other serious political problems, in particular, the fears this prospect produces in the United States are always very clear to see. I have had the opportunity to speak about them several times. They are still very clear, very strong. There is fear of further competition between NATO and the EU, with duplication of SHAPE, the NATO headquarters. And this fear, you know, is shared by several European countries, which are concerned about eventual transatlantic delinking. (…) A permanent military headquarters is not on the agenda any more. However, I believe that we have to devise something, which doesn't exist today and which corresponds to a specific need that is characteristic of the European Union and which could, I feel, be much more acceptable, perhaps even fully acceptable, to our American friends and those in the Union who share their concerns. I believe that we have to think about a civil-military headquarters. When we look at what we're doing, we note that our planning of civilian and military activities, which have to come together in managing a crisis, can be totally integrated, and this will be even more true when the CMPD is up and running - in the near future, I hope. However, we will still not be able to lead. What we lack is a “leadership” dimension, and this is something which, I feel, a civil-military headquarters will address. How, then, do we make sure that this civil-military headquarters doesn't take too many risks on military operations as such - that is, that they retain a certain degree of purity, if I may use the term, in the transmission of military orders, while being genuinely civil-military, and making sure that it is not simply two parallel lines, which would be of virtually no interest - that is the problem we still have to solve. It's not easy. One of my colleagues here tried to work on it with a number of people from the secretariat general. It is anything but simple. Maybe we won't be able to do it. But, no matter, I think it is something worth considering. (O.J./transl.rt)