A few principles. As I write these lines, the European Parliament has still not definitively decided whether it will decide this week on the nomination of the president of the new European Commission. I am basing this on the hypothesis that there will be a vote in favour, in order to point out a few fundamental principles that sometimes appear to have been forgotten or neglected in the heat of the discussions:
- The EP is the elected democratic element in the European institutional system and obviously has to give an example by respecting the will of its electorate. It therefore appears logical that it appoints someone at the presidency of the Commission who comes from a political current that enjoys majority support. This person should not necessarily belong to any given political party but must reflect the general political orientation that obtained the most votes. This clearly has to be the centre-right. The heads of government, as we are aware, have already taken this criterion into account.
- The person chosen by the European Council, namely by the member states, can obviously be contested in the parliamentary debate if another candidacy is mooted. A few names were actually mentioned but nothing really came of it. The claim by certain groups to speak on behalf of the European people when they only have a very limited number of votes appears more like demagogy than democracy.
- Each group and each political current obviously has the right to remain loyal to its doctrine and its aims, and affirm them either by way of a vote against or by posing certain conditions on their possible support.
- The president of the European Commission, however, should not think that he is representing the political forces from he whence he comes. This would be incompatible with the collegiate nature of the Commission, whose members belong to a variety of different political currents. The European interest often resides in taking into consideration different national and ideological doctrines, particularly because future national elections (some of them imminent) could change the situation in some of the member states.
Preventing a void. Any hypothesis of delaying a parliamentary vote on the president of the Commission as a way of avoiding any overlap in procedures emanating from the Treaty of Nice (for the nomination of the president) and those in the Lisbon Treaty (for the nomination of the Commission as a whole), overlooks one crucial aspect: the necessity of Europe very rapidly having a Commission available that is in full possession of its powers, which will allow for the effective functioning of the institutional machines.
From a legal point of view, the question is controversial and appears to create a number of different interpretations. Certain quarters affirm that if the procedure begins under the Treaty of Nice, it should be completed on the same legal basis. Others consider that parliamentary procedure can begin with the Treaty of Nice rules and finish with those of the Lisbon Treaty (which are, as we know, different, including those on the number of commissioners). I believe that considerations regarding the urgent political nature of the situation should prevail. Delaying the decision would mean that as from November (when the current mandate ends), the Commission would not be able to manage current affairs. How could decisions regarding global issues on energy and the climate, new financial rules and relaunching the Doha Round negotiations be decided upon? Faced with these challenges, the Commission would not immediately have its prerogatives, its future president would not have been appointed and several commissioners would have resigned or be uncertain about their future.
This would result in a weakened EU. How can the EP allow itself to become responsible for a situation created by domestic rivalries that are difficult for the public to understand?
Difficulties to overcome. The nomination of the Commission according to procedures of the Treaty of Nice will certainly include a baggage of different complications, the main one being that the number of commissioners will necessarily be lower than the number of member states (the formula of “one commissioner per country” is tied to the Lisbon Treaty entering into force). What country will immediately be willing to give up a commissioner from their own country? According to Guy Verhofstadt, the answer is simple: this member state would obtain the promise that at a certain time, the vice president, who at the same time fulfils the role of the high representative for the CFSP and ESDP and that of the president of the External Relations Council, will come from their country. This ought to allow for the country in question to quite contentedly accept that for a few months, they will not have their own “national” commissioner.
Tomorrow, this column will look at an apparently often forgotten priority criterion. (F.R./transl.rh)