The signing of the “Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement” (see yesterday's bulletin No 9941 for the ceremony and content of the agreement) is of huge importance for the security of the EU's energy supplies. Its significance, however, goes well beyond that. At the ceremony in Ankara, the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, stressed that Nabucco opens up a new era in relations between the EU and Turkey. It is a “strategic bond” that can “cement the links” between the respective nations. The impact of such an agreement, however, ripples far beyond EU-Turkey relations, as we shall see below. Let us first of all look at the essential features of Nabucco itself.
Unofficial indications from the European Commission services point to:
1. Differences overcome. The Commission's active mediation has allowed all the often highly complex legal aspects and regulatory elements of the signed agreement to be clarified. The compromise on the aspect that had raised difficulties until the very last minute - that is, Turkey's request to be able to take significant quantities of gas transported - was the subject of various interpretations last week. Some say this right had been acknowledged, while others say there is no right. According to explanations received, the principle of the Energy Charter, whereby a transit country cannot officially have the right to take gas carried through that country, is respected. The “transport agreement”, however, shows that account shall be taken of Turkey's legitimate concern for its supplies, which is a generally recognised concept. Also, the principle of “flow reversibility” will allow Nabucco to carry gas originating in the West to Turkey, where necessary.
2. Signatory countries, participating companies. The agreement has been signed by Turkey and the four Community transit countries: Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Germany has given its political support to Nabucco, and the German company RWE is part of the consortium entrusted with carrying out the project, alongside companies from five signatory countries (see yesterday's bulletin). Commission services challenge the fact that Gaz de France has not been accepted as part of the consortium for political reasons (Turkish veto). They assert that this company had not been selected on the basis of normal admission criteria. At first sight, it does seem strange that a giant like Gaz de France should not meet the technological, commercial, economic, financial or other conditions to be allowed entry …
3. Guaranteed financing. Commission services say Nabucco is certain to be an economic success, a good investment for anyone wishing to take part beyond subsidies from the Community budget and the planned loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB).
4. Problem-free supplies. Commission services deny that Nabucco needs Iranian gas in order to be viable, all the more as Iran is a net importer of gas at the moment. Sources available or already foreseen for the project are largely sufficient - for example, reserves from Turkmenistan could “supply four Nabuccos”. At any rate, it is up to the oil companies to buy gas, and to conclude contracts with producer countries (including Azerbaijan, whatever its agreements with Russia may be). Availability is already guaranteed to allow several years' operation. See yesterday's bulletin for the various supply sources.
5. Nabucco is not a project against Russia. In no way is the Nabucco project directed against Russia. It represents an aspect of supply diversification, which is one of the pillars of European energy policy. Nabucco is complementary to, not in conflict with, other projects such as South Stream or ITGI.
Continuing perplexity, strategic scope. Despite official optimism, there is still doubt about the practical realisation of the Nabucco project. The fall in world demand for gas, the first for half a century, only leads to greater perplexity, although the reasons for believing in the project seem stronger. There may be enormous repercussions not only for the security of European energy supplies but also at the strategic and political levels: the creation of new, powerful links between the EU and Turkey (whatever the outcome of the latter's accession process); the increased requirement that, by overcoming obstacles, EU-Russia relations may be strengthened; new concrete prospects for EU links with Iran, Syria and even, in time, Iran, as well as, of course, with the republics that arose from the disappearance of the USSR. There is a colossal amount at stake for the future of Europe and beyond. So why not believe in it? (F.R./transl.jl)