As part of the three positive results of last week's European Council, the part on the roadmap that ought to lead to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, raises a number of institutional questions that warrant some forethought. The formulas decided upon includes a tangle of complications that will not be easy to undo. I am not referring to the fact that nothing has yet been won (the last word goes to the Irish themselves) but what will happen even if the Irish vote yes. The formula for the future composition of the European Parliament represents a kind of major but convoluted accomplishment, whose objective is to please everyone as much as possible.
Early modifications to Lisbon. The new calendar implies that European elections will occur before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and therefore under the Treaty of Nice regime. The latter calls for the number of MEPs to be reduced from the current 785 to 736. The Lisbon Treaty, however, has changed everything by introducing both a ceiling and a floor to the figures: the maximum number of MEPs per country will be 96 and the minimum 6 (by reinforcing the over-representation of small states in relation to their populations). This reform will then be delayed until the following elections in 2014. For some member states, the application of the Nice regime would have proved troublesome. After complex diplomatic negotiations, the summit subsequently decided to apply the Lisbon Treaty regime as soon as this enters into force, without waiting for the following elections. This formula will logically have been accepted once there is an increase in the number of MEPs (4 more for Spain, 2 more for France, United Kingdom, Sweden and Austria, 1 more for Italy, Poland, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Latvia and Slovenia) but in order to respect the minimum 96 mentioned above, Germany will lose 3 MEPs. The result was to logically maintain 99 German MEPs by raising the total number of MEPs to 754 instead of 751.
Is this politically understandable operation legal? It could be contested from two stand-points: the total number of MEPs and the change in the German figures in relation to what was established in the treaty. It is up to the legal experts to respond.
Some questions for the European Commission. The political commitment of getting back to the principle of one commissioner per nationality of each member state is a wise one because it gets rid of the equal rotation system, which is already unjust and would be even more so in the perspective of new accessions. The result would be, for example, that Serbia split into three (Republic of Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo) would still have at least one commissioner, as well as the three Baltic countries, whereas in certain periods there would not be a German, French or British commissioner (see this column in EUROPE 9804). Returning to the rule of a commissioner per country is therefore reasonable but it is not the definitive solution: forty commissioners will not constitute an Executive any longer but rather an Assembly, even if the Lisbon Treaty, by strengthening the powers of the presidency, provides some of the elements of response.
The question of the weight and role of the Commission in the future institutional balance in the Union is clearly more political and it is not through paragraphs in a Treaty Article where the answers to this question will be found. The accusation of Mr Barroso having transformed the Commission into a sort of Council Secretariat leaves out one essential detail: the increasing and widespread use of Parliament/Council legislative co-decision, which automatically means that the negotiation of compromises and the definition of final drafts are shifted. The main framework is no longer Council/Commission dialogue but meetings that aim to reconcile Parliament and Council positions. The Commission's role therefore essentially becomes one of mediator (but experience indicates that it is in fact very often the Commission that comes up with the solutions). The fact that the Parliament is protesting against this development is quite curious. A certain redistribution of roles is inevitable but we can understand the fears of those that get the impression that the EU is subsequently sliding increasingly towards an inter-governmental system. The institutional balance could be safeguarded if the presidency of the Commission is strong and if the right of initiative on new legislation remains within its exclusive remit.
Another institutional aspect should be raised: the future stable presidency of the European Council is undoubtedly indispensable but is at the same time problematic because the Lisbon Treaty does not in fact provide the solution but creates the problem itself. This column will be returning to this issue.
(F.R./transl.rh)