Importance of the Presidency. In addition to the points developed yesterday and the day before in this column, further reflection is needed on how the institutions of the European Union work. Despite the fact that official circles avoid admitting it and practically no-one speaks of it, it is obvious that the whirlwind mission by the president of the European Council to Moscow to present the text drawn up in common in Brussels on the end of hostilities was only effective because the country holding the Presidency at present is one of the large EU countries. Nicolas Sarkozy was able to immediately meet Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev, who discussed the situation with him and agreed to the European proposal (as, moreover, did the Georgian president). Would an EU president from a small country have been able to achieve the same result? Not to say a president-in-office from one of the member states (Poland and the three Baltic States) that took part in a joint press conference with the Georgian president to express their solidarity with him and their support for Georgia's swift accession to NATO.
What conclusions can be drawn from this? At first sight, there are two presumptions, subject to more indepth analysis. These are: a) the stable presidency of the European Council, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, is increasingly essential and urgent. It is therefore necessary to overcome the blocking of this treaty as soon as possible; and b) the stable presidency should not be purely symbolic, with its essential task being the organisation of summits, but should have real powers and responsibilities. Unless one could envisage the European Council having the possibility, with the agreement of its formal president, to entrust specific missions to one of its members under specific circumstances.
The attitude of the four presidents or prime ministers that attended the joint press conference with Mikheil Saakashvili cited above was somewhat strange, as it distanced itself from the common position that had been defined within the External Relations Council. To my knowledge, only one member state criticised them overtly: Italy, whose foreign minister, Franco Frattini, declared: “I believe that, in such a tricky moment, the EU should remain united and that initiatives of this kind should be avoided” (the EU's stance had been adopted by unanimity).
Understandable differences. Views on relations between the EU and Russia (and therefore also indirectly those of the United States) do indeed differ to some extent. EU cooperation with Russia is vital and most member states will never give it up. But the attitude of some countries of Central and Eastern Europe is still greatly influenced by the “historic memory” of the former USSR - just the image of Russian tanks moving forward brings back dramatic memories. One has to understand the mistrust felt by Poland, the Baltic States and perhaps by a number of other Eastern European countries, and the EU should take this into account. But these countries should, for their part, understand that it is only within the framework of the EU that they can make their voices heard in Moscow and set out their arguments. They must also understand that, on the ground, US protection has its limits, as already experienced by Georgia. It is as part of the EU and certainly not through bilateral clashes with Moscow that their interests are best protected.
The normal differences between historic national sensitivities must not lead to internal divide within the EU. Commentators have reproached the member states of Eastern Europe for wanting only support and financing from the EU and neglecting political aspirations and solidarity. This may be wrong and, in some cases, I am quite sure of it. But if such an impression were to correspond with the truth in some countries, then the two-speed Europe, “differentiation”, would become inevitable.
Safeguarding future cooperation possibilities. Before the crisis, there had for some time been talk in Moscow of ambitious guidelines for cooperation with the EU. In a university lecture in Berlin, Mr Medvedev had even drawn up a world architecture in which Russia was part of the “western world” alongside the EU and the United States. Given the current circumstances, such a vision seems unrealistic if not absurd, and we must avoid being over-naïve. Vigilance is necessary, and the EU must remain firm in its demands and staunchly safeguard the friendship and cooperation that it has always enjoyed with its ally on the other side of the Atlantic. However, account should be taken at the same time of its interests and convictions, including the possibility of future cooperation with Russia.
(F.R.)