Starting point. Before becoming president of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano was for a long time president of the European Parliament's institutional affairs committee. He has now taken up the most simple of formulas for preventing the no vote of a single country blocking the progress of the EU: by deciding that an approved treaty enters into force at a date previously set by member states that ratified it, and by “accepting the risk that one or other (member state) remains excluded”. The hypothesis of ratification at majority voting is obviously impossible: no country can be made to accept a new treaty that it has not ratified. Any country has the right to reject additional commitments but it cannot prevent the progress of the others.
If this starting point is agreed, how can it be applied? The simplest way is to continue with the ratifications of the Lisbon Treaty because it has been decided that when four fifths of member states ratify it, the European Council will meet to decide what follows. Most states could then invite the countries with reservations to choose whether to ratify or accept partial participation in Community activity (which is what already partly exists as we know: the United Kingdom, for example, is not part of the single currency or the Schengen area, nor is it bound by the binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).
Other ways forward have also been indicated. Countries that want to, could take up the Lisbon Treaty as it stands, without further negotiation, apart from technical adjustments. Current treaties would remain valid, with their rules and institutions (the institutional construction would subsequently become very complex). Another more radical formula has also been mooted: a simultaneous exit of the current Union to found a new Union. The countries involved would no longer be tied by current commitments but these would logically remain valid for the countries that do not want the new treaty. The legal feasibility, however, of this formula remains unknown and at first glance raises many perplexing questions.
Identifying the causes. Much has been said about the causes that led to the Irish people's decision. I'll quote them almost at random: 1) Some Irish ministers were dumbfounded by the scale of the lies from the supporters of the no vote, who claimed, for example, that the new treaty would oblige Ireland to legalise abortion and introduce compulsory military service. 2) The president of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, pointed out that in a referendum, each category sees its own interests and does not assess the general interest, which only Parliament can do. 3) Some unfortunate remarks from the authorities of other member states could have influenced the result, such as the untimely affirmation by the French foreign affairs minister about the scale of the subsidies that the Irish had received when they joined the EU. 4) The weight of the traditionally anti-European Irish and “Murdoch” press was cited, as well as the observation that the press in general (as well as academia) have for a long time contributed to creating an image of a bureaucratic and politically irresponsible Europe.
These comments are partly justified. It is true nonetheless, that the Irish had many ways of informing themselves about the stakes at play and that all the parties at Parliament, with a single exception, supported the yes campaign. The Irish have decided in full knowledge of the facts. They've made their choice. This must be acknowledged and subsequent action taken.
Beginning the rethink. It won't be this week's European Council that provides a detailed definition of which road to follow amongst all the possible options, but it will begin a rethink. The first step will be to get to know the Irish government's intentions. After this, other heads of governments will speak about continuing national ratifications. British Conservatives and Vaclav Klaus, President of the Czech Republic, have affirmed that in their opinion the Lisbon Treaty is dead, but it is not up to them to decide whether this is the case on behalf of their countries (see the details of the national positions in yesterday's edition of our newsletter).
French programme unchanged. The imminent French Presidency will indicate what it intends to keep from its programme, which, in any case, independent of the Irish vote, would have been accomplished with the instruments of the current treaty. The priorities (energy, immigration etc) will remain unchanged. Certain tasks, however, disappear. Seeking principled agreements, for example, on the appointment of a stable presidency of the European Council and the high representative/vice president of the Commission and president of the External Relations Council no longer makes sense. Accession negotiations with third countries may also be affected by the Lisbon Treaty blockage, whatever certain governments say about them.
(F.R./transl.rh)