A compromise having been reached within the EU, for better or for worse, on the dossier of the Union for the Mediterranean, it is unsurprising to hear that the official circles are satisfied. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the commissioner for this dossier, stressed the positive: “renewed political ambition which will be placed in concrete projects” and “a better division of responsibilities: Europe must ensure the management of this with its Mediterranean partners”, whilst “speaking with one voice” in the new structure. For his part, Nicolas Sarkozy gave a positive interpretation of the Franco-German differences of opinion: “When France and Germany argue, it is in order to find a solution”.
The Mediterranean third countries are unbelievers. But our role of observer and commentator brings with it other requirements, and it is worth stating that the project is continuing, despite the amendments, to give rise to reservations and to justify confusion. It was ill-conceived from the start, and any arrangements which have been made cannot atone for the birth defects, as it were. Over in France, Secretary of State for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet has achieved the difficult task of correcting the catastrophic taste in the mouth left behind by the initial plans for a Union of the Mediterranean, and the European Commission has brought it back within the Community framework, although many other uncertainties persist, such as the financial dimension. But this is not the main point: the EU will get through it, although it is to be expected that a certain German bitterness will not be fully reabsorbed overnight. The main point is the radical scepticism on the part of the Mediterranean third countries, which seem in some cases to support the project for political reasons or out of a certain diplomatic politeness, but which, in reality, are quite wary.
Genuine interests. Why? Quite simply because they do not constitute a grouping that can act as such. Between them there are many differences in interests, to say nothing of open conflicts, some of which can be quite dramatic. They may all support certain projects, but what is really of interest to them is their bilateral relations with the EU, for which almost each country has its own specific objectives which it pursues doggedly and, in several cases, with skill and favourable intentions. These objectives may end up being watered down, or sidelined altogether, if all of the countries are dealt with as a group which does not exist and cannot exist, until all conflicts between them are sorted out. For the time being, the term "Union”, as applied to them, is a meaningless term. Algeria has rejected the idea of a free-trade zone and is seeking a closer energy partnership. Morocco aspires to a special partnership reserved for it alone. Israel has for several months been forwarding a "non paper" aiming radically to deepen its ties with the EU, in the hope that this paper can be discussed halfway through this month at the forthcoming Association Council (which, in reality, will be difficult). The list of bilateral ambitions may go on, but to what end? The direct specific reactions to the European project speak volumes in themselves.
It is not even certain that all of the Mediterranean third countries invited will actually take part in the official ceremony of 13 July; several heads of government have turned down their invitations, despite pressure brought to bear by Paris. Algeria, in particular, is stepping up its talks on energy issues with the EU, but its foreign affairs minister has spoken of the Union for the Mediterranean as an "announced failure". Some countries have rejected out of hand the system of a rotating co-presidency allowing Israel rights on the same level as the others. For an overview, I refer you to the survey of the representations to Brussels of the Mediterranean third countries, which was published in our bulletin 9668. I cannot emphasise enough the major concerns regarding the financial aspect. What most of these countries fear is that the globalisation of certain projects will be achieved at the expense of the bilateral aid earmarked by the EU for each of them, that the European funding for the Mediterranean will be re-absorbed into regional cooperation, reducing the amount that certain countries will receive. This is also of concern to the president of the Commission. Mr Barroso recently said that "We cannot change the financial perspectives of the EU. The projects funded by the Union for the Mediterranean will require additional funding from the private sector, from the states in question and from regional banks. We hope that the great interest many states have shown in these projects will be more than empty words, and will lead to major financial commitments". It will not be easy, against a backdrop of budgetary difficulties.
The above comments explain the fears that all pomp and circumstance does not add much to reality. Hope lays mainly in the patient reinforcement of the Barcelona process, and in the progress of regional cooperation in the groups of countries on the other shore of the Mediterranean.
(F.R.)