My comments last week about the CFSP did not get to the heart of the matter. Descriptive and explanatory, my comments did not touch on the motivations of players on the European security and defence scene that allowed its development and explain its current vitality. After so many decades as a global economic player, why does Europe feel the need to also become a political player? How and why has the reluctance that long prevented it moving in this direction been partly dissolved and how and why have all Member States, to a greater or lesser extent, demanded that the EU take action? I will base much of my thought on the slim but substantial essay by Philippe de Schoutheete, 'Une autre lecture de la PESD', which I quoted in my previous editorial.
Tony Blair's double motivation. The UK opening up to common defence was part of Tony Blair's political project to put the UK at the heart of Europe. The field of defence met a virtually general demand and was deliberately chosen because the UK can rightfully demand a leadership role and the partner for launching the initiative was obvious - France - also a military power and just as firmly convinced that defence policy should be intergovernmental. Hence the Franco-British declaration of 4 December 1998 which firmed up the basic guidelines already outlined in the Maastricht Treaty and the innovations introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty by paving the way for future achievements and the operational decisions that followed from June 1999 onwards, namely the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative for the CFSP, and the creation of COPS (Political and Security Committee, PSC), the Military Committee and the High Command, in other words the CFSP's administrative structure. In two and a half years, the various decisions taken by further European Councils have laid the foundations for a Defence Europe.
The revolutionary innovation introduced by the Saint Malo declaration was to place defence initiatives within the framework of the European Treaties, which meant that France and the UK abandoned their position of historical principle. Decision-making mechanisms remained intergovernmental, but it is within the EU's institutions and bodies that strategies are defined (Javier Solana is Secretary General of the Council) and the final operational decisions are taken. The demand for coherence made this change necessary and it is the EU which personifies the power of Europe, as Mr de Schoutheete observes: 'From the time when the leaders of Europe wanted to exercise a kind of collective power, an ambition shared pretty much across the board, the distinction between economics and politics, between and between civilian and military, became an obstacle.' The distinction between economics and politics continued in the creation of separate 'pillars', one governed by the Community Method and the other by the Intergovernmental Method. One would have to wait for the draft constitutional treaty before scrapping this distinction was envisaged.
Winning over the US. How was it possible to relaunch common defence and include it in the European Treaties? How was the reluctance of various Member States and the hostility of the United States overcome? I have already referred to Tony Blair's overall European strategy (unfortunately, the overall plan has failed - see my column in issues 9230 and 9231). Philippe de Schoutheete, based on huge documentation, several essays by players or eye-witnesses of key events and also on his own personal experience (he was secretary of the 'Group of the Wise' chaired by Jean-Luc Dehaene that towards the end of 1999 recommended adding defence to the subjects to be negotiated in future treaties), points out that Tony Blair wanted to get the UK to play a 'decisive role' in Europe while ensuring that NATO was not imperilled and reassuring the United States: 'Any proposal for defence formulated or supported by France was automatically under suspicion in Washington; Great Britain and Great Britain alone was able to get the US ally to accept - willingly or unwillingly, as something useful or the lesser evil - significant European defence initiatives.' Whatever one might think about the 'special relationship' between London and Washington, only Great Britain could get the United States to accept a change in the strategic domain and on several occasions, it assumed the often difficult task of convincing the United States that certain initiatives were well-founded. In addition, British pragmatism meant that the focus was put on operational capacities rather than on the institutions, because people in London have always believed that 'wars are not waged with institutions or organigrams'.
Reassuring reluctant Member States. London's role was also vital when it came to overcoming the reluctance of two categories of Member States - those which have traditionally been 'neutral' and the countries of central and Eastern Europe which are firmly in the 'Atlantic' camp. Sweden, Finland and Austria still retain their reservations of principle about the 'mutual security clause' (they managed to get it rendered more flexible in the draft constitutional treaty), but they fully cooperate in initiatives and have even been active in winning recognition and an extension of the 'Petersberg missions'. According to Mr de Schoutheete, Finnish and Swedish politicians have 'recognised, intellectually, that neutrality and non-alignment have lost their meaning with the end of the Cold War'. Ireland still takes a prudent line but does not block anything, while Denmark makes sparing use of its 'opt-out', which does not prevent it from participating in common action. The attitude of most central and East European states is dictated by history. I remember hearing Polish politician Saryusz-Wolski, now an MEP, forcefully arguing that the European military security clause meant nothing and only the similar NATO clause had any meaning. But last week, Polish prime minister Jaroslaw Kaczinski said that Europe had to have a 'credible' military force, although not necessarily immediately. We can say that the cause of Defence Europe is slowly making progress in Eastern Europe.
Germany immediately interpreted the Saint Malo declaration as a longed-for opportunity to reconcile Atlantic orthodoxy with European ambitions, and it was under the German Presidency that the Cologne European Council launched the CFSP at European level in June 1999. On the European Convention, France and Germany took the imitative together, and Joschka Fischer and Dominique de Villepin's joint document went even further than the United Kingdom wanted. After the crisis caused by disagreement over the Iraq War, it was in Berlin in September 2003 that France, the UK and Germany agreed on a common approach, and in December 2003, the European Council approved the first 'EU defence strategy'. Europe had never before had such a document, a genuine overall framework for future developments.
The other 'old' Member States have tended to follow this movement. Belgium even wanted things to go faster through initiatives that were badly interpreted in Washington and London (and reportedly led to the UK vetoing the appointment of Guy Verhofstadt as the President of the European Commission).
Has the 'Community Method' been compromised? Following this overview, a fundamental question remains - has the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and the CFDP dealt a mortal blow to the 'Community Method'? The Community Method is based on the European Commission's exclusive right of initiative, the gradual extension of qualified majority voting (qmv) and the development of Parliament-Council codecision. European integration purists say that the CFSP and CFDP's infringement of the Community Method constitute a precedent which restricts future evolution without any remedy.
There remains a school of thought which disagrees with this, and Philippe de Schoutheete efficiently summarised its views. I quote: 'Even those who believe (like myself) that the Community Method is in the long term the only truly effective method, recognise that in practice in certain cases and at certain points of time, other methods can be more appropriate'. During its evolution, the EU has been designed to a greater or lesser extent as a 'multiform network of heterogeneous procedures and constructions providing flexible responses to different needs.' Along with the CFSP and CFDP, he mentions the Schengen Agreements, Monetary Union and the Lisbon Strategy. Some of these constructions keep Community elements and others acquire them as they develop. In his view, we are in the process of a double movement. 'Since Maastricht, Community purism has not been what it used to be; since Saint Malo, intergovernmental purism has not been what it used to be either. This double movement has not solved the contradictions but has started to provide a solution. A third way has been created, not without ambiguity. The post of EU Foreign Minister in the draft constitution is the most obvious manifestation of this.' Mr de Schoutheete recognises, however, that when it comes to defence, 'procedures are accepted that would make small countries indignant if they were used in other fields', like the big countries' habit of holding discussions about new initiatives between themselves before they are submitted to European institutions and bodies, and the option of giving special Member States special tasks.
It would be interesting and useful for European figureheads to express their views on this subject. I am not thinking of the institutions, which will not respond, but rather of free spirits who would like to express themselves. (F.R.)