Let's take a few steps backwards. It is natural, possibly even indispensable, for governments to examine and discuss the draft Constitution for Europe word for word, that the various sensitivities should come to light, and that serious discussions are held on just one sentence or one word. But at the same time, a few more general considerations should be borne in mind, which should dictate the behaviour, and ultimately determine the final verdict of the Heads of Government. From my own point of view, and in the full awareness that other observers or commentators may well have different priorities and attitudes, here are the general considerations I feel should be taken into the equation:
1. The priority. Under current circumstances, the priority is for the Constitution to be adopted, only straying from the Convention's draft for points of minor detail. This Constitution is not a fait accompli but a starting point; it is imperfect, some bits of it are lacking, but Europe needs it, especially for its public image. The EU's image has been distorted over the years by criticism which is often unjust or excessive, due partly to bad faith, but mainly to ignorance. For many citizens, the EU is a kind of bureaucratic monster, sitting in Brussels imposing its rules on populations stripped of their legitimate decision-making powers. Just approving the Constitution could go some way to correcting this impression, and giving confidence and impetus to the people, most of whom remain in favour of the idea of Europe. The Constitutional Treaty will improve the running of the Union by making it more transparent and more efficient, and create instruments to concretise and develop the common foreign and defence policy, and the common area of security, freedom and justice, representing the indispensable new boundaries of the united Europe.
2. The main thing. It is entirely understandable that every effort will be made to safeguard the Convention's results, and to improve them as much as possible, but without questioning the final success just for a detail. I can understand the disappointment of those who wanted more, but if they share the prerequisite in the previous point, they will be more concerned about safeguarding the general outline than some detail or other, which is neither crucial nor urgent. Don't let's endanger the "fabulous" achievements to date in European construction by being in too much of a hurry. The adjective "fabulous" came from Michel Rocard, reacting to movements afoot within the French Socialist Party to campaign against the adoption of the Constitution for the forthcoming European elections (see this column of 15 April). You don't play about with the peace that has finally been achieved between Europeans, with firmly-rooted democracy, freedom and respect for human rights in our continent, with the chance to make Europe's voice heard in the world, with the gradual affirmation of the European model of society, which is increasingly recognised and envied.
3. Preserving the future. In fields where it is not possible to achieve all the goals the Constitution wanted (majority voting, for instance), revisions mechanisms to safeguard the future should be brought in or kept, as planned by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his Convention. However, please let's avoid dramatising certain obstacles. For example, in trade policy, some commentators say that the Irish Presidency plans to come back to the rule of unanimity (which would clearly be an unacceptable step backwards). In reality, unanimity would only be envisaged for cultural and educational issues, i.e. a specific field in which no Member State, or almost none, would accept majority decisions (just think of the language issue), and where cautious wording is possible, without compromising the principle of the EU's position in negotiations with third countries being defined by the Council by majority, upon a proposal by the Commission, which then takes up the responsibility for negotiating.
The main thing for the decision-making mechanism is, for now, that majority voting makes progress and that Parliament/Council codecision becomes more generalised.
4. Common policies. The Constitution should neither define nor set in stone the Union's common policies. It is logical for all political forces, and especially European political parties, to base their electoral campaigns on the content of the economic, social and other policies the Union will develop in the future, and for them to do so with passion, and sometimes with a slightly argumentative edge. But the Constitution should not be mixed up with the election campaign at the European Parliament. This Parliament, due to its growing powers of codecision and the expansion of its political muscle in general, will have an increasingly essential role in defining European policies, and each political tendency rightly puts its choices and ideals first; this is the very point of elections. But for my money, it's absolutely absurd to go laying things down in the Constitution. I will develop this idea in this column tomorrow.
5. Referendums. The content of the Constitution should not be determined by the prospect of national referendums, whereby several European nations will be called upon to give their view. In other words: governments should not allow themselves to be swayed by concerns with making the draft easier to swallow in such or such a Member State. Here, one's thoughts turn naturally to the United Kingdom (where, for the time being, opinion polls remain negative), and other countries such as Denmark, where the referendum will take place after the British result is announced.
Potential "no" to the Constitution could pave the way for "two Europes"
Point 5 above perhaps merits a small clarification. I think we should accept the risk of a negative result to the referendum in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, rather than allow the Constitution to be denuded of all sense, because I'm quite certain that the failure of ratification would not mean an end to further evolution in Europe, but would fairly soon lead to ambitious new initiatives by Member States convinced that radical progress in European integration is of vital importance. The legal complexity of an alternative integration is clear, but never in history have legal problems stood in the way of determined and clearly expressed political will. Certainly, it is greatly preferable for the Constitution to be ratified by all the Member States; but this preference should not be used as blackmail to rid the draft of all real content, or to make the "reinforced co-operation" instrument unusable, as the more weaknesses the Constitution has, the more this will be needed.
This is the basic point. For years, Jacques Delors has been saying that 25 countries with different histories, traditions, mentalities and economic situations cannot share the same ambitions at the same times. Therefore, a solid common base must be set up, covering the essential part, with a single institutional structure, and then the door should be left open for "differentiations". These could be voiced and made reality within the Union, via reinforced co-operation, with the option for all Member States to take part or to join in at a later date; this is the Constitution path. Without it, "differentiations" would become a new construction on the sidelines of the EU, which would become the free-trade zone, with a few common rules, which some Member States have always dreamed of.
For now, a blind eye has been turned to the prospect of this, to hold on to the chances of all going forward together, and avoid all talk of alternatives. But they do exist, and will surface if they are needed. It is not yet time to discuss them. Back to reality.
Simplifying. Whatever the result of the IGC session at Foreign Minister level, which is taking place as I write, the Irish Presidency should present its global compromise proposal, covering all aspects of the Constitution except those reserved for the Heads of Government, and soon. This will not be to all tastes, as must be the fate of all compromises, and we know that when the moment of truth is drawing near, everyone will try to consolidate their negotiating position, sometimes making more of the differences than really exists. This also goes for the points reserved for the IGC summit, which must be de-dramatised and simplified:
- modalities for majority voting. The principle of double majority is in the bag, and the percentages to define the majorities should not be overly involved, somewhere below 55% (for the number of States) and 65% (for the population), with a few precautions to stop too few countries from being able to block decisions;
- composition of the Commission: It is impossible to make a detailed definition, in a couple of days, of a definitive wording acceptable to all. Therefore, we must start off applying the Treaty of Nice (a Commissioner of each nationality), and set a later date, putting no more than the essential principles in the Constitution, without quoting from the Nice formula or using the adjective "equal" to the rotation, or else the future of the Commission's role will be bleak and the "Community method" seriously compromised.
And this business of "Christian roots"? I think it's unreasonable to make this into a major topic of debate and a cause of divergences. After a gallant last stand, we should got back to the wording in the "preamble" to the draft. There is no point reopening the debate which was already thrashed out by the Convention, and which ended up with a perfectly acceptable solution. (F.R.)