It is not a failure for Europe. I don't see the Swedish no vote on the euro as a failure for the European Union. It simply confirms that in today's Europe, and even more in tomorrow's enlarged Europe, Member States do not share the same ambitions or objectives. For careful observers, this statement is no surprise. Jacques Delors has been saying it for years, the Convention recognised it by planning a series of safeguards in fundamental areas (like defence and autonomous economic coordination of the eurozone). If attention has not focused on this area recently, it is because the priority at the moment is to get the Constitution approved in the form it was prepared by the Convention. This is not the moment to stress differences, it is time to stress what united European countries rather than what divides them.
Accepting "differentiation". While the majority of the Swedish population were rejecting the single currency, the Estonians were voting widely in favour of Estonia joining the EU, demonstrating the extent to which candidate countries want to be part of a united Europe. What is growing is reticence about the extent to which integration should be pursued, and hence the gap between different countries' ambitions and aims. I have already tried to explain in my column that there are no goodies or baddies in Europe, but different integration needs caused by history, traditions and mentalities. We should avoid distinguishing between a first and second class Europe and should calmly accept "differentiation". Levels of integration can differ because requirements differ. The coexistence of different levels of integration in a single unit is possible through a very simple rule - countries wanting not wanting to be involved in certain initiatives have the option of remaining outside (with "bridges" so they can join when appropriate) but they cannot prevent others from going ahead.
Greater autonomy of the eurozone. For the single currency this idea already functions to general satisfaction because a) all Member States have the right to join the eurozone; b) those excluded are excluded by their own free choice; and c) acceding countries will have to express the political desire and meet the necessary economic and monetary conditions if they are to join the eurozone. I know that the legal situation is rather different in reality, and Sweden would not have the right to not join the euro so each year the Commission has to make an excuse (non-membership of the European Exchange Mechanism) to justify its absence. But the political reality is as I described it. Who can seriously imagine Sweden being forced to join if most of its population is opposed?
I am not going to join the debate about why most Swedes voted the way they did. A population giving its opinion is always right. The government and business and financial milieus favoured joining the euro on the grounds that it would have been beneficial to Sweden, but they obviously failed to convince enough people. Most observers feel that Sweden will suffer some negative consequences from its decision in terms of fdi and influence on the EU's economic policy. There is no doubt about loss of influence because eurozone countries have to be firmer in their demand to be able to take economic and financial decisions over the eurozone fully autonomously without the authorisation of the "general" Ecofin Council (where eurozone countries will be in a minority, after enlargement).
Monetary autonomy and political autonomy. Monetary autonomy is clsoely linked, in my view, with political autonomy. Expert observers note that if the euro didn't exist, France wouldn't have been able to take the position it took over Iraq since US and international financial milieus could have launched an onslaught on the French franc leading to its devaluation and disastrous economic results. Such manoeuvring is no longer possible with the euro, which saves eurozone countries from the danger of the periodic monetary storms suffered in Europe a few years ago with such disastrous repercussions on the economic, political and even psychological cohesion of the European Union. The single currency is a vital basis for changes in the Common Foreign and Defence Policies that are so strongly supported by some Member States. It is not an accident that the most reticent countries with regard to the euro are also the most reticent with regard to these changes.
(F.R.)