Contested and inefficient. The main obstacle that the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) will have to overcome, if it wants to avoid opening up the debate on all the other institutional reforms, its that on the composition and functioning of the European Commission. Other points will undoubtedly be raised or mentioned but they are either on the way to being solved (see yesterday's section), minor problems or consensus at the Convention was so obvious that they went unchallenged. The draft, however, on the Commission will be unable to avoid a number of searching questions as it is subject to very sharp opposition (notably from the Commission itself) and does not resolve any problems at all. The current solution is contested and inefficient: there are a number of things to think about.
We are aware that the Convention intended that the Commission should be composed as from 1 November 2009 of a President, a Minister of Foreign Affairs (and Vice President) and thirteen Commissioners "selected according to an equal system of rotation between Member States". In addition, the Commission President appoints the Commissioners who don't have voting rights and who come from Member States where Commissioners do not have the right to vote. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said that he was happy with this solution as it responded to three essential demands: a) it introduces the principle of a number of Commissioners that is less than the number of Member States, indispensable in his view for the college to function efficiently; b) it confirms equality between Member States; c) not entering into force before 2009, this formula implies that the Commission will be appointed for the period from the end of 2004 to the end of 2009 and will be composed according to the provisions in the Treaty of Nice, hence a Commissioner of the nationality of each Member State. This deadline guarantees, in particular, that each accession country has its own Commissioner and therefore respects the political and psychological demands of their respective publics, which could interpret any absence of a Commissioner from their own countries as a relegation to a lower category. Until 2009, this public opinion would, according to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing be quite familiar with the mechanisms and spirit of the Community and understand that the Commission is a supranational body. They will not be frustrated at all once they realise that they are being treated the same as other Member States, even the most populous and older EU countries.
A debatable principle but…VGE bases his analysis on a principle that in itself is debatable: the Commission must not be a duplication of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) and composed of an Ambassador for every Member State. The Commission is made up of independent figures who are committed to acting independently from all other authorities in their countries of origin and who pursue the common European interest. In the press rooms, VGE described how he imagined a President , appointed by the Commission at the moment he chooses his team, would ideally behave. He would stand in front a map of Europe, he would rub out all the national borders and choose the appropriate people, without taking into account their nationality but rather their abilities, their European commitment and guarantees of independence. He explained that, "the correct method for composing the Commission is through the ability of those that are part of it".
Even one of VGE's reasons could be faulty. One of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's reasons is by definition, impeccable. The one that I have just recalled, however, is too theoretical and is unrealistic as the draft of the Constitution is clear, the President of the Commission for the first time chooses the 13 "Commissioners with voting rights" from the different nationalities. He can also choose the best from a list given to him but he will then be obliged to take into account the different nationalities and a possibly excellent Commissioner will be replaced by another simply because of his nationality. If the President does not find a talented individual from a country, he will have to appoint someone if it is the turn of a particular country. Condemnation of the nationality criteria, which was so strong in Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's opinions, does not correspond to the draft of the Constitutional treaty, which, on the contrary, was firmly founded on this criteria and by the rule of equal rotation between Member States. VGE himself, a few months before, had underlined the absurdity of an institution in which the six countries representing the main bulk of the population in the Union would have less weight than seven small countries whose population is hardly more than a million. Such an institution would not be able to vote due to the lack of representation. Moreover, the creation of a Commission from the nationality of each Member States, will effectively apply from now till 2009. VGE acknowledges that this will be a "testing period" for the functioning of the institutions. If governments think this Commission composition is not an accurate representation of reality in the EU, they will give it ever fewer big executive tasks, and even its exclusive right of initiative might be challenged (once the unanimous voting rule on the Council is maintained, as against the suggestion made by the Commission). The current balance of ten Commissioners for the five big countries and ten for small and medium-sized countries would be destroyed - from the end of next year, there will be six Commissioners for the big countries (adding Poland to the current five) and nineteen for the small and medium-sized countries. In five years, the damage might be such that the Community Method is dangerously challenged. I noted in this column on 20 June that there has never been equality of states within the supranational body, from the time of the High Authority of the ECSC onwards. The Community Method does not, it is true, involve the supranational authority representing Member States, but balance is needed all the same, and Jean Monnet and the other founding fathers of the European project never strayed from this.
Berlusconi confirms the danger. The serious nature of the risk to the Community Method is confirmed by various quotations by the President of the European Council, Silvio Berlusconi. In Thessalonica he expressed doubt about the very existence of the Commission, saying that heads of state were perfectly able to form the EU's government themselves - each one being given a portfolio and sending a representative to Brussels. How very simple! He later said this was a joke. But a few days ago he expressed the same ideas before the world's media and even gave examples (Malta could be given responsibility for maritime safety), adding that the idea was warmly supported by Romano Prodi (who could only express perplexity and deny his support). This idea reveals a frightening ignorance about the Community Method and the history of the European project, whose brilliance lies precisely in the creation of an institution independent of governments, moving beyond intergovernmental cooperation (which has always existed but never prevented inter-European wars). Luckily, the official documents of the Italian Presidency (even those read by Berlusconi himself) have a quite different “European content”. But the very fact that the existence of the Commission can be challenged at such high level shows that the Community Method is not home and dry.
Romano Prodi joins the fray. Assuming the “period of fragility” passes without too much damage, will the “lack of representation” be removed by the system that would come into force in November 2009? Serious doubt has been expressed, not least by the President of the current Commission, Romano Prodi. He asks how the future President would take important decisions or formulate vital proposals (on the multi-annual financial framework, for example) as the head of the Commission which didn't have any German or potentially French or British Commissioners? In a speech at Bologna University on 5 July, Romano Prodi said: “what legitimacy would proposals have that are made by a scaled down Commission where two or three of the countries with the highest populations are not represented. Proposals that would then be adopted by a Council where the same countries are in the minority?”. This is why Prodi opts for the idea of one Commissioner per Member State. I don't think that would necessarily solve the problem of representation. Under the “Giscard idea”, a German Commissioner would lose voting powers when it's the turn of another nationality. In the “Prodi idea” the German Commissioner would have one vote out of a total of 25 (in an institution voting by simple majority). The difference would be imperceptible. Problems with attendance and participating in debates would not arise because one Commissioner of each nationality would be involved in the debates but with one vote or no voting powers, therein lies the rub. But Romano Prodi has fleshed out his idea of one Commissioner per Member State as follows: “Of course, this would require greater internal independent power with “hubs” and a number of groups of Commissioners headed by Vice-Presidents." This sentence is vital since a radically different type of internal organisations would be necessary for the Commission which will soon have thirty-odd members. The powers of the Commissioners would have to be differentiated in order for it to function. But how could responsibility for all that be given to the President, who would already have the power to select Commissioners from lists of names supplied by the Member States? The President of the Commission would be so powerful that governments might think twice…
Jacques Delors' views. Jacques Delors has raised the basic issue by noting in an interview with Baudouin Bollaert in the Figaro newspaper: "to have a strong collegiate and confident Commission, there must be no more than 15 Commissioners selected according to their skills rather than on the principle of equal rotation between all Member States. Knowing that over a twenty year period, small countries will be represented at the Commission in the same way as big countries, will certainly please countries with smaller populations. But it is unreasonable."
Which is why this needs to be reviewed root and branch.
(F.R.)