This column today does not owe much to the journalist signing it but above all to the Chairman of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who organised an exchange of views last Saturday with a small group of journalists from press agencies so that he could let them know how he sees the current phase of work on the European Constitution. I cannot give to his remarks the form of declarations by the Chairman for two reasons: because it is not an interview and because I have grouped his remarks and positions according to "subject", for reasons of presentation and clarity. The Chairman's thoughts will therefore come until these headings.
Timetable and possible extension of work. VGE pointed out that the current president of the European Council, Costas Simitis, is seeking his colleagues' consensus on brief extension of the Convention's work, until mid-July for example, in order to proceed to fine-tuning part III (the Union's policies) with a view to making policies consistent with the ambitions of parts I and II. There would therefore be a text for the summit this month in Greece, which would then be completed for the autumn summit in Rome.
Regarding work under way, the Praesidium will not be presenting a new complete project for institutional reform to its plenary session this week (see article page 7), but attributes great importance to the preliminary contacts that the Praesidium is to have, from Wednesday morning on, with the various Convention "components", as the members of the Praesidium do not always provide a balance reflection of the position of the "component" to which they belong (see following point).
Option aimed at maintaining the Nice institutional regime is firmly rejected. In response to the stance taken by nine Convention Members who called for the Nice institutional regime to be maintained (see article page 5 of this bulletin), VGE dryly retorted that, if we are going to stick to the Nice Treaty, then the whole constitutional part of the Convention's work is without purpose. The Convention Members in question insist on how little time there is for reaching an agreement on a new regime and the requirement not to compromise the other Convention results, which must not be endangered by institutional divergence. They recognise the fact that the Nice agreement "is not perfect" but that, in their view, it represents a "point of balance between the different interests at stake". VGE rejects this position and does not allow himself to be impressed by the fact that the nine signatories all belong to the category of representatives of Heads of Government. He affirmed that "the positions of diplomats do not necessarily represent those of their leaders", and that the political authorities of at least two of the countries concerned gave him their support for the institutional reform contemplated. VGE considers that, in several cases, the defence of Nice is a "tactical position". If it were the essential position of all it would mean the downfall of any institutional reform, which is unthinkable as "something from Nice must at any rate change". Regarding the two major countries of the current EU which support Nice (United Kingdom and Spain), VGE considers that the position of one is "tactical" while the position of the other may still evolve, with some guarantees.
I wish to recall that some governments, especially the Spanish government, consider that the voting mechanism within the Council decided in Nice is more favourable to them than the "dual majority" system (in which the demographic weight of the States has greater importance: see this column of 23 May). There is similar reservation about the composition of the European Parliament. VGE vigorously defended "dual majority", which not only protects the small countries (a majority of States being needed for a decision to be taken) but also the large countries (the majority needed must exceed 50% of the population, and VGE considers 60% is reasonable). This system also avoids the need to renegotiate the percentages every time a new country joins. According to VGE, the Nice mechanism "had blocking aims" (the main concern expressed by negotiators was that of being able to form minorities likely to block a decision), while the aim of the Constitution must be to allow legislative work.
VGE recalled that the Laeken Declaration puts explicit questions to the Convention on the effectiveness of the Commission, the roles of the EP and Council, and the way the decision-making process works.
Necessary improvements. Among the improvements that the Convention could make to the draft Constitution proposed by the Praesidium, VGE cited: a) the Union's economic governance. The part relating to the euro zone government must be specified, on the basis of reactions by Convention Members; b) foreign and security policy. VGE considers the Convention could return to the two-step idea
Since just one step would be too much for the here and now and too little for the future so it's better to foresee gradual change; c) for the justice part, VG3 didn't give any details. I note that in plenary both Michel Barnier (on behalf of the Commission) and Hubert Haenel (and other Members) called for a European prosecutor to be established; and d) the making the third part of the Constitution coherent with the principles and guidelines of the first.
The composition of the Commission is not an unsolvable problem. VGE feels that the understandable concern of the Central and Eastern European countries about having a place on the European Commission is already being taken into consideration since the next Commission (which will start in 2004) will be formed according to the rules in the Nice Treaty and will therefore have one national from each Member State. The problem of cutting the number of Commissioners will only arise in 2009 or 2010. For the end period, the Convention should establish various principles, such as the Commissioners being selected on the basis of their commitment to Europe and not their nationality. These principles should be accompanied by various rules to avoid arbitrariness and guarantee balance which should feature in a document annexed to the Constitution. The period from 2004 to 2009 will be a period of "fragility" when everyone will be able to note and acknowledge the need for reform.
To understand the previous sentence one has to reread what VGE said last month in an interview in Le Point on 9 May: For several years, Europe of 25 Member States will have to operate with the measures in the Nice Treaty. The 80 million Germans will only have one Commissioner - as will the French - while the Baltic States, for example, which have 8 million inhabitants, will have three Commissioners. During this period tension is predictable since the institutions will be seen as not very representative.
The Commission cannot chair the Council. VGE rejects point blank the suggestion that the President (or a Vice-President) of the Commission could chair some Council formations. The EU's institutional system is based on a triangle (European Parliament, Commission, Council) with each institution having its autonomy and its own tasks. It is vital for each to stick to its own side of the triangle since otherwise the whole system will have to be changed. A European Currency Minister could be considered in the future (similar to a European Foreign Minister) but keeping the institutions separate.
Romano Prodi's tactics. VGE says the objective remains a single draft Constitutional Treaty (possibly indicating a few minority positions) without options. But this presupposes that "conservatives" give up their current positions. The Chairman says the Convention Members wanting the current set-up to be maintained are the "conservatives" since they oppose innovation. Asked about the attitude of the Commission's President, VGE said he didn't see him as a conservative but "for tactical reasons" Prodi had supported various ideas that weaken the Commission. He gave the example of favouring one Commissioner per Member State without proposing anything that could resolve the problem of the Commission. VGE added that various important Commissioners had told him they favoured a smaller Commission.
To back up his statement about the "conservatives", VGE quoted what he sees as the most innovative initiative (although it is subject to criticism), namely creating a Congress of the European people, a forum of the democratic institutions of the EU and its Member States.
"The battle between the institutions is more bureaucratic than political". VGE says the battle between the institutions, with each defending its prerogatives (that started in 1996 more or less) is negative for the EU and more bureaucratic than political. If the EU in the future is a single state, the battle to decide which is to be the government of Europe would be understandable, but the objective is an EU of countries and peoples, based on power-sharing between the institutions, all have of which to be strengthened and improved. It would have been better to consider in more detail about what Europe will be in future. Jacques Delors, for example, has done so, but governments have not.
That "federal" word. VGE said he had decided (before meeting Tony Blair) to replace the word "federal" in the Constitution with the word "Community". Why didn't he call for a concession in return from the British government? VGE replied that that would be the "Nice method" which he doesn't favour since his objective is to "reach a good text".
"The coming into force of the Constitutional Treaty will not be settled by the Convention". According to VGE, the question of avoiding the new Treaty falling in the event of a single Member State refusing to ratify it "is political not legal". Legally, he explained, it is impossible to repeal the current treaties in the event of disagreement. He problem clearly calls for a political evaluation but it is not to be dealt with by the Convention. On the other hand, VGE feels a measure concerning the potential departure of a country will be included in the Constitutional Treaty. (F.R.)