The real institutional debate has now begun. The phase during which each put forward his or her specific scheme or proposal on some aspect or another is now over. At present, positions meet head-on and sometimes clash. Reactions are in response to proposals. The debate is now under way. I shall seek to enlighten you by comparing the positions held by the most prominent actors (the Chairman of the Convention, the European Commission, some governments, Conventional Members and Jacques Delors) on a number of fundamental and controversial aspects of institutional reform.
Exclusion of countries that do not ratify the new Treaty. As foreseen, the United Kingdom rejects any provision that would exclude from the Union the Member States that do not ratify the constitutional treaty. Peter Hain, British Minister and Convention Member, told "La Libre Belgique": "I do not agree that a country that does not ratify the constitutional treaty should be forced to remain out of it. You cannot hold members at gunpoint like this - it is not democratic". He was of course referring to the project included in "Penelope", mentioned in this column on 11 December. Speaking before the EU delegation of the French Senate, Jacques Delors had declared last month: "I believe it is imperative that the entry into force of the future constitutional treaty should not be blocked by the refusal of any country to ratify it". Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had spoken in a similar vein.
The European Commission did not give its view (see this column of 30 November), but the working document known as "Penelope" devotes a specific text to this (see this column of 11 December).
The "President of Europe". Stances are in stark contrast. Support for a long term president, designated by the European Council, a president who would only carry out his newly appointed duties, was vigorously confirmed by the United Kingdom and by the Chairman of the Convention, and remains the official position held by France and Spain within the Convention. But this was just as firmly rejected by the European Commission and by the Benelux countries.
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said in an interview with Le Figaro: "A stable Council President is needed, a long term president, with possibly vice-presidents entrusted with specific tasks such as foreign affairs or economic and financial issues". He went on to add that, in his opinion, the small countries would end up rallying to this idea "as the president could be from one of their nations. If you look at the list of major posts held in European bodies, you will see that many of them have been filled by nationals from the small countries, who reach a consensus more easily".
Peter Hain was quite clear, saying that, when George Bush, Vladimir Putin, the Chinese or Indian Prime Ministers contact the Council, and its president changes every six months, Europe is not credible. There is a terrible schizophrenia in many countries, especially the small ones - they want a strong foreign policy but reject the means of achieving it. He said the argument is not between large and small countries but those who want an effective Europe and those who do not. If you want a paralysed Europe, he said, then keep a rotating Presidency. Observing that Guy Verhofstadt could very well be the first "President of Europe", the British Ministers specified that his term of office should be of the same duration as that of the President of the Commission, and that he would have at his side a small team of four or five persons from different countries.
Guy Verhofstadt does not seem close to being convinced as, in the memorandum signed with his Dutch and Luxembourg colleagues, he states: "Benelux is in favour of keeping the rotating presidency at the level of the European Council and the specialised Councils. Benelux will never agree to a president that is elected outside the Council". The European Commission thinks along the same lines: it considers that a full-time president of the European Council, appointed for a long duration and chosen by the Heads of Government, would be in duplicate with the Commission President, without having the same legitimacy or the same obligations to defend European interests. Speaking before the European Parliament, Romano Prodi asked what the "President of Europe" would do between the mythical telephone call from the US President and the three or four annual Summits, that is, during 360 days of the year. Would he be edifying his staff, or preparing the sessions of the European Council at an intergovernmental level? The "Community method" would be overturned and distorted.
Speaking before the French Senate, Jacques Delors declared: "I have noticed that most of those who want a strong president either do not know the Community system or want to damage it. I therefore have great mistrust regarding this idea".
Unifying the Presidents of the Commission and Council? In order to get round the divergence over the "President of Europe", the idea of a single president for the Commission and Council was launched. This is not a gadget but a formula that has been thought over at great length, floated by Robert Toulemon and taken up within the Convention by Pervenche Berès and Pierre Lequiller. The Lequiller initiative is beginning to appeal to a certain number of Convention Members, the most significant and unexpected being French Minister for Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin, who declared on 2 December in Marseilles: "Should one create a single Union President who wears the cap of both Commission and Council President? We should explore the idea". According to some observers, "this idea" would be on the table in the Franco-German context, in preparation for a joint document that France and Germany plan to present early next year. It would be a compromise between the stances taken by Joschka Fischer, who advocates making the Commission the executive power of the Union, and of Jacques Chirac, who is in favour of a "President of Europe" designated by the Summit.
Opposition voiced to the "common president" is both strong and highly qualified It is enough to state that, among those rejecting the solution, there is the Chairman of the Convention, the European Commission and Jacques Delors. The main objection to the idea is that the "Community method", would be compromised - a method founded on a balance between the three sides of the institutional triangle: the Commission, Council and Parliament. All three must all be consolidated and strengthened and their autonomy must be maintained within their specific spheres of competence. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said: "The idea of a single Presidency does not correspond to the philosophy of the Community institutional system. In this system, the Commission proposes and expresses the European common interest, and the Council decides. You cannot have one and the same person proposing at one end of the chain and deciding at the other". Michel Barnier, responsible for institutional affairs within the Commission said "we must avoid hypocrisy. Is it a question of the president of the European Council who has the Commission as its secretariat, or a president of the Commission who has all power? We must come out of this ambiguity. The idea that, one day, there would be a president of the Union responsible before an assembly and who would be at the head of a European federal authority does not frighten me. But for a certain time we must live in the system of shared powers that we know today: that of a collective Union government".
Jacques Delors pointed out that he shared the analysis made by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the conclusions he draws. In his opinion, in order to have a single president it is necessary to come out of the current system.
European "Foreign Affairs Minister". The idea of creating the post of a single person in charge of Union external relations is quite broadly shared, but some see it within an intergovernmental context, whereas others see the official as a member of the Commission. The compromise proposed by Michel Barnier taken up by the Commission in its communication, blends the two concepts together to take into account the specific responsibilities of the Member States in this field. We shall let Mr Barnier do the explaining: "Today, we have a High Representative, Javier Solana, and an External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten. Let's merge the two posts! Let's call it the "Secretary of the European Union" as in the United States you have "Secretary of State". Let's give him the power of own in initiative as well as a double hat. I mean he would be vice-President of the Commission but, unlike his colleagues, he would be accountable to the Council. Europe would finally have a single face and a strong voice for its citizens and for the rest of the world". Regarding the arrangements for his designation and other aspects, see the Commission's communication point 1.3.3. The Benelux memorandum fully supports the Barnier project.
Election of the European Commission. The European Commission proposed that the Commission president should be elected by the European Parliament and approved by the European Council. This would therefore mean dual legitimacy, that of the peoples (Parliament) and that of the States (European Council), which implies that the Commission may be censured by both. Reticence to this parliamentary election is motivated by the risk that the Commission could become a prisoner of the political majority that elects its president and could be all too marked by a given political direction. Jacques Delors recalled his personal experience: all the decisive breakthroughs of Europe have benefited from the support of the two political forces which built the Union - Christian Democracy and Socialism. It would be absurd to oppose them now by deciding that the Commission President will have the support of one and the opposition of the other. The provision whereby the president will be elected "by a two-third majority" of the EP (included in the communication) could resolve this difficulty, but some MEPs are opposed to it considering that the requirement of such a majority would establish a system of "permanent compromises" (see our bulletin of 6 December, p.4). Michel Barnier believes the risk of a few difficulties (controllable ones, moreover) in EP/Commission relations must be accepted given the requirement of strengthened democratic legitimacy of the Commission.
The institutional aspects under discussion are of course far more numerous but the five that I have retained seem to me to be the most visible. I would add that some current reflection goes beyond the specific points mentioned and moves toward more radical changes to the current structure. (F.R.)