It is clearly difficult to seize the two different but non-contradictory aspects of the Union's enlargement: the political aspect, essential and that raises enthusiasm, and the practical difficulties, serious and at times of concern. Following the Commission's recommendations, most commentators have given the impression of focusing on one or the other aspect, which provides as result either hymns to the historic event that is reunification, or sceptical or disenchanted comments which place emphasis on shortcomings and concerns.
Realism replaces enthusiasm. It seems that public opinion does not really grasp the historic and sentimental scope of the enterprise. It may be regretted (for my part, I regret it greatly), but that's the case. Our countries had lived through Europe's separation into two parts with a certain amount of fatalistic resignation, and when the iron curtain was brought down, enthusiasm did not last for long. The tourist trip to Prague or Budapest became almost banal, emotion gave way to normality. Last week, some political leaders tried to rekindle the flame of enthusiasm. Romano Prodi reaffirmed that the Continent's reunification was a historic project "to ensure peace, stability and democracy in Europe", Pat Cox spoke of "removing the last bricks of the Berlin Wall", and Jean-Louis Bourlanges, who has the feeling for formulas, was the most trenchant, stressing that to reject enlargement was to "assume Stalin's heritage". But public opinion remains quite apathetic, little inclined to excesses of enthusiasm, and, in the end, enlargement will be assessed by the populations of Member states and those of candidate countries, especially in the light of economic, financial and social considerations and some momentary hiccups it could lead to.
These considerations are not superfluous, as new accessions will have to pass the test of popular judgement, through referenda or parliamentary ratification. Great effort at explaining and informing is thus required, not in the form of propaganda or "brainwashing", but to put across the true message, factual reality. The prospect of accession has already had astonishing effects in applicant countries: without the pressure of the "Copenhagen criteria", a certain number of these countries would not have made the known efforts, would not have eliminated, or at least controlled, the at times serious frictions between them, would not have consolidated their democratic bases nor transformed their administrative structures as much as they have been able to do. On the side of the Fifteen, the possible influx of illegal immigrants or an aggravation of insecurity does not concern the ten countries that the Commission recognised as "ready for membership", but other countries, Balkan or Mediterranean (public opinion sometimes makes unwarranted amalgams). For the EU as a whole, enlargement could be an amazing upper in the grey climate we are experiencing.
The stakes of the Convention. Efforts at informing, explaining and clarifying could only really be effective if two essential conditions are met. The first is the success of the Convention. I do not have the impression that this condition is often cited. Yet, should the EU not succeed in its reforms enlargement will lead to its dilution into a simple free-trade area, without soul or will (which some Member states maybe want). I shall not insist on this point as the Convention is doing its work and nothing leads us to predict failure. But it is, at times, useful to remember the stakes.
Essential rigour. The second condition concerns the actual capacity of candidate countries to implement Community legislation. This thus takes us back to the practical chapter of this large enterprise. I do not share the opinion of those that claim that the Commission is too rigid in its negotiations, too finicky, too attached to technical details. I firstly recall that it is not the Commission that defines the negotiating positions, or which negotiates. Those are the Member states: the Commission proposes. Having said that, the idea that "cut price" accessions may be acceptable, granting one or another of the new Member states the possibility of being part of the Union without respecting the rules and constraints, does not hold water. The abolition of borders is only possible if the internal market is uniform: what would be the point of elaborating quality or health standards, technical or other to protect the environment, health, safety, consumer interests etc., if products that do not respect these are then allowed free movement? Or to reaffirm the principle of "Community preference" if the rules of origin are not rigorously applied? Or to provide ourselves with sophisticated and rigorous provisions for company law and financial markets, if these provisions are not implemented throughout?
Lost opportunity. Following the collapse of the Berlin wall, the EU had the opportunity for a grand operation of European rapid reunification, by not waiting to open up its arms to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with close associations that would have answered these countries' immediate demands and effectively prepared them for later membership. Jacques Delors made the suggestion, but the heads of government did not have sufficient vision to go down that road and some of them preferred to give way to the demagogical temptation of promising full membership… before 2000. We know what became of those promises. The grand immediate gesture that could have led to a marriage of love did not materialise, negotiations inevitably dragged on for years (after half a century of Communist rule, no country of Central or Eastern Europe could improvise the indispensable transformation of the whole national administration, management and production methods, or practices and mentalities) and, if all works well, we hall have a marriage of reason. Enthusiasm may then follow, if the marriage works and Europe renews.
A certain confusion. While awaiting these promising tomorrows, the Commission has thus recommended that negotiations end this year. But at the same time, the Commission's reports point to the existence of at times serious delays, so much so that some commentators have emphasised this aspect, wondering about the real prospects and expressing a high degree of scepticism as to the possibility of overcoming the stated difficulties in three months. This could stem from a certain confusion in analysing the documents: the Commission did not say that candidate countries would catch-up by the end of the year, but between now and then problems that remain "in negotiations" could be ironed out: none of these problems is of a nature not to be settled by December. For membership actually to take place, the 2004 target date is desirable and considered as possible, but close and permanent monitoring of progress will be made, and, half way through next year, the Commission will make another overall assessment. So as to take account of the many critical remarks in the Commission's reports (summarised, together with the first debate in the European Parliament, see our bulleting of 10 October, pp.4/5, and more in detail in our specialised publication "Uniting Europe" of 14 October) and provide greater weight to the monitoring of preparations on the part of applicant countries, Jean-Louis Bourlanges suggested that ratification of the accession treaties by the Fifteen only take place after the Commission has presented its final assessment report. Thus the separation would be clear between, on the one hand, the current recommendations and reports (that, notably, concern the state of an prospects for accession negotiations, in the light of the "Copenhagen criteria"), and, on the other, the final assessment of the ability of candidate countries to respect the undertakings made.
The cases of the three candidate countries not part of the first wave are not uniform. What the Commission has said for Bulgaria and Romania corresponds to what their authorities want: set out 2007 as possible target date for their accession, promising greater EU support, both financial and technical, to make this timetable credible. The road has been mapped out.
The Turkish people will decide. Turkey is in quite a different situation. Its government is demanding that 2003 be chosen as year to begin accession negotiations and that a date for accession also be set. Ankara is threatening a serious crisis if this month's European Council does not alter the Commission's conclusions by agreeing to its requests. I believe that, for now, the Commission is right: whatever progress Turkey makes towards meeting European demands and the (doubtless sincere) determination of the Turkish authorities to progress down that road, we must wait for the outcome of the 3 November elections. If the Turkish people vote for a fundamental Muslim majority, they will themselves have voted against membership. A secular State and all that goes with it is an essential condition for becoming a member of the Union. There is no question of rejecting a population because a great majority of them are Muslim: each citizen is free to choose his or her conviction and way of life; but in a united Europe the laws of a religion cannot be the laws of state. Nor would it serve any purpose to deny reality by authoritarian measures. Democracy demands that we know the truth as to the will of the people, and a people choosing religious fundamentalism cannot enter the EU. Of course, the Commission's document does not speak like that, the European Council of 24 and 25 October will do likewise. But I predict that, while awaiting the outcome of the elections, the European Council will not go beyond what the Commission has stated. Something could possibly change at the second Summit under the Danish Presidency, that of December, when the Turkish people have said what they want. Early next year, the Commission will anyway propose an enhanced co-operation strategy between the EU and Turkey, with additional financial means. It is up to the Turkish people to say whether they want to go further.
(F.R.)