A few commonplaces to avoid. The reader can rest assured, if Jacques Delors has ended a significant period of silence, it is not for nothing (see our bulletin yesterday p 4). In an attempt to push forward the European foreign policy and European Defence Policy, as well as flexibility and solve some institutional problems, he introduced a number of incisive reflections. He didn't try and hide what he thought of the stultifying formulas used in Summit "conclusions", with which Heads of Government give each other a mutual pat on the back and welcome with expressions of profound glee whatever document is sent to them. Europe has to break out of this insipid self-satisfaction, which almost makes us nostalgic for the Thatcher era where a bit of scrapping was normal in order to progress. He started by rejecting a few commonplaces:
a) European foreign policy will be no more difficult with 27 than 15. Don't look for excuses, it's not enlargement that's going to create obstacles;
b) There's no miracle solution for CFSP or ESDP. These common policies can only come out of a common political will (without ignoring the importance of what Mr Solana has already done, and despite some frustrating episodes, by Mr Patten;
c) Our old countries share a history, traditions and different interests that we can't wipe clean. Years and years will be necessary for positions on world affairs to become uniform.
With these premises posed, Mr Delors took a number of positions, which I'm going to classify according to subjects and bring his introductory ideas and answers together.
1. Eulogy to differentiation and flexibility. In the history of European construction, differentiation between Member States has sometimes been necessary to go forward, as well as to prove, for example the viability of the single currency and Schengen. A 27 State Europe will only be able to have a limited number of principal common objectives (peace and stability zone, sustainable development, voice of Europe in the world), whereas, "the remainder as I see it, will be strengthened co-operation, such as EMU (single currency), CFSP and ESDP". The reason being is that Mr Delors does not believe that 27 countries will be able to always go forward together and if we're always waiting for the last, nothing will get done (the Euro wouldn't exist if we'd waited for everyone to agree). The former Polish Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Geremek pointed out that "differentiation" is acceptable if it doesn't mean a "difference in status" between Member States, with some labelled as "second class". Mr Delors clarified that each strengthened co-operation must be preceded by a debate between all Member States and shouldn't be launched if every country is not willing to participate in an initiative. In any case, the door will always remain ajar for all subsequent accession, which is currently the case for the Euro. In the absence of strengthened co-operation within the treaties, certain large countries would end up carrying it out all the same outside of Community procedures, choosing to participate themselves, which would mean an end to the "Community method". Strengthened co-operation represents the only guarantee for small countries against the dictates of the "large countries, as in each case its up to them to take part- the choice is theirs.
2. Eulogy to "dualism". Jacques Delors is not afraid of co-existence between the President of the Commission and a "Union President", appointed by Heads of Government for two or three years. The Commission and European Council have different tasks and the "Community "Method" calls for their co-existence and their specific responsibilities. Therefore, two representative Presidents of Europe vis-à-vis the outside world, is not a bad model, on the condition that the essential is safeguarded, namely, the Community Method. The rivalry between the Commission and the Council is purely an aberration (Jacques Delors criticised it, as well as the "conflictual" situation between the Deputy Secretary General of the Council and Commission services).
3. No to the election of the Commission President by the European Parliament. Jacques Delors sharply criticised this formula because the President of the Commission would be a "prisoner" to the political group that appointed him, and who would be increasingly requested to align himself to their positions. The Commission must find a larger majority with the Parliament going further than one political group or other, in support of the common European interest, that the Commission is responsible for obtaining. Certain habits from national Parliaments should be prevented from entering the European Parliament, which would end up with a majority supporting the Commission (because it would have chosen the President) and an opposition systematically against it (because it would see the President as a political adversary).
4. Voting in CFSP? Wisdom and caution. Is it possible to apply current procedures such as those for economic unification to foreign policy? Mr Delors doesn't think so. In CFSP, the right of initiative is shared between the Commission and Member States and majority voting has to be handled carefully. A majority, for example (accepting that it exists), should never, in Mr Delors' opinion, be used to impose sanctions against Israel and the wishes of a substantial minority (former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt stressed the political impossibility of putting Greece in a minority over Macedonia). This doesn't mean that the possibility of getting majority decisions should be abandoned in CFSP but should be applied wisely and without arrogance and by perhaps distinguishing between main political guidelines and their operational implementation. In the absence of unanimous agreement by future Member States on foreign and military EU policy, CFSP and ESDP will become the object of reinforced co-operation (see point 1), without which we would inevitably end up with a "Directorate of three or four and with neutral countries happy to say that the EU is not present in these areas".
The effectiveness of CFSP and ESDP presupposes that the instruments for action are "all held in the same hands". If the EU decides on action, it ought to simultaneously master the rapid deployment force, budgetary means, emergency aid and economic assistance. The real medium-term solution would be that the CFSP High Representative (Mr Solana or the "First Commission Vice President") is responsible for all instruments for action.
A warning. In conclusion, Jacques Delors gave a warning - EU stagnation and its dilution would even have repercussions on what appear today to be acquis, such as the great market without borders. If, in particular, the principle of solidarity is not maintained (together with that of co-operation and competitiveness), there is a risk of everything exploding.
Loyal to a two-fold belief - worries about neutral countries
I'll sift through some of the following comments in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I believe that the positions of Mr Delors arise from his loyalty to a two-fold belief, a) The EU's political and moral duty is to welcome candidate countries with open arms to accession and the EU will even reap economic dividends from it; b) It is impossible that in a Union of 27 countries or more, all countries share the same projects and aims and that they are able to pursue all objectives at the same time. This why Jacques Delors attaches such importance to flexibility and "strengthened co-operation" as the only means of avoiding stagnation which would be unavoidable if any new initiative was subject to unanimity (this condition would mean that the Euro wouldn't exist).
The problem is to convince the small countries and candidate countries that flexibility does not aim to cast any country aside but on the contrary, "strengthened co-operation" within the framework of the Treaty, represents the only sure way of avoiding the diktats of large countries. Mr Geremek was afraid that such a development would lead to a "Community" Europe in economic domains and a "Europe à la carte" for political aspects. Mr Delors reassured him that his vision was of Member States participating in CFSP and ESDP if they accepted the principles and rules. My impression is that Jacques Delors is thinking of neutral countries as an ensemble rather than the candidate countries; the reservations of the former tending to hold up CFSP and ESDP development if the EU agrees to march at the pace of the slowest. Javier Solana vigorously defended the indispensable aspect of military capability and affirmed that, "global responsibility calls for both political will and military capability", which he had argued for himself in meetings with NATO officials before adding that, "It is useless to continue meeting up if we do not tackle military issues". Carl Bildt asserted that there was a need for "strengthening our military capabilities to be able to lead military operations separately from the USA". It seems obvious to me that Jacques Delors considers that if some EU countries to not change their opinions or attitudes, "flexibility" (to be clear - leaving these countries outside CFSP and ESDP development) represents the only way of giving Europe sufficient weight in world affairs. He was certainly not thinking of Poland, which Mr Geremek argued was "sovereigntist" but whose autonomy would best be guaranteed and protected as a participant in the EU.
I believe that Mr Delors' opposition to a Commission President appointed by a well-defined political force, is motivated by fear of the danger that this President would at any moment be able to be in opposition to the political direction of the majority of Heads of Government. His relationship with the European Council would in this case become singularly unhealthy. The political independence of the Commission President must be based on Member States and institutions and political parties combined.
(F.R.)