The importance of "options". The main problem posed by the Convention that is to be entrusted with preparing the new reform of the EU has not yet been resolved. In fact I would go further: it has not even been raised. I could summarise it with one question: What will happen if the Convention notes the existence of two incompatible conceptions of a future Europe? This is no idle question. By defining the composition, the functioning and the mandate of the Convention (see our editorial in yesterday's bulletin), the Fifteen specified that the "task of the Convention will be essentially to develop options for the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2004". Not a draft text, but options. I do not agree on this point with the EP rapporteurs, Jo Leinen and Iñigo Mendez de Vigo, who feel that the Convention should result in consensus, as I fear that - given the widely differing positions from the very outset - the obligation to seek consensus would necessarily result in downward compromises, and finally in a project close to the smallest common denominator. Those who are in favour of an ambitious project should not give it up right from the start! They must, on the contrary, define "their" project by giving it a structured form and by admitting the hypothesis that those who do not share it should present an alternative project. "Options" are not an aim, but a possibility that must be available to the Convention to keep its ambitions high.
Preparing for lack of consensus. I shall thus go right back to the beginning. We must be prepared for failure to reach consensus. "The Friends of Europe" (an association chaired by Etienne Davignon) did so by writing in their latest paper: "the public debate on the aims of the Union will tell us whether citizens of the different Member States have radically different ideas on what they expect of the Union. This will determine the validity, or otherwise, of the hypothesis of a vanguard composed of Member States that hope for more rapid integration (leaving the door open to partners hoping to catch up with them)". This is all very well, but I doubt that the emergency exit represented by the vanguard will, in this case, be sufficiently reassuring. The true danger is that an ambitious text would have no future because it would not be ratified by any of the national parliaments. During the ministerial debate of 8 October in Luxembourg, not only the Irish delegation (worked up after the result of the referendum on the Treaty of Nice) but also the British delegation spoke of the danger, inviting their partners to moderate their ambitions. Such remarks could reoccur each time the proposal of study exceeds a certain red line that some government or other has ideally traced.
Vanguard and self-exclusion. Under these conditions, one should now think of the possibility of a more radical formula to result, where necessary, in the birth of the vanguard: the establishment of an ambitious Treaty that would take effect as soon as it has been ratified by a majority of Member States. It would therefore be the Parliaments, or in the case of referenda, the peoples who would decide on the degree of integration for their countries' participation after enlargement. I am not unaware of the fact that the European Parliament is very attached to the institutional unity of Europe and that, in principle, it does not at all like evolution towards two Europes with different degrees of integration and with partially separate Institutions. But neither am I unaware of the fact that, in reality, this divide already exists (in the monetary area, in foreign policy and common defence, in the single area of justice and security), and that a first institutional separation is also here, with the Eurogroup (grouping the countries that take part in single currency at ministerial level). No-one chooses "two Europes" but neither can anyone prevent self-exclusion, except when renouncing all radical progress. Even the European Parliament, when it notes the magnitude of divergence during the Convention, should make its choice. It seems to me preferable to prepare for this rather than to just let it happen. All the more as the determination of the most ambitious to move forward at any rate, and to make it known, could exert pressure on others to follow.
The most ambitious Treaty should, of course, be accompanied by another more modest treaty, as, with a view to its enlargement, the EU at any rate needs certain adjustments (to complete the Treaty of Nice, or replace it if necessary). One must therefore foresee two texts, one for adjusting the current Treaty without any fundamental additions to be ratified by all Fifteen, and the other having nearly the nature of a Constitutional Treaty to be ratified by the countries hoping to take part. This is neither a politically nor legally easy path to take, but I can see no other. If there are other suggestions, I would be pleased to hear them. (F.R.)