The speech in which the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhoftadt set out his "Vision for Europe" last September remains most topical, as, from July, he will have the responsibility of preparing the wide-ranging debate on Europe's future and, in December, chair the first European Council devoted to this debate (see the "A Look Behind the News" section in our bulletin of 12 January). Here are the essential aspects of this fundamental speech.

Need for an objective. "We need to make progress, but that will be possible only if the ultimate goal which we wish to achieve is formulated first. For any process comes to a standstill when we lose sight of the objective. That is how it works. It is the dynamics caused by the debate about the ultimate goal that is the strength of European integration. If these dynamics are no longer there, European integration is threatened by stagnation. But there is a second reason why the debate about the future of Europe must be continued with great intensity. And that reasons is that in the absence of a coherent vision of Europe's future, the terrain threatens to be occupied by different ideas. Lack of vision creates a vacuum in which Member States fall back on themselves and in which they content themselves with the existent Community achievements. At best they will reject any further integration. In the worst case they will start to plead for the restoration of their former sovereignty".

Obligation to enlarge eastwards. "We have lived in a divided continent long enough. Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest are European cities like Berlin, Rome, Paris, Madrid and London (…) Enlargement is about the restoration of European unity. (…) Besides, there are quite a number of rational motives to bring about this greater Europe. If European unity is rejected, there is a serious risk of a further fragmentation of Central and Eastern Europe, of instability at our external borders, of increasing migration pressure, conflicts and war".

In what kind of Europe do we want to live? "The first question - although it may seem a bit banal - is the following: in what kind of Europe do we want to live? (…) It must not only be a democratic, pluralistic and solidary Europe; it must be a politically strong Europe that plays a prominent role worldwide, that has a say and is given a say, and that universally propagates its ideas and values. We want a Europe that is able to assume control and lead the way, both morally and economically, together with the other democratic superpowers in the world".

What Europe must do. "Let me concretise things for you. What we want is a Europe that takes action on its own initiative in the Balkans. A Europe that ends the ethnic fire in former Yugoslavia. Not a Europe that sits by until its American ally takes the initiative, just because we do not have the politically necessary power nor the military capacity to do it ourselves. We want a Europe that assumes its responsibility outside its own birders, for example in Africa, the continent that suffers terribly under poverty, illness and war. Only a strong, united Europe can develop a long-lasting partnership with Africa, a stability pact that can help the African people out of the economic morass and that can put them once and for all on the way towards development. For that is our responsibility and not the responsibility for the rest of the world (…) Finally, we want a Europe which - together with other superpowers - resolutely chooses for a balanced system of world trade without protectionism, without protecting its own markets, so that economic growth and prosperity will be possible in the underdeveloped regions too and so that the stream of migrants from the past decade can be ended.(…).

We need to develop fundamental lines of policy in at least four domains. Today these lines of policy hardly exist or do not exist at all. I think that these lines of policy are the following:

A truly common foreign policy. A policy speaking with one voice at all international fora, in the United Nations, in the Security Council;

An autonomous European defence policy. Helsinki was the first step in that direction, but we need to go much further than the rapid reaction force which was established there;

An integrated justice and migration policy. This surely is one of the domains where European citizens expect the Union to take action fast;

A joint socio-economic platform to complement the economic and monetary union we created a couple of years ago".

The method to follow. "The question then is, which is the best method to facilitate this European idea of the future and these new lines of policy? Do we prefer the intergovernmental method or the Community approach? And which is the best to achieve our aim?

I share with much of the criticism on the present Community approach: non-transparency, too much bureaucracy, and lack of democratic legitimacy. But it is not because we have ascertained that these weak points exist that the Community approach itself is to be rejected and that we must strike out on the intergovernmental course (…) It would be foolish to conclude from the existence of these imperfections that we must drop the whole Community approach for the intergovernmental. I fear that an explicit choice for the intergovernmental in a European Union with 28 Member States will inevitably take the form of a "Directoire", a virtual government by a restricted number of larger Member States. Even if this fear proves to be exaggerated, I am still convinced that an intergovernmental approach - whatever its nature may be - can never compensate for the lack of Community institutions" (The speaker referred to four examples of European powerlessness due to lack of common instruments: the Balkans, the euro, immigration, food safety, all fields where "only a Community approach can secure results", concluding on this point: "Does this imply that the intergovernmental approach should be avoided at all costs? Of course not. Intergovernmental cooperation can be an initial impetus, and sometimes an intermediate stage towards integration, but it can never be the actual objective".

Four urgent "measures". "Efficiency is closely linked to cohesion. Without cohesion there is no efficiency. Four radical measures are needed: a) A socio-economic basis for monetary union, a socio-econoic platform that is completed each year by means of directives or recommendations and which outline the policy to be pursued in these domains in the Union (…). The aim is also that it follows the example of the public finance policy we pursued in the past and which led to the creation of EMU, obviously less stringent, I concede (…); b) The inevitable separation of the Council's General Secretariat and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, seems to me to be the second measure. To my view, it would be better if the High Representative had a seat both on the Council and the Commission in order to avoid ambiguity in this respect. c) The third measure which is necessary refers specifically to the Union's defence policy; in 2003 we will have a rapid reaction force. We already have a Eurocorps, reinforced cooperation agreement 'avant-la-lettre' which unites five countries at present. Together, they may be the steppingstone to a truly European defence policy. For the Eurocorps is an instrument for converting the rapid reaction force - decided in Helsinki - into the nucleus of what is to be the future European defence system.(…) In the relatively short-term, we must go further than that and create an integrated European defence system with a collective military force, common equipment and materials ad even a common defence industry which can provide all this.. d) The last measure relates to it being possible to switch from a system of unanimity to qualified majority without the need to follow the rigid procedure of an intergovernmental conference and a ratification round.

Democratic legitimacy. Having turned to the integration of the Charter of Fundamental rights in the Treaty, "the re-writing and simplification" of the current treaties and the distribution of competencies between the Union, Member States, regions and federal entities, the Belgian Prime Minister continued: "Remains the question of democratic legitimacy (…)There is insufficient democratic legitimacy within the Union. The concept of a bicameral system proposed by minister Fischer is a step in the right direction. The first chamber would seat the directly elected members of parliament, on the basis of their respective populations, the second chamber would seat the representatives of the Member States with a fixed and equal representation of those Member States (…) Democratic legitimacy also implies the existence of an inter-institutional balance. Most European constitutions make it possible for government and parliament to dissolve each other. Within the Union, however, a unilateral system is applied, according to which Parliament can dissolve the Commission, but cannot be dissolved itself. This imbalance must be reviewed. Finally, democratic legitimacy implies the creation of a different Commission, a Commission which does not draw its power from its past, from the personality of one or more of its members, but from a renewed relationship with other institutions and more particularly from a democratically and directly elected chairman".