L’Europe superpuissance
In this publication, the Belgian political scientist Marc De Vos, founder of the Flemish think tank Itinera, analyses the way the European Union has been transformed by the succession of crises it has lived through.
Before developing his three main hypotheses, the author paints a highly optimistic picture of Europe for his readers: “a true colossus made up of 27 member states and 450 million souls, the European Union is the third-largest economic power and, collectively, has the third-largest defence budget on the planet, after the United States and China. 12 other countries, accounting for 146 million inhabitants, are in the process of trying to become members of the EU [the author does not clarify the 12 countries to which he is referring, but if Ukraine and Turkey were included, the total would be far higher: Ed]. More than 60 others enjoy privileged economic and political relations with the European Union, at regional or bilateral level. No other bloc of countries in the world can compare to the European Union in terms of size, depth and impact” (our translation throughout). He goes on, rightly, to temper this praise with one criticism of the way it works: “although the average European is in favour of Europe, he or she is more likely to be somewhat ambivalent towards the European Union, which is seen as the preserve of insiders and experts. With the exception of summits held in Brussels amid broad media attention, the EU is generally seen as an abstract reality, far away from the everyday lives of the citizens, used in national politics and the media as either a scapegoat or a tyrant, but most frequently and unknown or unloved quantity”.
“The EU is becoming a geo-strategic project” is De Vos’s first hypothesis. “Driven by Russian aggression and in the context of the new world order, the European Union is becoming not so much a European club based on values as a geopolitical coalition in the Western part of Eurasia. An Eastern ring of (potential) EU member states whose historico-cultural roots are mainly Slavic and/or orthodox (…) bears witness to an EU that is no longer principally a community of European nations. Furthermore, since Brexit, the Western external border of the European Union is less Atlantic and its centre of gravity has shifted East, to central and eastern Europe”, the author observes. He goes on to stress that “if we Europeans wish to impose our own sphere of geographical influence, the European Union must show creativity to transform its geostrategic ‘momentum’ into a true dynamic force. The alternative is essentially defensive or reactive to whatever the rest of the world reserves for us. The enlargement of the European Union must not be a passive process, simply absorbing enthusiastic and appropriate candidates, but a strategic process proactively encouraging reluctant countries to come into the European fold on the basis of a deliberate European strategic and geographical positioning”.
His second theory is that “the EU is becoming a superpower project”. “The current values, which have always been more of an objective than an actual reality in international relations, are no longer the driving force behind the international order. The supposed link between greater economic liberty and prosperity, greater political freedom and greater individualism is dead in the water. The decline of communism has not helped bring about universal liberalism, but has rather fed into a breeding ground for reactionaries loaded with untreated history, civilisational revanchism, religious traditions and identity politics. On top of this substrate, nationalism, populism and authoritarianism are gaining ground throughout the whole world, now overspilling into a new clash between the superpowers and a new war of civilisations in Ukraine. Even within the European Union, culture and values have become a source of conflict and division, both within and between the member states, particularly in the former Eastern Bloc countries, with their orthodox Slavic backgrounds”, argues De Vos.
“The geopolitical consensus gave way to rivalry and conflict, then free trade was replaced by decoupling, risk-minimisation, ‘near-shoring’ or anchorage – all variants of de-globalisation that are practised throughout the world (…). There is now no longer any strategic distinction between market and power, technology and armament, energy and security, money and violence”, the author continues, going on to stress that in this context, the European Commission has become “overtly geopolitical”, yet this change “still has no solid basis” and “mainly emphasises how the economy, trade, investment or technology – the natural turf of the European Union and its Commission – have de facto become geo-politicised”. This new situation “reflects a European aspiration and the European purpose, rather than the European Union whose member states have granted it geopolitical attributes and resources”, De Vos explains, adding: “I’m thinking, for instance, of competences in the field of foreign policy, cyber-security or defence. The European Union must practice geopolitics with the configuration of a free-trade club, which principally presupposes taking back trade and the market for other ends”.
“The war in Ukraine has taught us that we could mobilise militarily and exploit the ‘soft power’ of this large European market. We declared war on Russia economically and financially. We are not on the battlefield, but we are boycotting and compressing the Russian machinery of war and energy industry”, the author writes. He goes on to say that “European Union has orchestrated a battery of sanctions [it would be more accurate to say that the EU participated in this orchestration to an extent; there are in fact very few “autonomous” sanctions in the successive packages: Ed], which are impeding the Russian economy, affecting its financial, technological and industrial sectors, its military utility companies and the Putin regime elite. Trade, payments and cyber-technology are the weapons of modern-day total war. Financial and trade sanctions are the equivalent of the inter-continental precision weaponry which we, like Imperial America before us, are unapologetically deploying today extra-territorially against hostile countries, suspect international businesses and economic elites collaborating with the enemy”. But how efficient is all this?
“Without a powerful union, the European countries would be forced to look on helplessly as the world tips from a monopolar order favourable to Europe into either a new bipolar competitive Cold War between the United States and China or a chaotic and dangerous multi-polar disorder. Without a powerful union, the hostile world would act like a centrifugal force to deplete the cohesion between European countries in a race of the national interests”, the author asserts, adding that “our values and interests call for a strong Europe that is capable of partnering the United States and forming a bridge to the world”. Furthermore, “European military autonomy is necessary in a world in which Europe is once again a geostrategic fault line, in which Europe must rival China and in which the free West is once again in a situation of rivalry and conflict with another model of civilisation with global aspirations”. “On the basis of the fledgling European Defence Fund, the European Union must and could (…) progressively coordinate and rationalise a greater European defence capability, gradually transforming NATO into a European-American duopoly”, he writes, not without stressing that “if the European Union is to defend its international interests alongside the United States or through NATO, it must first of all be able to define the common European interests”. He concedes that “this is obviously much easier said than done. In reality, the European countries, particularly the large member states of the EU, do not trust each other enough collectively and trust themselves too much individually be able to achieve any kind of European synergy”.
“The new Union power calls for increased European strategic autonomy and operational capacity, as the European Union must be able to dominate or at least influence its geography: the Balkans, the Mediterranean region, including Turkey and North Africa, the states that have automatically become buffer states with Russia on the Baltic Sea and eastern Europe, irrespective of the ultimate status of Ukraine. In so doing, the European Union must be able to counter the interference of its strategic adversaries, principally Russia and China. It must be capable of maintaining unified borders. It must be in a position to enforce European territorial interests without recourse to NATO support – just consider Turkey’s position of vetoes within NATO. It must be able to offer support in security matters and protection to the neighbouring countries it hopes to include in its geostrategic orbit, whether or not these countries are official members of the European Union. Essentially, the EU must become for its neighbourhood what the United States was for Western Europe during the Cold War, either alone or in close cooperation with the United States”, De Vos goes on to argue.
His third theme is that “the EU is becoming a state project”. “The European Union is broadly lacking a mature and transparent federal architecture”, the author states, stressing that the “EU’s journey towards large-state federalism is principally the result of mission creep, successive waves of crisis policy dictated by great pressure, incremental Europeanisation without global agenda, decided upon by conclaves of heads of government and prepared by diplomats and bureaucrats”. Yet, De Vos goes on to argue, “the European Union is silently and unconsciously approaching its ‘American moment’: when a union that is still a confederation must move from de facto proto-federalism to formal federalism in order to preserve its original ideas and to replace its new mission”. He explains that “the transformation from a de facto proto-federal European Union into a federal European Union proper would be the way to respond to the major existential challenges of the new European Union, to overcome its internal contradictions and to adapt its functioning and financing to its mission”. Although “the likelihood that the member states of the EU United will jointly make this into an important constitutional and democratic moment seems vanishingly small”, the author acknowledges.
De Vos concludes by proposing five areas for action that could “help to consolidate the transformation of the European Union”: (1) making accession to the EU progressive and multi-level; (2) building European defence, in other words “laying the foundations for a European army”, at least with countries wishing to join such an initiative; (3) strengthening the single market (greater support for transnational projects, for instance); (4) increasing the European budget (i.e. national contributions and/or examining the possibility of the European tax and Euro-bonds); (5) institutionalising and democratising the new EU. (Olivier Jehin)
Marc De Vos. L’Europe superpuissance – La transformation de l’Union européenne (available in French only). Ertsberg. ISBN: 978-9-4647-5062-1. 154 pages. €17,50
L’Europe enfla si bien qu’elle creva
The “headlong rush” of enlargement, to 35 or 36, gives a “feeling of déjà vu” that is a permanent source of concern to former member of the European Parliament Sylvie Goulard (ALDE, France) (our translation throughout).
Having once exceeded the 500 million inhabitants mark, the European Union has been brought down to 448 million (2023) by Brexit. The accession of eight countries (five from the Western Balkans, plus Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) will bring it to 513 million. Furthermore, the highly theoretical accession of Turkey would take it beyond 600 million inhabitants. And the size of the population, like the demographic dynamic, is important in any conversation about geopolitics. However, it cannot be a political end in itself, particularly given the lack of institutions and instruments to ensure the cohesion of the bloc. Otherwise, the EU could end up like Jean de La Fontaine’s frog, who wanted to be “as big as the ox”.
“The fact that the EU has evolved over the decades is a good thing in many ways. But if today, the Commission is unwieldy and each government tries to control ‘its’ Commissioner, and the European Council, which often grinds to a halt due to vetoes, is struggling to make decisions, if the EU has no own resources [in the true sense of the term: Ed] or a capital markets union, it is because the momentum of integration has not been maintained. Anybody can now hide behind a large group to avoid taking responsibility. But what is worse than institutional loopholes is the consequences of these: the EU has lost some of its capacity for innovation and competitiveness. In the space of 20 years, a dreadful technological, economic and military decoupling with the United States has come about. The Europeans, who had a standard of living virtually equivalent to that of the Americans at the beginning of the century, have become considerably poorer. They have been left behind in global competition. Lacking strategic autonomy, the EU also lacks the means to defend itself alone in the event of an attack. So the overwhelming priority today is to bring ten more countries on board?”, Goulard writes.
Stressing that in legal terms, “European Council is literally irresponsible”, the author goes on to argue that “the EU has now identified executive power with legitimacy to act at European level. I fear that this failing will render any geopolitical pretensions, any idea of resolute action in the field of foreign policy and defence null and void. Who would entrust the command of the French army to a conference of regional presidents deciding unanimously? How is it imaginable that the enlarged EU, with its 35 or 36 member states, could aspire to resist Vladimir Putin under that kind of direction? In the terminology of physics, the European Council is a ‘black hole’ which concentrates such a mass (of power) in an invisible, opaque centre, which could end up collapsing on itself, taking the EU with it in its destruction”. Goulard adds that “as a woman, I would like a more in-depth reflection, to take place in public, about what is going on in Europe and that can be summed up as the transformation of the community created for peace into a player involved indirectly, but permanently, in armed conflict and aspiring to play a geopolitical role, without a responsible executive power before an assembly elected by the citizens, nor elected by them”.
“Short of globalisation under exceptional circumstances, I am concerned that we would not be able to cope simultaneously with the enlargement of the European Union, increased military efforts and the vital ecological transition whilst remaining true to our values, principally the primacy of law over power”, he goes on to write, referring to the necessary reforms that must take place before any further with enlargement: (1) identifying the borders, tangible achievements and symbols on which to base a feeling of belonging to the EU; (2) ensuring proper own resources and a European budget adequate to its needs; (3) extending qualify-majority voting at the Council; (4) reforming the European Council and reinforcing the sanction mechanisms in the event of rule of law breaches. (OJ)
Sylvie Goulard. L’Europe enfla si bien qu’elle creva – De 27 à 36 États ? (Available in French only) Tallandier. ISBN: 979-1-0210-6123-1. 135 pages. €15,90