The regulation banning the sale of all new private cars and light commercial vehicles that are not ‘zero emissions’ from 2035 onwards is an important event in the history of the European Union. Here’s why.
It cannot be emphasised strongly enough that all the major successes of European integration, its most robust achievements, were based on the same common elements: 1) a clear and specific objective that everybody can understand, 2) a deadline for this objective to be achieved, 3) a precise schedule for the stages towards meeting this objective, 4) a binding legal framework for the member states, 5) the involvement of all those most closely involved, and 6) a communication campaign targeting the broadest possible audience, ensuring that as many citizens as possible are informed about, and therefore take ownership of, the collective aim.
Even the Treaty of Rome contained several of these elements, such as the transition period of 15 years, broken down into three stages for the completion of the single market (article 8 EEC) and of the CAP (article 40 EEC). The second probing example was the direct election of the members of the European Parliament, based on the Act of 20 September 1976, adopted by the Council; this irrevocable decision had the effect of getting political parties involved which, over time, increased citizens’ awareness. The ‘recipe’ worked once more for the completion of the single market, following a mini-Treaty (the Single European Act) and the adoption by the European Council of a White Paper drafted by the Commission and containing 300 legislative proposals; the year 1992 took on greater symbolism as the target timeline for economic operators and a theme for the media. Finally, preparations for the single currency contained the six magic ingredients, not least the 27 articles of the Maastricht treaty on economic and monetary policy, setting out the phases of the project with extreme clarity.
There is so much that we can learn from these ‘success stories’. Non-institutional actors were brought on board because they knew for a fact that the final outcome of the process must necessarily happen; yet this necessity stemmed from the obvious fact that the member states were obliged to make it happen, as they were legally bound to do so.
At the turn of the century, this model could have been used as inspiration for a framework agenda on enlargement on a grand scale, entitled ‘Objective 2013: all together towards the peaceful reunification of the continent’. Had this been the case, it would have avoided a few misunderstandings and reduced prejudice. It was a missed opportunity.
Then came three counter-examples, which spoke volumes – pretentiously.
The first of these, in 1999, was the Bologna process, which was launched outside the community framework in what could even be described as a climate of hostility towards it. The objectives for 2010, on the basis of nothing more binding than a ministerial declaration, were not met. It was inter-governmentalism writ large, based on soft law and growing red tape, bringing on board as many as 49 countries, each one pulling in its own direction. The Bologna process, renamed the ‘European Higher Education Area’, ceased to be taken seriously.
Then, in 2000, the European Council launched the Lisbon Strategy, also with 2010 as its horizon. What was the object of this time? To become the ‘most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. It was already game over for the understanding of the man in the street. Not a word was said about the need for a legislative framework, but great emphasis was laid on the open method of coordination (OMC), a process that excludes the Parliament. It did not produce the hoped-for miracles. The setting of specific objectives for every area was one positive aspect of the project – but they were not met.
Finally, in 2010, the Commission resurrected the initiative with the ‘European strategy 2020 for the European Union to developers a smarter, knowledge-based, greener economy, growing fast and sustainably’. The wording was better than it had been in 2000, but it was too abstract. Once again, there were specific objectives, but the OMC had fallen from fashion; it was time to bring back the legislative trio. There was no general mobilisation in its favour and the final results were lacking: and that was the end of the Strategy 2020.
Is the ‘von der Leyen’ Commission doing any better, having reinstated the key ingredients of success? Yes, in several aspects, starting with the determined use of hard law (although this does not go as far as proposing a new treaty). The climate challenge is the one on which all the rest depend: the citizens have doubtless understood the general intention of the Green Pact, which not even current events (pandemic, war, energy crisis) can obscure.
What is the final objective? A carbon-neutral (zero emission) European Union by 2015. Its required framework was the subject of a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 30 June 2021. As it is directly applicable, a regulation is always better than a directive and far more so than a set of recommendations. The three principal institutions are all singing from the same hymn sheet. It is worth stressing that the founding regulation has always been nicknamed ‘European Climate Law’ (see EUROPE 12750/27). The word ‘law’ was proposed in the late lamented constitutional treaty (Title V), as it is easier for everyone to understand. Law is obligatory and solid: ‘Dura lex, sed lex’. This regulation explicitly ‘sets a legally binding target of net zero greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by 2050’ (article 1).
The intermediate steps are set out: there are targets of 2030 and 2040 (the latter to be described later). Achieving them will require legislative proposals of the Commission (which is already the case). Progress will be evaluated (the first time by no later than 30 March of this year and then every five years); these evaluations will focus on the performances of the member states, which may be handed recommendations by the Commission on a country-by-country basis; in the event of delays, each country will have to explain itself. Public participation, which is considered indispensable, is the subject of a specific mechanism (article 9) and the various economic sectors will have roadmaps (article 10). The degree of mobilisation is already fairly clear among them. There is nothing soft going on here: the ‘Climate Law’ is a corset, a battle plan. As for the media, they are proving keen to back up the communication activities of the institutions.
So where is the Achilles heel? The objective is too far away. As we saw above, the success stories were all based on processes of a duration of between four and 15 years, tops. Between the adoption of the law (2021) and the final objective (2050), nearly 30 years will have passed – more than whole generation. Many members of the general public feel that they will not live that long, or point out that unexpected events may occur between now and then. Young people and adults with children are unquestionably the most motivated in the fight against climate change; as well as this motivation, they will also need to have faith in the total feasibility of the ‘Climate Law’ over the longer term.
It is correct to point out that there is a closer deadline, 2030, which is also clarified in the law: ‘the binding Union 2030 climate target shall be a domestic reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030’ (article 4). The means to achieve this are set out in detail. The agreement on the ‘at least 55%’ bit was adopted after a battle royal between conservatives and progressives.
To sum up this objective, the Commission has adopted the expression ‘Fit for 55’, launching a legislative package to this end in July 2021. It cannot be denied that sectoral operators are following and, where possible, influencing these legislative processes, but I would challenge anyone to find an ordinary citizen, even a highly educated one, outside the Euro-bubble who could tell you what ‘Fit for 55’ means, in any language.
We have therefore ended up in the following situation: firstly, an comprehensible but far-distant final objective; secondly, a temporally closer objective that means nothing to mere mortals. Happily, in a kind of unexpected miracle, the European legislator has created, albeit not without difficulties, a subject that may help to bridge the gap: the green car. (To be continued)
Renaud Denuit